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ABSTRACT  
A culture of accommodation and tolerance is a necessary part of 
establishing and preserving a functional multi-national and multi-ethnic European 
Union.  Civil society organizations and their associated social capital have been 
shown to foster civic capacity and achievement of public policy goals.  However, 
social capital that is based on group identity can also contribute to a sense of 
intolerance towards out-groups, undermining the stated tolerance objectives of 
the social pillar of the European Union.  States with a strong presence alongside 
civil society are expected to be curb the development of the exclusionary bonding 
form of social capital in favor of bridging social capital which will improve progress 
toward policy goals.  
This study tests the link between government capacity, social capital and 
tolerance using data from the 1990-2009 waves of the World Values Survey and 
European Values Study.  Using path analysis and multi-level models of the 
relationships between political capacity, social capital and intolerance, the model 
establishes that government capacity enhances bridging social capital and which 
increases social tolerance.  The study fills a gap in understanding how government 
capacity and policy can result in improved social capital even with greater diversity. 
A proposed relationship between political capacity and bonding forms of social 
capital was not supported. 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION
In 1997, Article 13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam gave the European 
Community the right to “take legislative action to combat discrimination based on 
sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.”  
This declaration of the right to action placed an additional responsibility on 
European member states to proactively meet the human rights objectives to which 
they had agreed in both the Maastricht treaty in 1992, and as members of the 
Council of Europe and signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights.  
The Treaty of Amsterdam, however, obliges the Union to penalize member states 
found to be in violation of the requirements to protect fundamental human rights 
(Ram 2003; FRA 2007b).  
On February 15, 2007 the Justice and Home Affairs Council of the 
European Union made permanent an agency to monitor and provide technical 
assistance in meeting the social harmonization goals of Pillar III (The E.U.M.C., the 
Predecessor of the F.R.A. 2007). Social rights items, as outlined in the Amsterdam 
Treaty, are the protection of human rights, the promotion of democratic values, 
and to combat ethnic, racial, gender, and religious discrimination.  Promotion of 
these rights and values is part of the Aquis Communitaire and the obligation of 
member states (Wood and Yeşilada 2002; Van Oudenaren 2005).  As Europe 
adds new members with vastly divergent recent cultural, political, and ethnic 
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composition as well as different levels of development and civil society traditions, 
the problems of harmonizing outcomes in an issue that touches on mass-belief 
systems and economic experience are exacerbated.  The many states of the 
European Union are tasked with achieving the social tolerance goals of the Union, 
but are accorded deference in how to achieve those goals because of the unique 
structure of the Union.  The emphasis on national sovereignty over issues of 
“home affairs” like immigration and social tolerance, means that the Union’s 
mechanisms for promoting inclusion are limited to policy diffusion and monitoring
—  there is little scope for punishment, and even monitoring functions like review 
of national laws by the Fundamental Rights Agency have been challenged 
(Kjaerum 2009).  The challenge is to find the conditions that have led to success in 
extending social tolerance to traditional out-groups.  One of the main areas 
associated with successful public policy in general, and in this area specifically, 
has been strong a strong reserve of social capital.
 The central hypothesis is that higher government capacity leads to 
reduced intolerance by fostering the development of a particular form of social 
capital, bridging social capital, and through the direct mechanism of repressing 
expressions of intolerance.  Social capital can be thought of as networks of 
relationships that individuals are able to access to meet their needs.  It can be 
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conceptualized as having two main forms, bridging and bonding social capital 
networks.
Bridging social capital is associated with reduced intolerance expressed 
towards groups of outsiders. This works through several mechanisms.  Civil 
society institutions can generate social capital that can foster either in-group 
bonding or between group bridging relationships, depending on their structure 
and purpose.  The first mechanism is improved civic capacity as bridging capital is 
associated with more effective communities with a more effective political and civil 
society policy nexus (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1993; Putnam 1994).  The 
development of bridging capital leads to an indirect path of improving tolerance by 
expanding the community’s ability to solve problems thereby reducing competition 
for resources, and a direct path of government ability to suppress intolerant acts 
or organizations.  A second mechanism that is also a direct path is also at work, 
this is the contact path.  As actors from “outgroups” interact in civil society, 
refereed contact with minorities reduces the xenophobic nature of the majority 
community.  
In contrast, bonding social capital is conceived as very tight networks that 
do not extend outside of an individual’s social identity group.  Bonding social 
capital is marked by an in-group or family focus of the network, and organizations 
that are provide resources to group members.  Weak government participation in 
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society limits the ability of individuals to access services outside of their “self-help” 
organizations, reinforcing the centrality of the identity group and stunting the 
development of broader networks of contacts.
The political capacity of governments, should constrain the type of social 
capital civil society groups (such as religious groups) generate.  The combination 
of strong political capacity and a government interest in promotion of tolerance is 
expected to be associated with more bridging capital.  The government will be 
able to constrain expressions of intolerance, and facilitate implementation of 
policy.  Also, stronger governments reduce the competition for resources, or 
narrow-self help nature of some tightly bonded identity or family based bonding 
capital structures.  Higher government capacity, should lead to more bridging 
forms of social capital, and therefore, more civic capacity and less intolerance.  
Societies with strong governments and strong social capital are expected to  
generate more successful tolerance outcomes than those with other combinations 
of government capacity and social capital.
The research questions are several-fold: Is bridging-social capital 
associated with better (lower) intolerance rates?  Does relative political capacity 
lead to improved social tolerance?  Does relative political capacity provide 
conditions for intensified bridging forms of capital? and finally, what conditions 
mediate any relationship between government capacity and intolerance.
Noordijk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1.3 Hypotheses Related To Research Question
Hypothesis 1: Increased relative political capacity will be associated with 
lower levels of Intolerance in the European Union and accession states.
Hypothesis 2: Relative political capacity will reduce Intolerance by 
encouraging bridging forms of social capital and constraining bonding forms.
Hypothesis 2.1: Bridging social capital (Trust-based) is associated with 
reduced Intolerance. 
Hypothesis 2.2:  Increased relative political capacity will intensify bridging 
forms of social capital.
Hypothesis 2.3: Increased relative political capacity should constrain 
bonding forms of social capital, and constrain the relationship with Intolerance.
Hypothesis 3: More local allocation of state resources will foster stronger 
community engagement.  Controlling for other factors, local expenditure should be 
associated with both increased social capital, and reduced intolerance.
Hypothesis 4: Government intention (measured by right-wing participation) 
interacted with relative political capacity should have a stronger effect on 
intolerance than relative political capacity measured alone. 
In addition to analyzing the relationships between extractive capacity and 
intolerance through the mechanism of social capital, local government policies in 
two Dutch cities, Rotterdam and Utrecht, are discussed in light of their intentional 
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promotion of social capital as an instrument for achieving better social integration 
and tolerance.
1.4 Plan Of Dissertation
Chapter two, following this introduction, provides a review of the literature 
that informs this analysis and highlights the data challenges and underpins 
sources of the research questions.  In the literature review, social tolerance as a 
policy goal of the European Union is established.  The limits placed on available 
public policy tools in the European model of governance are also reviewed in 
chapter two.  There is also a discussion and overview of the challenge in defining 
and measuring intolerance in a multi-year and multi-national comparison.  The 
different forms of social capital and their relationships to intolerance and civic 
capacity are reviewed, as well as the interaction between government capacity 
and the forms of social capital.  Finally, a  comparative measure of government 
capacity, or penetration in society that can be used to test the relationships 
proposed is discussed.
 Chapter three (methodology) introduces the models that will be used to 
test the hypotheses.  In chapter three, the different variables and their 
characteristics are also developed.  A discussion of the challenge faced by 
missing data, and the technique used to address this issue is presented.  
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Chapter four presents the analysis of three types of models used to 
investigate the relationships between political capacity, social capital, and 
intolerance.  A path model is constructed to investigate the direct and indirect 
relationships between political capacity and intolerance, specifically focusing on 
bridging social capital as a mediator between political capacity and intolerance.  
Several multi-level regressions are then used to explore the relationships more in-
depth and analyze interactions between the effects of social capital and political 
capacity on intolerance.  Other covariates are also introduced to control, or as 
elements of interest.  Participation in government of right-wing parties and the 
ratio of local to total spending are included as estimates of government intention, 
and potential policy effectiveness respectively.
Chapter six presents a more in-depth look at the national and local policy 
contexts for two Dutch cities that intentionally incorporate social capital as part of 
their strategy to address social intolerance.  The national policy context of the 
Netherlands is informative because it is one of the early migration destination 
countries, and one of the first to begin analyzing social phenomenon to construct 
national policy to address intolerance towards minorities.  In the Netherlands, the 
implementation of social policy occurs primarily at the municipal level, and the 
examination of municipal policy in two major Dutch cities illustrates that cities 
consciously use social capital enhancing programs to meet social tolerance goals.  
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The cities also participate in policy diffusion networks that help identify and spread 
best practices.  The emergence of several of these programs has paralleled this 
research project.
This analysis contributes specifically to the present problems facing the 
European Union as it adapts to its newly dynamic and multi-cultural nature.  The 
analysis contributes to synthesizing the fields of Political Science and Public 
Administration by integrating comparative politics concepts of relative political 
capacity and the ability of the state to promote specific social objectives.  
Understanding the relationship between state political capacity and intolerance in 
a cross-nationally comparable way provides an important tool in understanding 
conditions for successful policy implementation.
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CHAPTER 2: STATE OF THE PROBLEM AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
2.1: Status Of Fundamental Rights In The European Union And The Open 
Method Of Coordination
The European Union must be considered a multi-cultural polity, if it is to be 
considered a polity at all.  The Aquis Communitaire,  now represented by the 
Lisbon treaty, contains human rights guarantees referenced by the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1992, which incorporated both the Council of the European Union’s 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and the Council of 
Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2009; 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
as Amended by Protocol No. 11 2009).  The Charter requires that all states 
adopt a much more coordinated effort at decreasing intolerance and increasing 
forms of social inclusion.  Despite having only created the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union in 2000, and only giving it legally binding effect in 
2009, the European Union member states have been obligated to perform their 
responsibilities under the Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights.  As all 
the members of the European Union share prior treaty obligations to protect 
human rights,  the opinion of the European Court of Justice, proscribed the 
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Commission from promulgating laws that could impinge on Human Rights under 
the Rome Convention (Commission 2009).  In response to the European Court 
Justice Rulings, in 1977 the Commission, the Parliament, and the Council of 
Ministers issued a joint declaration vowing to protect human rights.  Subsequently, 
through a series of declarations, treaties and institutions, The European Union has 
paid special attention to the problem intolerance throughout  the series of recent 
expansions since the early 1990s.
The pursuit of social tolerance and the responsibility to combat racism and 
xenophobia, as well as discriminatory violence, are policy areas that bridge both 
the former Pillar I and Pillar III areas as defined by the Maastricht Treaty.  As the 
competency of much of the issue falls in the Pillars of the European Union that are 
defined by inter-governmentalism not pooled sovereignty, therefore an institutional 
response to the issues that is uniform across the European Union is impossible.  
Even after the ratification of the Lisbon treaty, the issues of social intolerance still 
fall primarily in the competency domain of national governments (Fight against 
Racism and Xenophobia 2010).  
European institutions like the European Union and the Council of Europe 
and the European Court of Human Rights have all started down a path of 
standardizing expectations of how minorities are to be treated.  However, Koenig 
and others note that there has been an element of a European identity backlash of 
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the sort anticipated by Ignatieff (1993) in his book about identity, “Blood and 
Belonging”.  Koenig (2007) finds that as the European Institutions have been 
pushing standards of treatment, the relationship between religious institutions and 
the state have evolved into something with salience to establishing national 
identity.  That is, he observes that “traditional” religions of certain states have 
become an important national marker in an increasingly harmonized Europe, with 
the effect of marginalizing minority religious groups.
The single best manifestation of the public policy regime being offered to 
address the issue was the creation, in coordination with the Council of Europe,  of 
a plurilateral institution to monitor, research and coordinate national policy 
responses to intolerance, the European Union Monitoring Center to Combat 
Racism and Xenophobia.  This organization and its methods were early model of 
what was to become known as the Open Method of Coordination, where the state 
of a public policy problem is assessed for each member, then benchmarks are set, 
and a network for policy exchange is created. A means for “shaming and naming” 
countries that are not meeting benchmarks or implementing changes is the 
principle method of coercion (Nedergaard 2007; Velluti 2007; de Ruiter 2008).  
The OMC is a coordination-style of governance, with partners from the different 
governments, the Union, and non-governmental groups networked together in a 
form of institutionalized policy-diffusion.
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The Open Method of Coordination is a system of coordinated inter-
governmentalism, it is marked by the following characteristics.  Quoted from 
Radulova (2007), page 369 ;
“In its fully-fledged form, the method involves the following processes : 
• fixing guidelines for the Union combined with specific timetables for 
achieving the goals which they set in the short, medium and long terms; 
• establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative indicators 
and benchmarks against the best in the world and tailored to the needs of 
different member states and sectors as a means of comparing best 
practice; 
• translating these European guidelines into national and regional policies 
by setting specific targets and adopting measures, taking into account 
national and regional differences; 
• periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organized as mutual 
learning processes.“
The European Union Monitoring Center (EUMC) predated the establishment 
of the OMC but bears many of its hallmarks. The EUMC was a center jointly 
supported by the European Union and the Council of Europe, which recruited 
national partners, both official and non-governmental, to assess the current state 
of intolerance and to offer and implement policy solutions.  It was conceived as 
collaborative, a center to collect information on the states of intolerance in each of 
the member states, it collected information on the “best practices” in data 
tracking, and in policy, and provided a forum for the diffusion of policy back to 
national partners (The Eumc, the Predecessor of the Fra 2007).  As in other Open 
Method of Coordination structures, the EUMC worked extensively with national 
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partners (National Focal Points) and non-governmental agencies in a network 
structures.  Like other OMC structures, the EUMC, and its successor, the FRA, 
have no power to implement or enforce policy
As the EUMC began to conduct studies on the type and nature of social 
intolerance in EU member states, it was apparent that the development of 
benchmarks was impossible.  There were many different legal traditions, different 
record keeping, and no uniform data from country to country, or even within 
countries.  Also, as noted in the annual reports from the Fundamental Rights 
Agency and contributors such as Dijkstra, Geuijen and De Ruijter (2001), there is a 
big distance between paper rights and the actual experiences of discrimination on 
the ground in EU member states (European Union Agency for Fundemental Rights 
Annual Report 2008).  Also, the requirements for citizenship to member states 
determine the rights of immigrants, some countries are jus sanguine (blood-
based), and others jus solis (birthplace) based citizenship states.  The European 
Union’s extension of citizenship to minority immigrant populations, is therefore, 
contingent on the state in which immigrants reside.
The trends observed by the Fundamental Rights Agency of the EU are not 
terribly encouraging in light of the different polices, or lack of policies of member 
states.  The FRA report from 2007 shows that ethnic or religious minorities are 
substantially less likely to be employed or employed at their level of qualifications 
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compared to their peers (FRA 2007a).  They also note that many EU countries, 
including  Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, France, Italy, Austria, Portugal, Romania 
and Finland did not have legislation, or institutions to monitor and prosecute 
discrimination against individuals until the implementation of the Racial Equality 
Directive of the Amsterdam Treaty  (Trends and Developments 1997-2005- 
Combating Ethnic and Racial Discrimination and Promoting Equality in the 
European Union 2007). 
The European Union has taken the issues of social tolerance seriously 
since the 1977 joint statement.  However, as the issues surrounding intolerance 
are centered in areas outside the scope of the community method, and outside 
the competency of the Union, the responses to the problems of racism and other 
forms of social intolerance, had been left largely to the member states.  It is not 
until more recently, the late 1990s and onward, has there been a coordinated and 
institutionalized response to the phenomenon of social intolerance.
2.2:  Intolerance In Europe
Intolerance in Europe has been a subject of broad study, but unfortunately, 
little systematic measurement.  Studies have largely found the expected directions 
of correlation of intolerance by education level, age and conservatism; less of the 
first, and more of the last two are correlated with intolerance with some qualitative 
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differences in national contexts.  However, the record on religiosity and intolerance 
is mixed and more strongly related to qualitative characteristics of religion and 
national context.  Also, the rate of in-migration is not clearly associated with 
intolerance as might be assumed.  Migrants seem to move to the wealthier 
countries with greater job opportunities.  Those countries also seem to have more 
tolerant populations than poorer ones.
 Studies on correlates to racism in different European countries find a variety 
of observations.  In general, education is inversely correlated with ethnic or 
religious intolerance.  However the education effects vary in a number of different 
studies, as data from surveys and qualitative research indicate that educational 
practices in some Central and Eastern European (CEE) states actually reinforce 
racial and religious bigotry against Roma and religious out-groups or historical 
national rivals (Hello, Scheepers and Gijsberts 2002; Mudde 2005).  A number of 
theories on the genesis of anti-immigrant and anti-minority attitudes and behaviors 
postulate a material basis for intolerance (Coenders, Lubbers and Scheepers 
2005d).
Additionally to competition for scarce resources, loss of status for groups 
sharing demographic features with immigrants, or who believe they have lost 
status because of social shifts also drives the perception of threat from unfamiliar 
“others” (Norris 2005).  Observations that opposition to immigrants is apparent in 
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both groups perceiving direct competition for jobs, such as the less educated, 
lower skilled workers, and self-employed people seems to lend support to both 
notions of threat (Coenders, Lubbers and Scheepers 2005a; Coenders, Lubbers 
and Scheepers 2005b).  
However, several studies show that even controlling for income, education, 
and employment status, other factors, such as age, political self-placement, forms 
of religious adherence, authoritarian personalities and the presence of racist 
political parties or actors in society all correlate with intolerance towards minorities 
(Altemeyer 1996; Coenders, Lubbers and Scheepers 2004).  At least in the 
European cases, contact between groups, as in urban settings or in integrated 
cities, an element of social capital, seems to reduce the intolerance impulse 
(Coenders, Lubbers and Scheepers 2005c). It is clear that there are motivations 
beyond simply economic threat for intolerance.
Another study of immigration into European Union states analyzed 
migration with respect to several hypothesis; (a) migration is largely from co-
language states or former colonies of European powers, (b) migration is generally 
driven by economic factor, particularly labor market demand, (c) finally that 
migration is driven by the generosity of social welfare benefits.  The authors find 
that there is support for the labor market factor and the prior colonial experience 
thesis but not for the benefit generosity hypothesis popular with right-wing 
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politicians (Hooghe, Reeskens, Trappers and Meuleman 2008).  In a slight 
contradiction to Hooghe’s findings, and a caution for using support for restrictive 
immigration as proxy for racism, Coenders et al, found that while overall racist 
attitudes were lower in Western Europe than in the southern or CEE states, 
attitudes towards repatriation policies were somewhat stronger (Coenders, 
Lubbers and Scheepers 2008a).  This may be a reflection of the increased 
salience of repatriation policies in states with recent immigrants flow, whereas 
Southern and Eastern Europe have been primarily transit states, so they have 
fewer people to consider threats worthy of repatriating .  
Another study that offers an interesting twist on the observations of the 
impact of immigrant or minority populations on attitudes towards out-groups.  
Semyonov and co-authors (Semyonov, Raijman and Gorodzeisky 2008) find 
expected relationships between political position, social vulnerability, and 
destination country GDP.  They find a positive correlation between recent 
immigration flows and negative perceptions of foreigners. Most interestingly, they 
find a very strong relationship between perceived immigration flows and negative 
attitudes towards immigrants.  That is, regardless of reality, those who think flows 
are large, think foreigners are a cultural or economic threat, regardless of actual 
flow sizes . This means there is a real problem for using actual census or 
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immigrant flow data combined with opinion surveys as there may not be a good 
relationship between actual and perceived conditions.
While relatively few of the recent accession states are included in this 
analysis, a number of studies have shown that the new batch of states have 
higher rates of intolerance than the established European Union members.  This 
lack of progress towards minority rights in the accession countries is attributed to 
several factors relating to the idea of subsidiarity and the practice of the Open 
Method of Coordination (Rechel 2008).  Rechel (2008, 179-181) claims that the 
lack of clear guidelines or laws on the implementation of minority rights in EU 
countries, combined with the lack of enforcement of recommendations in old EU 
countries, and the absence of pressure related to the rights of minorities as a 
condition to accession all combined to undermine EU influence on minority rights.  
The Acquis and a Council directive required the passage of national level 
legislation, but there has been little evaluation of the effectiveness or resources put 
into countering intolerance in accession states.
A study about national contexts and how issues are framed have examined 
what contributes towards hostile feelings towards immigrants.  The analysis tested 
the effects of unemployment conditions in the host country during the survey 
period and during the respondent’s coming of age.  They also tested survey 
responses during periods of political framing of immigration issues that 
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emphasized outgroups’ failures to assimilate, and tested the effect of assimilation 
versus multicultural framing in laboratory groups (Coenders, Lubbers, Scheepers 
and Verkuyten 2008b).  In both surveys and laboratory experiments, they found a 
strong correlation for intolerance when assimilation framing was both in the public 
domain and included in questionnaires.  The implications of this study are stark 
and resonate with Tarrow’s observations on framing as well as psychology 
observations on the availability bias.  Political actors are able to use scape-goating 
or out-group framing to create a more intolerant social environment simply by 
activating that reference frame (Tarrow 1998). 
Despite data indicating strong anti-Roma, religious, and sexual orientation 
intolerance in Eastern accession countries, Mudde (2005) notes that the new 
accession states are not “hotbeds of racist extremism’.  Mudde notes that in 2004 
only one of the Eastern accession states had an extremist party with a strong 
presence, compared to five of the older EU members.  While Poland, Slovakia and 
Romania all have strong racist civil society organizations including nationalist 
groups and conservative Roman Catholic and Orthodox churches, only in 
Romania do they have a direct presence in parliament.  He also notes that despite 
poor data keeping, several CEE states have sustained high rates of racist violence. 
Despite the clearly racist elements in civil society the attitude, and violence rates 
and success of rightest parties do note correlate very neatly in the CEE states.  
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Mudde (2005, 171-182) seems to attribute this to both political structure barriers 
and perhaps to the relative absence of out-groups other than Roma.  While 
Mudde explains that racism is not as bad as is feared in the CEE states, Ram 
(2003) finds that the accession process played a very important role in bringing the 
Czechs and Romanians to implement policy meant to harmonize their laws, 
institutions and societies with that of the core EU states in the area of minority 
rights.  She finds that the progress in those two countries occurred despite active 
opposition of some domestic political actors and the negative example of some 
Western European EU member states.  EU official pressure combined with 
interactions between domestic and foreign NGOs and EU support of human rights 
NGO all combined to place minority rights on the public agenda conditioning the 
political structures in a way that should provide opportunities for increased 
tolerance while stemming the ability of racist actors to gain wide audiences.  
Intolerant public attitudes,state capacity, political opportunity for intolerant 
organizations and resonant frames seem to come together more in the CEE states 
than in the Western and Northern European EU member states. 
National identity and European identity reflected in surveys, and in 
naturalization laws also influence intolerance. Racist attitudes and violence are not 
restricted to the CEE states. In a well-balanced study of racism in Belgium, racist 
attitudes towards out-groups are documented in both of the main ethnic 
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communities of Belgium (Mielants 2006).  He finds that the inability of politicians to 
deal with immigrants stems from their unwillingness to realize that immigrants 
were no longer simply foreign workers destined to return home.  Political action 
against the racist right-wing Dutch-speaking Vlaams Blok/Belang and the 
Francophone  groups are mediated by Belgium’s internal identity struggle.  
Perpetrators of racist violence are slow to be punished and racist attitudes are 
generally tolerated outside of official circles, also reflecting a lack of concern with 
dealing directly with racism problems facing Belgium—the seat of the EU (Mielants 
2006, 321-324).  Like the studies by Coenders, Lubbers, and Scheepersl, the 
anti-immigrant feelings sensitive to assimilation versus multiculturalism framing 
were particularly directed at immigrants and citizens from North African or Turkish 
ethnic origins instead of former colonial possessions (Coenders, et al. 2008a).  
A range of studies have shown an attachment to a European identity with 
citizenship based on legal, not ethnic lineage, identifiers, that is particularly strong 
among the more well-educated and those who identify more with the European 
Union.  Another study finds that identification with European Union citizenship has 
a positive effect on tolerance attitudes towards immigrants among Belgian youth 
(Quintelier and Dejaeghere 2008).  Interestingly, they find that intolerance levels are 
higher among Dutch speakers, then among French speaking youth.  While the 
current case among Belgian adults indicates that the Dutch speaking youth will 
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have higher levels of educational attainment and economic security.  However, 
there have been very prominent Flemish political actors who have repeatedly used 
political scape-goating against immigrants and French-speakers in order to create 
a Flemish separatist movement, so negative images of “othered” groups may be 
more frequent in the homes of Flemish youth.  The series of studies commissioned 
by the European Union Monitoring Center for Racism and Xenophobia, have 
traced a correlation between expectations of legal behavior as a qualification for 
citizenship with higher levels of education (Coenders, Lubbers and Scheepers 
2005e).  While Coenders et al associate this requirement to be an indicator of 
intolerance among more well-educated Europeans, my own past research found 
that there is an inverse relationship with other forms of multi-cultural resistance 
and the “legal citizenship” requirement among those who are well-educated.  That 
finding is consistent with a jus solis and a naturalization conception of nationality 
and citizenship over one based on ethnicity or blood lines.  Unfortunately, as noted 
in the annual reports from the Fundamental Rights Agency and studies such as 
Dijkstra et al, there is a big distance between paper rights and the actual 
experiences of discrimination on the ground in EU member states (Dijkstra, et al. 
2001).  Also, the requirements for citizenship to member states determine the 
rights of immigrants, some countries are jus sanguine, and others jus solis based 
citizenship states.  The European Union’s extension of citizenship to minority 
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immigrant populations, is therefore, contingent on the state in which immigrants 
reside.  
European institutions like the European Union and the Council of Europe 
and the European Court of Human Rights have all started down a path of 
standardizing expectations of how minorities are to be treated.  However, Koenig  
and others note that there has been an element of a European identity backlash of 
the sort anticipated in Ignatieff’s work’s on ethnic nationalism in the face of 
economic and identity displacement caused by globalization (Ignatieff 1993).  
Koenig (2007, 921-923) finds that as the European institutions have been pushing 
Union-wide standards of treatment, the relationship between religious intuitions 
and the state have evolved into something with salience to establishing national 
identity.  He observes that the traditional religions of certain states have become 
an important identity marker in an increasingly harmonized Europe, with the effect 
of highlighting historical majority religions and pushing minority groups to mobilize 
behind a religious identity.  Furthermore, the European Institutions have reached 
directly to religious organizations as part of civil society in order to reach around 
the states, while several of the European states have historically used the power of 
governments precisely to supplant religious groups as providers of legitimate 
services (Rex 2000).
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Different immigration policies, traditions and political structures in EU 
member states have led to a variety of outcomes. Rex explores the forms of 
response that European states have adopted in dealing with immigration. 
Transnational immigrant populations are problematic for European governments 
formed around class compromise.  New policies to deal with multi-ethnic inflows 
take few main forms. 1st, the exclusion of minorities and repatriation back to 
source countries.  2nd is to extend legal citizenship to native-born or naturalized 
minority group members but insist on social and cultural integration.  3rd is the 
guest-worker strategy or treating immigrants and their families as temporary. 4th is 
permitting group-based identity and multiculturalism.  Rex (2000, 62-70) argues 
that allowing multiculturalism provides structures for services and community-
government integration.  However right-wing politicians combat multiculturalism 
with deterministic arguments that place minorities as a threat to the state because 
they have static and incompatible values with the majority population. Entzinger 
(2000) sees the kernels of conflict in the treatment of minorities as groups, he 
observes that when states emphasize group rights, they also make it easier to 
target groups.  Without strong state  enforcement of individual rights, and the 
allocation of services through group organizations, using minority organizations to 
help execute policy may be problematic in the long-run as the attachment to the 
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state as the legitimate venue for pressing claims is weakened as services are 
provided by organizations . 
Koopmans(1999) and Norris(2005) each focus on the interaction of public 
demand for policy to deal with minorities with the political opportunity structures 
that are determined by the state as an explanation for the rise of right-wing 
parties.  Koopmans and Stratham(2000) note in their study of continental and 
British responses to minority problems, The structure of the state and franchise 
extended to immigrants (citizen, group rights, or geographic concentration) 
informs the types of claims-making options available .  The state is still the frame 
of reference and the target for claims-making by migrants and minorities, not 
transnational organizations.  The European Union acts merely a coordinating 
committee not the focus of rights claims or for minority groups. German exclusion 
of citizenship leads to source country nationality-based claims-making and the 
prevalence of home-country based ethnic mutual support organizations, while 
British groups are identified by religion or social group or region, not source 
nationality as they are identified as British individuals.  
The very different strategies states have for dealing with naturalizations, 
immigration flows is a product of structural conditions for claims-making and 
influences the political participation among immigrant communities (Ireland 2000).  
All of the European-Union states demonstrate varying degrees of poor outcomes 
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for minorities indicative of stubbornly remaining racism in society.  Fennema (2000) 
examined a number of the policies in several states and found varied usage of 
legal instruments to combat racism.  He found that France, Belgium and England 
had all rarely used their anti-racist legislation to prosecute discrimination against 
individuals, or discrimination by political parties.  Germany used its legal 
instruments to suppress leftist movements until after a series of deadly attacks on 
minorities in the early 1990s. The Dutch, despite having anti-discrimination laws 
on the books since 1972, primarily used the law to protect against political 
discrimination and left social issues like racial discrimination to be responded to 
through the use of a pillar model.  They created semi-private social organizations 
and tried organize the ethnic community groups to essentially help themselves 
access the political system and integrate into Dutch society.  The process has, 
unintentionally, led to community enclaves that replicate source country divisions, 
and separation from Dutch society at large (Ireland 2000)(Thranhardt 2000).  
Unlike many other states the Dutch governments, frequently assessed the 
success of the integration efforts through ongoing public policy analysis.
The Fundamental Rights Agency of the EU, reports on the recording, 
reporting and responding to problems of social integration in a systemic manner, 
are not terribly encouraging in light of the different polices, or lack of policies of 
member states.  The FRA report from 2007 shows that ethnic or religious 
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minorities are substantially less likely to be employed or employed at their level of 
qualifications compared to their peers (FRA 2007a).  They also note that many of 
the EU countries, including Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, France, Italy, Austria, 
Portugal, Romania and Finland, did not have any legislation, or institutions to 
monitor and prosecute discrimination against individuals pending the 
implementation of the Racial Equality Directive of the Amsterdam Treaty  (FRA 
2007b).  
2.3 The Measurement Problem For Intolerance
It would be optimal if there were a dataset that accurately recorded acts of 
social intolerance.  Consistently recorded and consistently published records 
would provide a means of external validation for the variables used to estimate 
attitudes of intolerance in this analysis.  Unfortunately, such a dataset does not 
exist.  The structure for addressing the problems of social intolerance and social 
exclusion in the European Union is the Open Method of Coordination, a method 
that requires the establishment of and comparison of policy progress towards a 
set of benchmarks.  However, the most basic elements of comparison seem to be 
missing in all instruments except the occasional special Eurobarometer survey, the 
recent European Social Survey, and neither of those other surveys has maintained 
the same questions over several years yet.
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There have been some efforts to assess the state of European Union 
assessments of their problems with crimes of discrimination, and member state 
performance has been consistently poor. Not only do the EU states generally not 
keep standard or consistent records of reported hate crimes that are comparable 
between one another, by and large they fail to keep records that are comparable 
from year to year at home (Trends and Developments 1997-2005- Combating 
Ethnic and Racial Discrimination and Promoting Equality in the European Union 
2007).  Further complicating this measurement problem is the fact that as 
awareness of the problem grows among law enforcement and in the community at 
large; the frequency of reporting goes up as a proportion of population.  This 
phenomenon creates a correlation between pro-active policy and the rate of 
reported hate crimes when reported crimes increase as a direct result of policy 
responses taking hold! Even in the United States, Congress directed the FBI to 
track Hate Crimes in 1990, and by 1995 the FBI only issued uniform reporting 
standards for hate crimes reported by only 18% of law enforcement entities 
(Uniform Crime Reports 2010).
Table 1.2 is derived from data collected by the Fundamental Rights Agency 
and extracted from the World Values Surveys.  The table provides an overview of 
the changes in reported racist crime over time within countries compared to the 
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changes in attitude over same period for the few countries that have World Values 
Survey data over the same range.
For a perfect instrumental variable of racism one would expect some level 
of monotonic change between those measures.  Racist crime should go up when 
racist attitudes go up and vice-versa.  However, of the five countries for which 
there are overlapping data, four have reversed relationships. Clearly there are 
factors contributing mightily to measurement error.  We know that the wording and 
methodology of the World Values Survey instruments are consistent over the 
periods and between countries, although social conditions are not static (such as 
large riots in France the month prior to 2007 survey). We also know from the FRA 
reports and from national reports that there are problems with police recording of 
data within each country as well.  Table 2.1 demonstrates why using reported 
crime is not going to be a successful measure of comparable progress towards 
social tolerance goals. Further detail of the complications of using various data 
sources other than the World Values Surveys are explained below.
Table 2.1: Reported Racist Crime Selected Countries and Years
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average 
Annual % 
Growth of 
Intolerance 
(WVS)
Belgium 757 751 727 848 1021 1224 1359 1289 7.60
Czech 
Rep
364 452 473 335 364 253 248 196 -8.80
Denmark 28 116 68 53 37 87 96 35 3.20
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Germany 14725(.14) 12933 11576 12553 15914 18142 17607(
.22)
8.5(7.5)
France 903 424(.21) 1317 833 1574 979 923 (.6) 707 -9.9(17)
Ireland 72 42 100 62 84 94 173 224 16.20
Austria 450 528 465 436 322 406 419 752 7.30
Poland 215 103 94 111 113 172 150 238 1.5(-7.5)
Slovakia 35 40 109 119 79 121 188 155 21.30
Finland 495 448 364 522 558 669 748 698 4.90
Sweden 2703 2785 2391 2436 2414 2383 2575 2813 0.5(-8.5)
England 47614 52638 54858 47810 53113 56654 59071 61262 3.6(-1.7)
Source data:  European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights: Annual Report 2009. Pp24-25 
"Reported Racist Crimes".  WVS Combined wave 1980-2007, added means of two questions 
"Would you have a problem if an (immigrant) or (foreign worker) moved into your 
neighborhood?"
Trust in the police and judiciary also dictates whether individuals will be 
willing to report crimes, further complicating the value of indicators even in 
countries like Great Britain, which have had a fairly consistent reporting standard 
over a number of years.  According to some reports up to 85% of crimes against 
Muslim victims in the European Union member states go unreported .  The recent 
MIDIS project commissioned by the Fundamental Rights Agency of the EU 
provides a broad range of fairly stark findings for the likelihood of reporting hate 
crimes .
The figures present data from the MIDIS report.  The two tables present 
different responses from sub-groups of minorities in the EU, their trust of the 
police, and their reasons for not reporting assaults or threats of a discriminatory 
nature.  What is noteworthy in these tables is the overall trust of police in most 
minority communities contrasted with the very high lack of trust among non-
reporting victims of hate activities.  The MIDIS studies (European Union Minorities 
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and Discrimination Survey: Main Results Report 2009; European Union Minorities 
and Discrimination Survey.  Data in Focus Report: Muslims 2009) also report the 
differential levels of trust in the police among different ethnic groups within 
countries.  You can see from the two charts that the Roma at once trust the police 
least, and cite that lack of trust as a reason for non-reporting most consistently of 
the surveyed groups.
NL- Turkish
DE- Turkish
BE- Turkish
PT- Sub-Saharan African
FR- Sub-Saharan African
RO- Roma
HU- Roma
CZ- Roma
NL- North African
FR- North African
BE- North African
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Trust in Police by Ethnicity
Tend not to trust Neither trust nor distrust Tend to trust DK
Figure 2.1: Trust in Police by Ethnic Identifiers in European States. Data from 
European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (2009)
To further illustrate the confounding effect of trust in the police on reporting 
rates, note the different mean scores in the figures below, the first illustrates 
differential scores between religious minority populations and majority, the second 
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between muslim self-identifiers and majority (or non-religious) self-identifiers.  Two 
important limitations to this data are that the religious minorities data include 
ethnic majority individuals who are of a minority religion such as Roman Catholics 
in the Netherlands, and does not capture ethnic minorities of the majority religion, 
such as gypsies in Hungary.
What the two tables below illustrate are the complicated nature of the 
relationship between minorities and the very people to whom they need for 
protection.  The first shows the confidence of minority religion self-identifiers and 
the police, and the second the confidence of Muslim self-reporters and the police. 
In the tables below, the country name has an asterisk if the means difference is 
significantly greater than 0. 
Minority religious self-reporters and their confidence in the police varies 
greatly from state to state.  There are a number of conflicting strains to explain this 
phenomenon.  One is, that as an artifact of the data, the modal group of religious 
identifiers is used as the base category for determining majority status.  This 
means that in several of the countries the “minority” group may actually be part of 
the ethnic majority.  Non-reporters were also grouped into the majority group, 
which may be inappropriate for highly religious societies like Turkey, but it makes 
sense for most of the European countries, as many people are only nominally 
religious anyway.  The imprecise nature of the groupings increases the 
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unexplained variance and may mask some of the differences that are addressed 
by the Midis study however, these classifications are comparable across countries. 
They still capture the differences in attitudes toward the police, if in a less precise 
manner. While it is difficult to identify any clear trends, the western wealthier states 
(with more recent experience of immigration) do tend to show minorities who hold 
the police in less esteem than their majority peers.
* Denotes difference significant from 0 at p<.05.
Notes: Data from combined WVS-EVS waves 1-5,World Values Survey 1981-2008 Official Aggregate.  
Question asks "How much confidence to you have in the following…Police? 1=Great Deal, 4=No 
Confidence."  Minority religious status doesn't include ethnic minorities of majority religion (like 
Orthodox Christian Gypsies in Greece) and does include majority ethnicity persons of minority religious 
status (Roman Catholics in the Netherlands for example.)
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Figure 2.2: Confidence in Police by Majority Religious Status 
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The chart, “Confidence in the Police by Muslim Status” further highlights 
some of the differences of experience from state to state, and could provide some 
insights into the difficulty of measuring racism through crime. It has the added 
benefit of selecting a group that is in a distinct minority in most of the European 
countries (except Turkey and Cyprus.)  The chart reinforces the observation of the 
minorities chart above, with some clear exceptions.  In France, the Netherlands 
and Sweden, people have pretty strong confidence in the police, but Muslims 
have even more confidence than do majority religion (or secular) populations.  The 
rest of the developed western states do not, however, have such a salubrious and 
counter-intuitive record.
The instances of high confidence in the police by both minority and majority 
status, illustrates an interaction effect that may create the appearance of high 
crime in countries of low reported intolerance for countries like Sweden or the 
Netherlands in which minorities are more willing to report incidents to police, while 
likely experiencing fewer incidents overall because the police are believed effective 
by people holding racist attitudes.
National RPE and confidence in the police have a strong relationship with a 
correlation of -.13 p<.01 (confidence in the police is scored from 1 to 4 where 1 is 
“a great deal”.)  This further reinforces the argument that countries, which have a 
stronger state presence in society, and are perceived as more capable, will have 
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higher levels of reporting of hate crimes and lower attitudes of intolerance 
simultaneously.
There is no series of data on intolerance that is uniform between countries 
over time other than the WVS scales on neighbors.  Reported crime data cannot 
be used because of the numerous problems in data collection, and local attitudes 
towards the police and local expectations of the treatment of minorities.  The lack 
of externally valid data other than the World Values Survey leads to the 
requirement of constructing a scale of intolerance from the series available in the 
World Values Surveys. 
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* Denotes difference significant from 0 at p<.05.
Notes: Question asks "How much confidence to you have in the following…Police? 1=Great Deal, 
4=No Confidence." Data from World Values Survey 1981-2008 Official Aggregate 
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Figure 2.3: Confidence in Police by Muslim Status
One more item of note for the intolerance scale, especially in the context of 
Eastern and Southern Europe, including Italy, is intolerance towards Roma ethnic 
identifiers.  The World Values Survey has conducted only limited surveys of 
attitude towards the Roma, but where it has, the results confirm recent analysis by 
the Fundamental Rights Agency.  The Roma are one of the least tolerated groups 
in Europe.  Unfortunately this item was only widely used in the 1999 European 
Values wave of the World Values Surveys and cannot be included in the 
intolerance variables.  However, for the data that both sets exist we can estimate a 
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correlation between our current measures and the gypsy variable by finding the 
Eta of the means difference between those citing gypsies as undesirable 
neighbors versus those who do not.  Unsurprisingly, there is a large correlation 
present with an eta of .41 with the summed responses to the other five neighbor 
questions as a measure of Intolerance. 
Table 2.3: Intolerance toward Roma
Neighbors: Gypsies
Correlation Coeﬃcient N
Neighbours: People of a diﬀerent 
race
.306** 14324
Neighbours: People who have 
AIDS
.351** 14324
Neighbours: Immigrants/foreign 
workers
.336** 14324
Neighbours: Homosexuals .339** 14324
**Sig. (2-tailed) tau-B.  Question asked if respondent would have a problem with listed neighbor.  
Countries in the sample: Bulgaria (1999),Finland (2000), France (1999), Italy (1999), Netherlands 
(1999), Poland (1999), Romania (1999), Sovenia (1999), Spain (1999), Sweden (1999), Turkey 
(2001), Great Britain (1999)
Source:World Values Survey 1981-2008 Official Aggregate
Understanding trends in intolerance is a challenge even using instruments 
designed expressly for that purpose.  The European Union has only just developed 
such instruments, and instead has been forced to rely on non-comparable criminal 
justice data, or anecdotes from their national partner groups.  The World Values/
European Values Surveys provide one instrument of measure consistent over 
several years both in structure and application in measuring a scale of intolerance.  
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Establishing an instrument for measuring intolerance allows us to examine the 
correlates of intolerance and explore the effects of policies and intent in the 
European Union context.
Thus far, efforts to achieve EU goals have been largely left to the different 
member states.  Only in the past 10 years has an institution existed to track, 
compare, evaluate and coordinate social tolerance policies between the states.  
Despite the inter-governmental nature of the problem, major institutions of Europe 
have encouraged efforts at social inclusion among their member states.
2.4 Civil Society And Social Capital
This section presents the background and state of the literature for different 
forms and measurement of social capital and its relationship with civic capacity. 
This study explores the role that state capacity plays in creating conditions for the 
emergence of bridging social capital instead of more intensely bonded networks.  
A strong state provides the conditions for increased bridging capital and stronger 
civic capacity in general.
Social capital is an essential component of any well-functioning 
government and must be present for democracies to function at all (Bermeo 
2003).  Social capital has a three-fold relationship with tolerance as a feature of 
society.  First, as Stepan (2000) notes, tolerance of differences (political and 
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otherwise) itself is a lynchpin of democracy.  Second, common measures of social 
capital feature items such as trust of neighbors and society; intolerant individuals 
are expected to not show trust towards out groups.  Finally, and most importantly, 
social capital is expected to increase the civic capacity of governments that are 
part of societies with strong social capital, with both government autonomy and 
officials’ embeddedness in social capital networks (Evans 1995).  The European 
Union members are required to be functioning democratic states, and each of 
those states face strains through expansion of the EU.  Additionally, their 
demographic changes furthermore put explicit emphasis on achieving community 
objectives through partnerships between government and civil society.  Those 
partnerships are expressly meant to both foster increased social capital 
infrastructure and embed national or European Union-level government actors in 
the societies.  
There are a number of definitions of social capital available in sociology, 
economics, political science and public administration.  While these definitions 
have variations in disparate fields, there is some harmonization on the concept 
and ways to try and measure it.  There is agreement that social capital is 
composed of both trust networks, associations, and a set of norms or values 
carried by the individuals in society (Van Deth 2003).  Social capital is capital in the 
sense that these networks provide some instrumentality for individuals in these 
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associations or networks.  The presence of dense, intersecting networks in society 
allows for individuals in a network to access resources in adjoining networks, 
whereas networks that reinforce existing relationships offer less opportunity for 
utilizing resources, and foster closed trust networks marked by tight social control. 
In order for individuals to tap resources beyond their immediate group, intersecting 
networks with norms of trust and cooperation must be present.  Therefore social 
capital must have both dense networks and norms of trust or cooperation (Sobel 
2002; Van Deth 2003). Conceptions of social capital have two main addresses 
that are not mutually exclusive.  Social capital is at once an attribute of individuals 
and society (Van Deth 2003). 
Putnam (1993, 167) describes social capital as, “ the features of social 
organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve efficiency of 
society by facilitating coordinated actions.”  Light describes social capital as trust 
relationships that are part of social networks.  His concept of social capital, as 
Putnam’s, is instrumental and intentional.  Social capital can exist as both 
spontaneous and latent networks, but can be made instrumental and is 
convertible to tangible benefits (Hutchinson, Vidal, Putnam, Light, de Souza 
Briggs, Rohe, Gress and Woolcock 2004).  Woolcock(1998) provides a broader 
description of social capital that includes some notion of civil government within 
the rubric of social capital.  Woolcock’s (1998) conception of social capital starts 
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at the micro-level of interpersonal relationships within a social subset of 
individuals .  The trust relationships, shared norms and networks among those 
individuals he calls individuals’ micro-level embeddedness.  He also notes another 
dimension of human capital, which is the link of an individual to other larger social 
networks  (vertical “autonomous” capital) that extends to the macro level of society 
giving an individual access to other sources of social resources.  Macro-level 
social capital is similar to civic capacity— it is the combination of the ability of the 
broader society to get things done (autonomy), and the networks of relationships 
that sub-groups have with larger society (embeddedness).  The inclusion of the 
macro- and micro-levels of social capital integrate the concepts of civic capacity 
(the ability of social groups to identify and achieve goals) and civil governments as 
institutions that bridge groups, as well as the narrower conceptions of social 
capital described above (Woolcock 1998).
Portes (2000) also attributes Putnam with pushing the transition of social 
capital conceived as an attribute of individuals to one of society.  He argues that a 
society has a “stock” of social capital that is generated by bridging associational 
memberships and norms of trust and cooperation (Putnam 1994; Putnam 2000).  
Newton (2001), however, goes further arguing that social capital is only 
conceptually plausible as an attribute of society.  It is a measure of the stock or 
social trust, associational links, and possibly political trust in a society.  While it 
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may manifest in the ability of individuals to access resources, the stock of capital 
itself is a collective phenomenon.  Newton tested his claims about social capital.  
He analyzed the correlations between associational memberships and forms of 
trust toward society and public institutions and found that the relationships only 
emerge systemically at the level of society and not as attributes of individuals.  The 
associational memberships and social activities of individuals were generally 
unrelated to their indicators of social trust.  Instead other factors like socio-
economic status, majority status and education had far higher correlations with 
elements of trust (Newton 2001).  Conceptually there is a logic to social capital 
being conceived as an attribute of society as well as of individuals.  An individual 
with few personal associational memberships, or even low levels of social trust, is 
still able to activate more “loose ties”, or access more resources in a society with 
many interlocking connections and norms of trust, than the same individual in a 
society marked by tight non-intersecting associations and low-levels of trust.  As 
referenced above, Newton’s (2001)  analysis of the linkages between associational 
membership and measures of trust found little connection at the individual level .  
However, Paxton (2007) operationalized a confirmatory factor analysis of attributes 
of social capital including associational memberships at the individual level .  
Controlling for national contexts in a multi-level analysis, Paxton found that 
organizational types with members who have multiple memberships also have 
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increased levels of trust in other individuals more than other types of associations, 
while membership in some organizations (religious and unions) may actually 
reduce generalized trust (Paxton 2007).  Van Deth and Zmarli (2010) also 
operationalized an analysis of associational types of individuals’ memberships and 
found similar connections to Paxton’s; associational types mattered for the types 
of trust (this time political trust) that individuals possessed (Maloney, van Deth and 
Rossdeutscher 2008).
Trust networks are described as tightly bonded networks of individuals 
such as religious sects that are costly to exit, have tight control over pooled 
resources, have very high stakes of exclusion for individual members and may 
have a mixture of vertical and horizontal linkages within and between related 
organizations (Tilly 2005).  Tilly (2005) describes networks that have limited 
memberships and tightly connected nodes.  His case of study is Eastern 
European Jewish immigrants in Johnstown Pennsylvania, but may as well be 
Bengali immigrants to England, or Indonesian immigrants to the Netherlands. 
These networks are dominated by identity and community focus and access to 
resources is achieved through group membership and performance of qualifying 
duties.  There may be several organizations within this tight network, such as 
charitable groups, business associations, and women’s groups. But they are 
marked by having high overlapping memberships and few links outside the 
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community.  These tightly bonded networks can provide resources like financing 
for businesses, economic assistance, or social functions, but they also are very 
circular and can foster suspicion of outsiders as a means of further enforcing the 
social ties (Almond, Appleby and Sivan 2003).  Recent research (Iglic 2010) on the 
types of social capital associated with different groups has found some 
distinctions between types of association networks and their relationship to 
general or particularized forms of trust.  Finally, the societal nature of social capital 
lies in the presumed intersection of the structural (intersecting networks) 
characteristics and the cultural aspect in solving collective action problems and 
producing public goods (Putnam and Bagnasco 1996; Van Deth 2003).
Social capital can also be seen as residing in individuals to instrumental 
purposes and is not necessarily a public good.  The individual-centered 
conception of social capital relates to, but is distinct from social capital as a 
characteristic of a society, a public good, and not just its individual members.  
Social capital as an individual’s asset means that the social capital stock of an 
individual is identified by their location in and size of their trust networks.  That is 
their associations of individuals with whom they have sufficient social connections 
that they can count on society enforcing agreements (Portes 2000).  The notion of 
social capital utilized by Putnam in, Making Democracy Work (Putnam, et al. 
1993), and Bowling Alone (2000) is an attribute of the community as much as it is 
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of individuals.  The earlier notions of social capital offered by Bourdieu and 
Coleman put the instrumentality of social capital for individuals at the center of the 
concept, social capital was something individuals had, not societies (Portes 2000; 
Van Deth 2003).  Individuals had trust networks, or weak and strong ties that they 
could activate in order to improve their own lot.  But the notion of social capital as 
an individual’s attribute introduces the possibility of individual social capital short-
circuiting the positive effects of community stocks of social capital.  That is, we 
cannot merely add the social networks of individuals alone and arrive at an 
estimate of civic capacity (Coleman 1988).
While Kwon and Adler (2002, 18) describe social capital as the goodwill 
flowing between individuals, they state that social capital is manifest in the 
resources that relationships can bring to the individuals.  Granovetter’s (1983) 
description of social capital places emphasis on the advantages of weak ties, or 
the resources available through the broader and weaker social networks that 
individuals posses (Granovetter 1985).  There are also extrinsic and internalized 
aspects to the concept of social capital.  The extrinsic descriptions highlight the 
utilization of networks by individuals to garner resources or facilitate their personal 
objectives, but the intrinsic element of social capital is the set of internalized norms 
for cooperation and behavior that membership in groups and iterated relationships 
within social networks help to create (Adler and Kwon 2002).  Social capital is also 
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described (Portes 1998; Knoke 1999; Burt 2004) as processes through which 
individuals create and activate bonding and bridging networks by joining and using 
membership in organizations to expand their personal access to resources and 
information.  Knack’s (2002, 776-778) analysis of social capital’s impact on the 
civic capacity of states operationalize two aspects of social capital separately.  He 
uses both generalized trust, and memberships in associations as his measures of 
social capital.  Knack also highlights that group membership need not lead to 
more trust at all as groups, like religious or ethnic affiliation organizations, garner 
bonding capital by burning bridges, which is why he insists on a multi-faceted 
measure of social capital. 
To further illustrate the importance of social capital as an individual’s 
attribute, imagine two people as part of society.  One is a member of two 
associations, both nested in a sectarian context; a member of a Roman Catholic 
business association and part of a charitable association— also part of the Roman 
Catholic community (this would be reflective of the sectarian based associations 
that dominated the Netherlands until the middle of the twentieth century).  The 
effect of membership in the bonding-type associations on the individual’s social 
capital mean that he has many links to the same group of people but generates 
low levels of generalized trust—he does not trust outsiders and doesn’t need to 
trust others within the group as he has many avenues of control and reciprocation 
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and simply.  Along with low-levels of generalized trust, the individual has a limited 
network of potential contacts as many of their links are redundant and all are 
within the same community.  Consider another individual, also with two 
memberships: one in a secular social charity organization such as Rotary 
International, and another in a local education group (such as a parent teacher 
association).  There may be some overlap of membership in the two groups, but 
the individual essentially spans two groups with different memberships and 
different second-order networks.  This individual learns more generalized trust 
because she has fewer social control links to the individuals in her networks and 
instead must trust associates to act fairly.  She also has a much broader potential 
network of “friends of friends.”  The interlinked nature of her memberships 
provides greater social capital in the form of both networks and generalized trust.  
2.5 Bonding And The Dark Side Of Social Capital
Individual social capital and community-level capital can be at cross-
purposes. While it is often the case that social networks can be useful to help 
reduce transaction costs (by providing a means of finding qualified job candidates 
or connecting individuals to government officials, for example) those relationships 
are not necessarily positive.  However, individuals with connections may instead 
play a market-distorting role by controlling information or selecting members only 
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from an “in” group (Portes 2000).  This is the case of corruption in “strong society” 
countries lacking in a autonomous state apparatus.  In this hypothetical, instead of 
fostering institutional trust and civic capacity the individuals with high levels of 
capital undermine the communities’ stock of social capital.  The cases in “Making 
Democracy Work” (Putnam and Bagnasco 1996) in Southern Italy, illustrate how 
extended family and patronage networks dictated access to resources and 
employment and fostered organized crime networks, providing substantial 
examples of social capital networks that have a malevolent effect on society .
Although the earliest definitions of social capital are based on observing the 
positive externalities achieved by networks of trust and associations, Durlauf and 
Fafchamps (2004)  in their survey of the evolution of the concept note that not all 
versions of social capital are socially beneficial. Several early explorations of the 
concept at least mention that not all elements of social capital are necessarily 
positive (Granovetter 1983; Coleman 1988; Woolcock 1998), introducing the 
concept of social capital alongside examples of its darker forms.  Other authors 
have explored the potential pitfalls of individuals being too embedded in a tight 
associational environment, either socially or between business and public-sector 
actors (Evans 1989; Portes 2000). Evans (1989) and Portes (2000) separately 
dealt expressly with malevolent forms of social capital networks designed to 
undermine fair allocation of resources and information.  Portes (1998) argues that 
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the dark side of social capital stems from networks that are too dense and stifle 
innovation or the ability of individuals to access resources outside their group.  
Social capital that is too rich in bonding capital and lacking bridging capital that 
can stifle success as much as absent capital.  Evans (1995) also argues that civil 
societies’ networks and their linkages to the state, or the absence of a strong 
autonomous state, can serve as networks of exploitation if the state is subject to 
capture by narrow groups.  Knack (Knack 2002) also explicitly measures social 
capital as associations and generalized trust and volunteerism separately because 
some groups are so focused on exclusionary memberships, they undermine 
generalized social trust and civic capacity .  Indeed, more recent work has also 
been dedicated to uncovering aspects of social capital that are less than salutary 
for the positive virtues expected.  
van Deth and Zmerli(2010) provide a taxonomy of dark social capital in a 
recent introduction to an issue of American Behavioral Scientist. They argue that 
the conception of bridging versus bonding capital does not really explain why the 
anticipated negative consequences would emerge from bonding over 
development of bonding capital. They provide three types of organizations or 
negative effects that can be described as “dark social capital”.  They especially 
focus on organizations with negative norms or intent, reproduce negative norms, 
and can achieve evil aims more effectively when gaining skills and reducing costs 
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of collective action with increased social capital.  Especially when it is a tight 
network of bonding capital with multiple informal avenues for control of members .
The dense bonding environment of small inward-facing groups isolates 
individuals and limits the community’s ability to solve problems.  In her study of 
democracy and social capital, Paxton (2002) notes that the absence of bridging 
mechanisms can lead to intolerance and isolation in inward looking groups and is 
inversely related to civic attitudes.  Government institutions can provide bridges in 
the absence of or in addition to overlapping memberships (Akkerman, Hajer and 
Grin 2004a). It is central to the argument in  Kemmis’ “Community and the Politics 
of Place” (Kemmis 1990) that a strong shared sense of broader identity can bridge 
smaller groups and create an environment for interlinking networks.
More recent work by Putnam (Putnam 2007) examining the impact of multi-
ethnic communities on social capital, measures such as social trust finds the 
impact of minority presence on social capital is strongly negative.  Even controlling 
for demographic variables, and census tract level variables, the finding is robust.  
In the United States, greater minority presence is associated with lower rates of 
social capital.  The measurement of social capital is problematic as highlighted by 
the concept of trust used in the context of Putnam’s 2007 paper.  For a 
respondent in a densely populated neighborhoods which are often integrated, and 
low-income, and have lower rates of home ownership, the image of a neighbor 
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encompasses many hundreds or thousands of people, most of whom they may 
not know personally. This does not mean they have low-levels of social capital or 
even generalized social trust—  it means that they don't know all of their 
immediate neighbors, but they may have hundreds of trust network members in 
the broader community. Which leads to a second critique.  The mentally available 
image of neighbor to someone in rural small communities is likely someone the 
respondent knows personally, so for them trust equals confidence in the sense 
described by Giddens (1990).  There is little risk in trusting their neighbor because 
they are in a trust network.  A more diverse, or high-turnover community or one 
with high population density evokes an image of neighbors who are strangers.  In 
this sense trust in neighbors is a blind trust, it is a question about the nature of 
humanity, and in a dense population, or in a poor neighborhood with high crime 
rates, there are plenty of examples of risk and betrayal available in the recent 
experience of the respondent.  But again, in aggregate they may have a more 
robust network, or even be more generous or optimistic person—  they are simply 
required to have more blind trust in their neighbors, than is the respondent in N. 
Dakota or even York, PA, two locations in their study.  
A response paper testing Putnam’s observations about the U.S. found 
stark differences between the U.S. results and regional variation in the European 
Union (Gesthuizen, Scheepers and van der Meer 2008).  Of course, the national 
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level variance in the European Union is much greater than that between states or 
cities in the U.S., but it is the reasons for variation that are very interesting.  The 
primary national level-characteristics that seem to ameliorate the adverse effects 
of ethnic diversity on social trust and other indicators of social capital in Europe 
are the lower levels of income inequality in Western European states, and the 
length of time of democratic experience.  Related to the democracy experience, 
more research indicated that respondents feelings of political efficacy were 
strongly tied to both indicators of social capital and ethnic tolerance (Hooghe, 
Reeskens, Stolle and Trappers 2006).  Although Gesthuizen and her coauthors 
(Gesthuizen, et al. 2008) claim that the levels of social security of the states does 
not play a major role in preserving social capital, it seems that social transfers are 
one of the major mechanisms for eliminating the income inequalities associated 
with the sort of resource competition and with-in group help systems that are 
associated with lower bridging-social capital for diverse communities in Putnam’s 
study and is an area worth testing because providing a safety net is one of the 
main functions, and instruments of control for tightly bonded social communities 
(Tilly 2005, 117-124).
The implications for policy from Putnam’s paper certainly resonate both 
with the European Union’s goals and observations from work on identities and 
authoritarian personality (Altemeyer 1996).  Putnam’s more recent work observes 
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the possibility of reduced salience of ethnic identifiers through rigorous 
enforcement of non-discrimination policies, as in the U.S. military. He finds that 
social change in the U.S. incorporates diversity into identity over time, in a way 
that can be accelerated by policy emphasizing procedural democracy, and 
American membership based on civic identity not ethnic identity (2007).  
2.6 Social Trust And Civic Attitudes
Regardless of whether one ascribes to an elites-driven, pluralist, or mass-
mobilization theory of democratic persistence, the connections between culture 
and political practice  are fairly direct.  An active civil society that has many diverse 
organizations and networks of connections can facilitate governance and act as a 
break on power.  If the culture supports trust and tolerance and is politically active, 
then the values of the broad base of society will be reflected in the form of 
governance and democracy secured from the bottom-up.  If the political culture is 
such that there is weak or inactive civil society, then the linkages between the 
people will be through party structures and political agencies.  In an environment 
of low social capital and traditional non-democratic civil society institutions, 
authority is respected and the fate of democracy lies in the loyalty of the political 
elites to democratic competition. 
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Despite a rapidly changing world, the persistence of national or regional 
political culture cannot be ignored.  An interesting study of the persistence of civic 
cultural norms and behaviors is provided by Rice and Feldman (1997).  Using 
World Values Survey and General Social Survey data they analyzed the civic 
attitudes and behaviors reported by Americans against those of their countries of 
ethnic origin.  The authors conducted their study on the premise that a civic-
minded political culture is foundational to the persistence of democracy.  They 
were interested in the persistence of civic values as a sort of leading indicator of 
democratic decline of success.  In defining their measures for civic culture, the 
authors (Rice and Feldman 1997) borrow from Putnam’s 1993 analysis of Italian 
social capital and presage the observations on civic behavior in the Scandinavian 
Midwest from his, “Bowling Alone” (2000) which reflected their thesis.  The authors 
found powerful durability of civic culture surviving the transition to America with a 
nearly unitary relationship between civic culture values in the source country and 
those of American descendants.  The implications for the persistence of cultural 
values, and therefore democratic or authoritarian tendencies rooted in culture are 
profound.  It seems that the idea that one can take the person out of the home 
culture, but cannot take the home culture out of the person is truer then often 
suspected.  The implication of this for comparative political analysis is that 
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measures of political culture may vary widely because of cultural artifact and will 
vary widely from state to state.
Particularly in societies that have an acceptance of authoritarian structures, 
the role of political and social elites cannot be underestimated.  If individuals in 
more traditionalist societies are less likely to be politically engaged, then the elites 
to whom they are connected will be able to either bolster a functional democracy, 
or undermine the legitimacy of a state government that has little outside the 
support of elites.  Civil society leadership, and the organizations those leaders 
head transmit values to their members.  Those values can be tolerant of other 
groups, or enforce group identity by emphasizing the differences and inferiority or 
threat of Others’ groups (Altemeyer, 1996).
Transferring the trust built into private trust networks to government 
requires that the link to government be one of contingent consent instead of a 
variety of other linkage types that are based on dominance or patronage networks 
(Tilly 2005).  Only with the effective linkage between networks and public authority 
extending to diffuse members of trust networks will democratic governance be 
supported.  The transfer is predicated on trust networks be linked to government 
and to one another (often) through government, and eventually generating norms 
of invested interest in the performance of government and the recognition of 
government as a legitimate venue for resolving community problems (Tilly 2005).  
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This is, again, an expression of the “crowding in” observed by Albana and Barbera 
(2010) instead of the “crowding out” of social capital by a strong central state as 
described by Fukuyama (1995a, p102).  Again, the impact on civic capacity 
caused by the interaction of state and society depends on the kind of government 
and the type of social capital.
2.7 Measuring Social Capital
The concept of social capital is difficult to measure.  However, trust at the 
individual and social levels and individual enrollment and activity in civics-oriented 
organizations are most frequently used indicators.  Social capital has several 
components; individual characteristics like trust between individuals, membership 
in different associations, and political engagement, as well as community 
characteristics marked by enlightened self-interest, bridging social capital and 
trust and expectations of institutions. 
Some investigations have been able to use specially crafted survey tools 
crafted to measure civic behavior among small populations (Williams, Shinn, 
Nishishiba and Morgan 2002) or make use of existing population surveys to 
measure trust and associations (Paxton 1999).  Norris also uses a social capital 
index taken from World Values Survey data that analyzes variables of individual 
social trust and the participation of individuals in associations (2002).  She notes 
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that the “big government” countries have higher levels of social capital, and that 
social trust is associated with economic development, not associational 
memberships.  Her observations call into question the importance of associations 
to development and provoke questions as to whether latent informal networks and 
social trust levels are more important than activated networks.  An alternative 
explanation is that some forms of association develop “strong society” ties that 
create “dense but segregated horizontal networks” that undermine the bridging 
capital important for the formation of horizontal networks (Putnam, et al. 1993). 
These observations emphasize the importance of both associational membership 
and generalized trust dimensions of social capital.
 Paxton’s is one of the more sophisticated efforts of measuring latent social 
capital in which she develops a three-part confirmatory factor analysis model of 
social capital (Paxton 1999).  The first latent variable she measures is interpersonal 
trust.  Then she creates an institutional trust variable that controls for covariance 
among indicators. Finally she creates a latent variable that combines personal 
associations and formal association to estimate the associational embeddedness 
of the individual. Using a factor model for estimating social capital is particularly 
beneficial because the technique allows for multiple levels of conceptualization 
and can highlight forms of association that undermine the trust features of social 
capital and vice-versa as well as control for covariant errors.  Unfortunately, neither 
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Norris nor Paxton examine their analysis to investigate the impact of particular 
associations on other variables of individual social capital to determine if there is a 
confounding indicator (Paxton 1999; Norris 2005).  However several recent 
articles have addressed the importance of type of association and have found 
some relationships between associational type and social capital type.
Organizations that focus on the uniqueness of their group members and 
reinforce particularistic practices may build a strong small social network, but they 
weaken the ability of the broader society to pursue democratic practices. Very 
new work by Iglic has traced a relationship between political tolerance and 
associational memberships, religion-based organizations in Eastern and Southern 
Europe have a negative association with political and social tolerance as did 
charitable groups and (Iglic 2010). 
Measurement of social capital must include organizational memberships, 
some measures of generalized trust and social outlook and ideally, an indicator of 
particularistic group composition, such as religiosity.
2.8 Political Opportunity Structures And Tolerance
Political opportunity structures in the various countries can both inform the 
types of political parties that are permitted to participate in national politics, as well 
as the locus of government civil society interaction.  The section below on ethnic 
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and racial intolerance introduces more detail about some of the opportunities for 
issue framing afforded right-wing parties in the countries studied.  However, as a 
more general analysis, the stated goal of each of the member states —not 
mention their treaty obligation— is to reduce intolerance towards ethnic, religious 
or lifestyle minorities.  The political opportunity structures afforded will also be 
affected by the level of government resources are committed to policy, what sort 
of political system is in place, and what parties have been in power during the 
period studied. 
Although generally applied to political protest movements, the concepts of 
political opportunity structures can inform the role that the institutions of the state 
can play in structuring the forms of social capital in a community.  Kitschelt (1986) 
describes political opportunity structures as the combinations of resources, 
institutional arrangements and repertoires of contention, or historical precedents, 
for pressing claims against authorities.  The access of social movements to the 
political process, and to policy-makers and the way that such access is 
conditioned by institutional rules such as access points, election laws and regime 
type, further limits the forms that social movements can take in society.  The 
coercive capacity of the state and elites’ tolerances for certain types of framing of 
issues also provides an element of structural constraint on acceptable social 
capital forms.
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Kitschelt’s (2000) argument that the political process conforms or 
constrains the kinds of social movements that are available to actors wishing to 
press claims depends on a functional state to sustain a constraining environment, 
the state must penetrate society, and be relatively autonomous of capture by any 
interest group in order to effectively shape the political opportunity structure.  His 
study finds that a few macro-level characteristics can shed insight on the political 
opportunity structures facing civil society actors.  The openness of the political 
system to claims, centrality of political structures, state participation in the 
economy, and capacity to implement policy are all primary features of the political 
opportunity structures (Kitschelt 1986; Kitschelt 2000).  While some critics of the 
concept of political opportunity structures, such as Pippa Norris, consider the 
concept too vague to be useful, there are political scientists who still find Tilly’s 
notion useful (Norris 2005)(Tilly 2005).  Koopmans defends the notion of political 
opportunity structures while recognizing that they need to be defined in particular 
comparative contexts and cannot be a standard set of characteristics for all 
cases, lest they lose any meaning by being too general (Koopmans 1999).  
Koopmans identifies cultural factors as additional conditioning structures 
facing social movements (Koopmans and Statham 2000)).  They argue that 
cultural factors have steered the framing of immigration issues in a direction that 
fosters right-wing politics in Germany and France.  This is similar to Tarrow’s social 
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movement notion that concepts must achieve resonant framing of their claims, 
and that resonance lies in the familiarity and acceptability to society of the problem 
identification and proposed solutions offered by social movement leaders (Tarrow 
1998).  Tarrow uses Tilly’s conception of political opportunity structures in 
identifying conditions when groups may be able to press claims and that 
mobilization may be most effective when there is divided government, or 
weakened repressive mechanisms.  Additionally, outreach to international 
organizations can help bring resources to domestic groups or induce the 
government into placing the issues of groups onto the domestic agenda (Tarrow 
2005).  
All of the states examined have reasonably strong states, but their level of 
penetration into society varies, as do their political structures such as elections 
types, and the distance of policy formation and execution from the community, 
and institutional tolerance of extreme-fringe parties  In order to capture a proxy for 
open opportunity structures, the ratio of how much non-social security 
government spending is conducted through regional and local authorities is 
included.  The notion is that the closer the distance of critical spending decision 
makers to the communities, the more open the political structures and access 
points to community members. A positive relationship between the ratio of local 
spending authority and level of social capital in an open political opportunity 
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structure would seem to meet the positive interaction criteria described by 
Akkerman, Hajer and Grin (2004b, 82-84).  One caveat to this approach is that the 
European Union and several of the national governments also work directly with 
civil society groups to execute social policy, and this metric may miss that 
relationship.  Personal communication with staff at the Fundamental Rights 
Agency of the European Union, and discussions with Peer Scheepers at The 
University of Utrecht informed me that nobody has tracked government spending 
on tolerance promotion (Grimheden 2007; Scheepers 2007). Gathering that 
information is well beyond the scope of this current study.
2.9 Association Of Religiosity With Tolerance 
 In light of the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the European Union’s 
expansion eastward and southward, the special case of religion as a civil society 
institution should be taken into consideration.  As Linz and Stepan’s typology of 
totalitarian states makes clear, the states of the former Eastern Bloc suffered from 
the states’ flattening of civil society (Linz and Stepan 1996b).  The only civil society 
institution to survive in much of Eastern Europe were the Roman Catholic and 
Orthodox churches. Where the church didn’t survive they were one of the first 
institutions to return.  In Western Europe, while church attendance is low, many of 
the countries still maintain official religions or have a long history of state-church 
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cooperation in the provision of services as well as the construction of identity. A 
number of studies of religiosity and tolerance have been conducted on the effect 
of religion on intolerance towards other ethnic and religious groups. 
 One study tested the effect of religiosity on anti-Semitism to see if anti-
Semitism in the Netherlands was a product of exclusionary doctrine of Christianity.  
The authors found that there was a positive, albeit somewhat weak relationship 
between christian religiosity and religious anti-Semitism (Konig, Eisinga and 
Scheepers 2000).  However, the authors found that Roman Catholic religiosity had 
a link to secular anti-Semitism while membership in the Protestant sects did not 
differ from average Netherlanders. The authors found a much more powerful non-
religious predictor of effect on anti-Semitism.  They found that a variable on 
perspective, “narrow perspective,” accounted for fifty-two percent of the 
relationship between christian beliefs and religious anti-Semitism, while religious 
beliefs accounted for less than fifteen percent.  The implication of their analysis 
was that the relationship between Christian religiosity and anti-Semitism was 
driven by the third factor, narrow perspective.  While the authors documented a 
positive and significant relationship between Christian beliefs and anti-Semitism, 
they established that the relationship was more of narrow perspective mediated 
slightly by values of a Christian religiosity.  Their analysis notes the relationship 
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between fundamentalist religiosity and authoritarian personalities, and narrow 
worldview that contribute towards antipathy for out groups.  
Yet another study conducted in the Netherlands, hypothesized that 
religiosity should have a non-linear negative relationship with intolerance.  The 
authors theorized that those who, “live” their faith will reject ethnic bias, while only 
those who claim an affiliation without being a core believer, or adhere to a 
particularistic faith will show positive correlations with intolerance (Scheepers, 
Gijsberts and Hello 2002).  This difference between “identity” religiosity versus 
lived religiosity is analogous to the idea of religiosity versus narrow-perspective 
reviewed above. The authors conducted a multi-level regression analysis of types 
of religious beliefs and behaviors as well as protestant and Roman Catholic sects 
of Christianity.  Their conclusions were that Christians tended to show more 
prejudice then non-religious people or persons of other faiths (however in the 
predominately Christian countries studied, other groups are the outgroups).  They 
also found that ethnic intolerance was positively associated with religious 
attendance, but with the strong caveat that the kind of religiosity practiced 
mattered.  They found a negative marginal relationship between intolerance and 
doctrinal beliefs and the importance of religion in respondents’ lives, but a positive 
one between intolerance and religious particularism. The results seem to support a 
commonsense notion that those who practice a religion that values tolerance, will 
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be more tolerant, but those who adhere to an exclusionary interpretation of their 
faith, will tend to be less tolerant.  Their study showed the importance of using a 
multi-dimensional factor for religiosity, as the type of religiosity and the manner in 
which it is practiced changes the sign of the association with intolerance.  The 
authors do caution that the non-Christian religious individuals in their study of 
European countries are members of outgroups, and therefore unlikely to express 
intolerance towards the minority group to which they belong.  Finally, and 
significantly to this study, the authors found that the religious heterogeneity of the 
countries in the study had a strong positive effect on prejudice, as did economic 
conditions.  Questions about ethnic bias may be more salient to those with out-
groups toward whom misanthropic feelings can be directed.  The findings of the 
multilevel study partially refute and partially support earlier studies on religiosity 
and bias in Europe.  
 A 1990 study of racism and religiosity in Holland found that their was some 
association with prejudice among casual church members and those who 
attended frequently but that the trend reversed among individuals who 
participated in church functions and associations.  They also found that the 
positive association between nationalism and religious participation almost 
completely suppressed the relationship between faith and bias (Eisinga, Felling 
and Peters 1990).  A 1999 follow-on study that extended the investigation to a 
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cross-state comparisons concluded that nationalism had a much more powerful 
effect on bias, and that the relationship between religion and bias may be spurious 
to that of nationalism and prejudice (Eisinga and Billiet 1999).
The hypothesis that Roman Catholic Eastern European states possess a 
cultural propensity toward intolerance and authoritarian behavior, can be 
understood in light of the studies reviewed above.  Indeed the relatively lower 
levels of economic security provided in the post-communist era would signal 
intolerance based on Inglehart’s thesis of modernization and tolerance (Inglehart 
1997).  Also, the observations of Scheepers(Scheepers, Te Grotenhuis and Van 
Der Slik 2002) and others that christian beliefs and Roman Catholicism in 
particular, are associated with decreased levels of tolerance would also indicate 
that a comparison of the United States and Poland, would find Poland less 
tolerant.  Finally a political culture dominated by years of Communist rule and the 
enforced conformity that was imposed, might also be expected to have eroded 
any residual culture of tolerance from before the Communist occupation.  
Scheepers and others observed that of the Eastern European countries, Poland 
was the only one that showed no association between faith and prejudice.  
Karpov’s (Karpov 1999) comparison between Poland and the United States 
actually revealed that, after controlling for demographic and economic indicators, 
Polish sentiment was generally, if less consistently, as tolerant as that of America.  
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The Polish case also indicates a Polish intolerance for anti-system militaristic 
behavior, having won their democracy, there seems to be a cultural propensity to 
try and keep it.
An effort to analyze the apparent relationship between nationalism and 
religious beliefs in the United States, created a survey with a battery of scales 
designed to investigate the conflation of religious doctrine with beliefs in the 
sacredness of the American symbols (Wimberley, Clelland, Hood and Lipsey 
1976).  Their study targeted fundamentalist Protestants who were thought most 
likely to possess a civil religious value system.  Beliefs of presidential authority 
stemming from God, the sacredness of the flag, and the religious importance of 
the American example all showed correlated but independent loadings from 
strictly religious doctrinal beliefs in their latent variable model.  Some 
fundamentalist Christian Americans were found to hold beliefs toward the country 
similar to those held towards God, with an emphasis on particularistic religious 
beliefs and civil values indicating a religious-nationalism axis in-line with the work 
by Altemeyer (Wimberley, et al. 1976; Altemeyer 1996).  The observations by 
Eisinga and Billet (1999) that a third dimension of nationalism and narrow 
perspective have a stronger relationship to intolerance than religiosity per se seem 
consistent with the results of these earlier studies .  Religion and religious 
organizations can provide motivation and structure for participation in organization 
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activities that provide community services.  However, religious participation is often 
associated with a narrower view of community- focused on co-religionists, and 
therefore also associated with intolerance.
2.10 The Interaction Of Government Capacity, Social Capital, And Public Policy
The interaction of government capacity and social capital is not a simple 
causal path.  Government provides conditions for bridging forms of social capital.  
Bridging social capital makes government more accountable and effective by 
preventing capture by narrow interest groups, by providing civil society 
mechanisms for identifying problems and pressing claims against and monitoring 
the performance of government.  Social capital offers at least two mechanisms to 
support better governance. One in which competent, honest and motivated civil 
service exists, a society with high social capital has an engaged civil society which 
can articulate social preferences while including a broader segment of the 
population.  Secondly, an engaged populace performs good monitoring functions 
to prevent malgovernance (Evans 1989; Evans 1995).
In Making Democracy Work, (Putnam and Becker 1995) the conclusion is 
that the tight networks of associations and the interpersonal and institutional trust 
they help foster, create increased civic capacity. Government is able to more 
effectively develop and execute policy, leading, in turn, to increased institutional 
Noordijk Social Capital and Tolerance 68
trust and participation.  Akkerman (2004b) also investigated the role of interacting 
states and civil society with an eye both to effectiveness and increased forms of 
civil society participation.  Their study of the Netherlands’ implementation of 
central government directed local initiatives for citizen participation in government 
found a strong positive effect of institutionalized participation mechanisms.  
Critiques of Putnam’s positive attributions of the role of social capital pivots 
on the notions of the political opportunity structures available to members of 
society.  The relationship between the state and social capital is not a simple one-
way causal relationship as implied by Putnam’s work in Italy, but it is a more 
interactive relationship (Tarrow 1996).  Tarrow argues that the form of government 
and the type of interventions in society the government makes has as much to do 
with the generation of social capital and thence civic capacity as the other way 
around (Tarrow 1996; Knack 2002).  As others have observed in the 
democratization literature, strong governments may not have an interest in an 
active a strong civil society (Linz and Stepan 1996a).  They may be intervening to 
promote patronage relationships, flatten civil society or create strong bonding 
capital within groups, but only do so to keep those groups dependent on the state 
(Kitschelt 2000).  Conservative social capital theorists argue, that a strong state 
serves to interfere with the formation of social capital and undermines the ability of 
members of society to organize and solve problems autonomously (Fukuyama 
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2001).  Their prescription for good policy formation and implementation is to 
reduce the strength and resources available to any single part of the state.
However, the observations of other analysts have been that the state does 
matter, that an effective state need not simply crowd-out social capital, but that 
the forms of the political structures created can strengthen social capital, and 
reward cooperative behavior.  Work by Pippa Norris (1999) and has documented 
an apparent decline in some forms of social capital (institutional trust and 
participation in elections) but argue that despite these declines, the western 
democracies are still well above a threshold for good governance.  
In order for the state to have a moderating effect on civil society, it must 
have penetration and integration yet some autonomy from civil society actors and 
civil society groups.  Migdal’s (Migdal 1988) seminal work on the competition 
between the state and traditional society structures in developing countries 
provides a very powerful insight on the mutual shaping effect the state and society 
can have on policy implementation.  Migdal (1988) observes many cases in which 
the relationship between policy makers in the central state and the people for 
whom they are attempting reforms is moderated by an entrenched social structure 
in which powerful individuals, those with the most capital, social and otherwise, 
work to undermine or twist reforms in order to reinforce the existing political 
economy.  Migdal (1988) also notes that previously strong state with functional 
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systems can be weakened by sudden changes in the structures of production. 
This is similar to the arguments that the existing state connections with certain civil 
society actors are altered creating an opportunity for civil society actors to reshape 
social relationships and their relationship with the state.  It is an opportunity for the 
central state to assert itself in addressing the problems associated with transitions, 
or to fade from relevance or autonomy in the lives of its citizens (Linz and Stepan 
1996b; Linz and Stepan 1996a).  
As the prior section on social capital briefly discussed, the relationship 
between the state and civil society need not be the zero-sum game that theorists 
in the de Tocqueville tradition anticipate.  Later studies on civic engagement and 
social capital demonstrate that federal requirements for citizen participation led 
Portland, Oregon to create neighborhood associations as official adjuncts to city 
government.  This official status for small civic groups directly linking citizens with 
their government appears to have led to citizen engagement in a wide variety of 
community organizations (Putnam, Feldstein and Cohen 2003).  This is an 
example of how access points and government structure, in response to the 
subsidiarity requirements of the European Union treaties, can lead to improved 
civic capacity at the local level, where policy is implemented.  Also discussed in 
section 2.4, not all studies of government-civil society interactions find a positive 
relationship between social capital and government policy; even in cases where 
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the policy is explicitly meant to integrate civil society organizations into policy-
making (Togeby 2004). With cautions that governments and civil society groups 
need “horizontal” interactions instead of hierarchical or patronage connections, 
several examples of a mutually beneficial relationship between government, 
society and civic capacity (Wallis and Dollery 2002; Akkerman, et al. 2004b).  Their 
observations are slightly mixed but they share common observations that there 
needs to be a balance between access points for civil society members to press 
their interests, but also sufficient government autonomy to constrain capture by 
groups with narrow memberships and bonding capital which isolates other 
citizens.
A recent analysis provides even more support to the observations made by 
other work on social capital in Europe, that the “crowding out” hypothesis 
postulated by Fukuyama (1995b) and others (Gesthuizen, et al. 2008) is not only 
incorrect, but reverse (Albano and Barbera 2010).  Albano and Barbera (2010) test 
directly the speculation that the establishment of a strong-state, particular of a 
social safety net, has a positive relationship with volunteerism and the bridging 
capital of individuals engaged in associational activities.  This result provides 
encouragement to my thesis about the importance of state capacity in generating 
a positive spiral with social capital, particularly with bridging forms of social capital.
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There are a broad range of studies that have shown trends that counter the 
general assumptions of the main body of earlier social capital work.  One is that 
social capital does not always have a positive effect on civic capacity- when 
groups work against each other either directly or through the state.  Another, 
discussed previously, is that smaller is not always better.  The novel element 
added to the literature by this paper is an effort to test and quantify the 
relationship between government capacity and social capital.  This will rectify the 
different observations of diversity and social capital.  It also will test the occasional 
proposition that negative or at best neutral effect government has on social 
capital- the presence of government at the macro level is associated with higher 
levels of social capital and numerous observations at the micro-level have 
recorded that government mediated interactions have improved both social capital 
and civic capacity. 
2.11 Relative Political Capacity
To conduct the analysis of state success in moving toward a more tolerant 
society, measures of political capacity at the state level are used to try and 
account for Evans’s theory.  As all the EU states should have fairly high levels of 
government penetration in society, an interaction effect between state autonomy 
and social capital that will lead to more successful outcomes is expected. States 
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with an ability to broadly extract resources from society must have a certain 
degree of penetration of their society.  With that penetration of society comes the 
ability to suppress or co-opt organizations working at cross-purposes to the state, 
and cooperate with civil society organizations working in support of the state’s 
goals.  With the European Union’s subsidiarity principle, as well as the recent 
focus on fostering civil society, states will locate their efforts closer to the 
communities affected. 
Relative political capacity in the European Union for the period of this 
analysis can be taken from work performed by Arbetmann and Kugler (1997) and 
others to compare tax extraction and therefore bureaucratic reach among 
countries at similar levels of development .  The model is an effort to estimate how 
deeply into society governments can reach.  It should be a proxy for Evans’ 
autonomous state, functionally combining autonomy and embeddedness. As a 
final note, the lack of state strength and state capacity is often cited as a threat to 
the establishment of democracy.  However a study by Jose Cheibub (1998) found 
that democracies, especially immediately after transitions, are more effective at 
extracting taxes from civil society than authoritarian forms of government.  An 
implication of this finding may be that the post-transitional phase of 
democratization provides a unique opportunity to establish the state and its 
functions as citizens are less reluctant to submit to the functions of the state .  If 
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that opportunity is realized by implementing parties, directed by their elites, then 
regardless of regime structure, democracy can be consolidated and strengthen 
the legitimacy of the state and the process.
The theoretical foundations of Arbetman and Kugler’s (Arbetman 1997) 
model of relative political capacity lie in observations of the seeming invariance of 
extractive capability with regime type.  The observation follows earlier work by 
Lipset (1959) and others who observed that contrary to the modernization theory 
assumption that a strong authoritarian state would have a better ability for state-
led accumulation, democracies have performed the strong state role of taxation 
just as effectively as non-democracies, often even more efficiently (Diamond, Linz 
and Lipset 1990; Przeworski and Limongi Neto 1997).  The construct of relative 
political capacity is meant to measure bureaucratic effectiveness in reaching into 
society, this is combined with the effectiveness of political parties in mobilizing 
system consensus and reducing the costs of political reach (Organski 1997).  As 
noted by Dahl (1971) and refined by subsequent research, if the costs of 
oppression surpass the effectiveness of the oppressive mechanism, then elites 
may turn to democracy in order to reduce costs of resource extraction, or to 
mobilize their populations (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 1999). 
The theoretical foundation of measuring political capacity speaks directly to 
the creation of institutions that allow the state to penetrate and mobilize society or 
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its resources.  Organski (1997) describes the cycle as one in which political 
development leads to increased political capacity, that capacity is then turned to 
collecting resources and addressing social concerns, which also improves 
government capacity and reach.  Implicit in this description is innovation in the 
interface of government and society—part of the model that would encompass 
national governments’ efforts to incorporate civil society elements, and to foster 
social capital in addressing EU policy concerns such as intolerance and the 
attendant discrimination.
Although a precise estimation of government effectiveness is an ongoing 
effort (Kugler and Tammen 2012), there have been several attempts at improving 
the measurement.  Measures of relative political capacity (RPC) as described in 
Arbetman and Kugler (1997) are derived from two components, relative political 
extraction (RPE) and relative political reach (RPR).  As the names imply, these 
measures are comparative in nature, they measure the behavior of states against 
the expected behavior of their peer states. The relative political extraction 
component is a measure of the tax revenue/GDP of a particular country divided by 
the predicted tax/income ratio calculated from the regressing the tax ratio of other 
states controlled for level of development and a series of economic structure 
variables such as agricultural production, exports, and minerals exports.  Relative 
political extraction is the ratio of reported government revenues over revenues 
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expected by the model.  RPE is the residual of the model (Arbetman and Kugler 
1997).
The relative political reach element is calculated in a similar fashion to that 
of extraction, the difference being that relative political reach uses the ratio of labor 
market activity of a country over the activity level predicted by a regression 
equation derived from all countries in the sample; controlling for a variety of factors 
such as development level, economic structure, and unemployment rate 
(Arbetman and Kugler 1997).  
The regression equations for the RPC measure are described below in 
Figure 2.5.  Unfortunately, the data required to complete the full formula for RPR is 
incomplete for many of the Eastern and Southern European countries over the 
period of this study.  Therefore the political capacity measure to be used in this 
analysis will be relative political extraction without including relative political reach.  
Relative political extraction is calculated using the methodology described by 
Arbetman and Kugler (1997) with latest relevant data from Eurostat, OECD and 
the World Bank.
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Figure 2.5: Regression Equations for Relative Political Capacity from Arbetman and 
Kugler (1997)
Even in the European Union members to be included in this analysis, there 
will be some variation in capacity observed, as different member states have 
different levels of social safety net, different rates of economic growth, different 
policies to connect with at-risk populations, and different abilities to make credible 
threats to sanction free-riding by double-dippers who collect social benefits, but 
also work on the side.  Particularly in states with high-unemployment or high 
migrant populations, the ability or desire of the state to monitor, assist or sanction 
should be less than in states without large fractions of marginalized workers.  
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Because the employment data in many of the eastern European accession 
states is volatile or unavailable for much of the period 1991-2001, RPE is used to 
estimate political capacity instead of the combined term.
2.12 Conclusion Of Literature Review And Discussion Of The Problem 
This section has introduced the state of the conditions of the problem of 
social intolerance in the European Union in several dimensions.  The state of the 
literature about the relationships of intolerance with a variety of personal and 
societal characteristics was introduced revealing some expected and counter-
intuitive relationships.  The literature, including a quick overview of existent 
quantification of intolerance was also introduced, demonstrating the importance 
and difficulty in measuring intolerance, either as a concept, or as activities such as 
hate crimes or acts of discrimination.
The state of theoretical literature on the other important concepts in this 
study was also presented.  The review covered the different conceptions and 
measures of social capital available including both theoretical and instrumental 
examples.  Social capital has a number of distinct dimensions, it is a characteristic 
of individuals, and societies.  It can be in-group focused, creating tight-knight 
saturated networks; it can also be more diffuse with multiple relationships bridging 
several kinds of groups.  The importance and role of government capacity was 
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also introduced, as well a discussion in how the relative capacity of governments 
might be measured. 
While the literature contains discussions of a direct path that social capital 
plays in promoting social inclusion and tolerance, the link between social capital 
(particularly the bridging form of social capital) and the capability of government is 
not as thoroughly explored and rarely in a comparative context.  The next chapter 
introduces the variables and models that will be used to test the questions 
introduced in chapter one.  Putting the different threads of the literature together, 
the relationships between state capacity and intolerance as transmitted through a 
direct effect an indirect path through the forms of social capital that emerge under 
a more capable state will be tested.  The expectation is that the bonding forms of 
social capital will be weakened and the bridging forms enhanced, resulting in 
improved intolerance outcomes for the community.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY, MODELS, AND DATA
This study will attempt to measure the impact that state political capacity 
has on shaping social capital in a direction that sustains bridging capital and 
supports the policy goal of increased tolerance. Bridging social capital is the form 
that is marked by numerous weak ties and generalized social trust and is 
associated with an inclusive outlook towards other groups.  Civil society 
institutions generate social capital, they create either in-group bonding or inter-
group bridging relationships.  The review of the literature provided a foundation for 
anticipating that bridging capital creates more effective communities with a more 
effective political and civil society policy nexus.  The political capacity of 
governments, combined with an interest in tolerance promotion, should condition 
the type of social capital civil society groups (such as religious groups) generate.  
The combination of strong political capacity, and government interest in promotion 
of tolerance is expected to be associated with more bridging capital.  Societies 
with strong governments and strong social capital are expected to be associated 
with more successful tolerance outcomes than those with other combinations of 
government capacity and social capital.
The model will take as its independent variable a measure that reflects the 
goals of the Pillar III harmonization agenda.  Absent surveys such as the European 
Social Survey, and the World Values/ European Values Survey, there is no 
consistent measure of intolerance that is comparable between European 
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countries.  Therefore a scale derived from questions regarding the suitability of 
members of possible out-groups as neighbors will be used as a measurement of 
intolerance for individual respondents.    
A hierarchical linear model, comprising important indicators of the concepts 
above, will be used to test the effects of individual and state-level characteristics 
on tolerance of diversity. The model will also test the relationships between and 
interactions of, social capital, state political capacity, religiosity and identity on 
attitudes towards others. These items will be measured for interactions and 
change over five waves of the World Values Survey, using factor analysis and 
hierarchical models to test changes within societies and the relationship with 
indicators.  World Values Survey data from 1990-2009 will be used for individual 
level information on age, income, education level, political ideology, left-right 
political self-placement, dimensions of social capital and tolerance.  National-level 
data for aggregate income, tax effort, right-wing government participation and 
social security expenditures are drawn from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators, the European Commission’s data agency, Eurostat, the OECD and 
from national statistical agencies.
In order to examine the specific hypothesized relationships between state 
political capacity, social capital and the policy objectives of tolerance, a series of 
models that control for relationships between demographic characteristics of 
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individuals as well as the relationships observed in others’ work to test 
components of the hypotheses will be used.  In the discussion of variables below, 
the direct correlation between the main variables of social capital, religiosity, and 
RPE are examined.  The relationships between social capital and relative political 
extraction as well as intolerance using a path analysis of ordinary least squares 
regression models is also tested.  Finally, the relationships with hierarchical linear 
models that include variables at the individual level like demographic 
characteristics and the forms of social capital, with group-level variables that are 
measured within national milieus is explored.  
The path model provides insight into the relationships between the different 
variables.  It allows the partition of variance to gauge both direct and indirect 
effects of independent variables on the phenomenon of interest. This model allows 
an assessment of the effect that political capacity may have on the creation of 
different forms of social capital on education, and finally on intolerance itself.  
The hierarchical models are used specifically, to account for the effect that 
state level characteristics, such as wealth, mean education level, religious make-
up, recent experience with immigration, and social spending may have on the 
pressures of ethnic and economic competition that individual’s experience.  
However, beyond those characteristics, the interaction between social capital, civil 
society institutions and a capable state are expected to have a greater effect on 
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achieving the goal of tolerance beyond high-levels of social capital, or political 
capacity alone.  As a mediator to the expected relationship between state 
capacity and social capital, the intensity and form of religiosity (personal versus 
institutional) as an element of social capital and identity is expected to have a 
relationship with tolerance that is also mediated by state capacity.
3.1  Path And Hierarchical Models To Test The Relationships Between 
Intolerance, State Capacity And Social Capital
The hypothesized relationships between intolerance, government capacity 
and social capital are characterized by multiple paths of effects between variables 
and by nesting in national contexts.  The relationship between government 
capacity and intolerance is proposed as including an indirect path through social 
capital.  Public policy execution in the European Union is an expressly context 
dependent process.  The European Union follows a policy of subsidiarity which 
gives considerable latitude to the member states in determining how to achieve 
Union objectives, particularly on domestic policy issues like integration.  Beyond 
the formally context driven nature of problem analyzed, the very characteristics 
and social phenomenon that are of interest, have unique national experiences that 
will modify the way phenomenon interact.  The distinct national social and political 
contexts indicate that any analysis that does not explicitly recognize the nested 
nature of the problem of policy implementation in different national and social 
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contexts, is going to suffer from unnecessarily large unexplained variance and lose 
a great deal of explanatory power.  Because of these characteristics, the 
relationship is explored using the two main techniques  of a path model and multi-
level regression.
Figure 3.1 contains a diagram of the path between government capacity 
and intolerance including the indirect path through social capital.  The diagram 
illustrates the proposed relationship between government capacity and social 
capital, where government capacity supports the emergence of bridging social 
capital.  The path from bridging social capital and the direct path from government 
capacity to are expected to reduce intolerance.
In addition to the theoretical basis for an analytical model that incorporates 
context, the method of data collection and cases available are drawn from national 
samples rather than a simple random sample of the entire population of the 
European Union and candidate states.  Therefore, the use of an analytical method 
that fails to incorporate the nested structure of both the phenomenon and the 
data would suffer validity problems (Snijders and Bosker 1999).  
The primary hypotheses of this study, that the political capacity of 
government matters for the execution of policy and the presence and type of 
social capital matters for tolerance, and that the interaction of government 
presence and social capital (government constraining malignant versions of social 
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capital and supporting bridging capital), require the ability to analyze cross-level 
interactions between context-conditioning national level characteristics like 
government capacity and individual-level characteristics such as social capital.  
The multi-level nature of the phenomenon highlights the limited utility of other 
analytical techniques like multiple regression with dummy variables as a proxy for 
national contexts (Bickel 2007).  
Figure 3.1:  Conceptual Paths of Political Capacity to Intolerance (author’s diagram)
The multi-level model itself is written below with lowercase variable names 
denoting individual level variables, and capitalized names denoting state-level 
variables.  The terms individual-level, micro-level, and level one are all used 
interchangeably; macro-level, group-level, level-two and state-level are used to 
describe level-two variables.
Poltical 
Capacity 
Bridging 
Social Capital
Intolerance
Bonding 
Social Capital
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Figure 3.2: Example of Hierarchical Model
Appendix D contains more detailed description of the strengths and 
limitations of the types of analytical methods to be used in the analysis including 
the need for dealing with missing data and distributional requirements of the 
maximum likelihood estimators used in hierarchical regression. 
3.2 Identifying And Testing Variables For The Models
Several of the concepts included in the model have multiple indicators and 
capture slightly different concepts.  In order retain a fairly parsimonious model 
while preserving the information available and capturing important dimensions of 
the concepts that may be in the data, compound variables or scales were created 
to derive some of the variables for use in the model.  There will be a three-stage 
test for each compound variable.  The first test is whether it makes sense 
theoretically to use more than one indicator for the variable.  If the indicator is 
unidimensional and captured by one question, then only one measured indicator 
will be used.  However, in many cases it is useful to combine the different 
Level one
Yintolerance= Random Intercept + Income + Education + Age + Political Self-Position + 
Religiosity + Bridging Social Capital + Bonding Social Capital + Minority+error
Level Two- within each random intercept
  RPE + GDP+ RIGHT_WING + Error
Cross-level interaction
RPEx Bridging Social Capital
Noordijk Bridging Intolerance 87
measures of a single concept together in order to have a more complete measure 
of the item.  Second, if the concept is theoretically multi-dimensional, the 
hypothesized dimensions of the concept are present in the data with a factor 
analysis and hierarchical cluster analysis to establish the appropriate combinations 
for variables.  If there is a compelling theoretical reason to combine dimensions 
under the first test, then that will override considerations of confirmatory 
techniques. 
The sections below describe each of the variables in detail, the derivation of 
compound variables and factors, as well as information on means and distribution 
of other components of the independent and dependent variables.
3.4 Intolerance
Fitting a model with an estimator for intolerance using questions about 
intolerance attitudes available in the European and World Values Surveys is 
somewhat difficult as there are few variables that persist in the core questionnaire 
from wave-to-wave.  Also difficult is tracking how well the estimates of intolerance 
generated by the variables in the survey correlate to acts of intolerance on the 
ground in each of the member countries.  As reported by the Fundamental Rights 
Agency, for the period of this research, there is no consistent reporting system for 
intolerant behavior or crimes, and even less cross-nationally comparable data 
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available (FRA 2007a).  Therefore, the general intolerance indicators available to 
test in our study will be a scale composed of related questions about undesirable 
neighbors from the World Values Surveys.
The European and World Values Surveys contain a series of questions that 
ask the respondents to state if they “would have a problem” with each of a set of 
hypothetical neighbors.  The characteristics of the “neighbors” in the survey vary 
from country to country except for a small group of potential neighbors that are 
carried through most countries most years.  This subset of neighbors includes the 
potential out-groups of immigrants, foreign workers, homosexuals, AIDS sufferers, 
heavy drinkers and drug users.  Other questions about religious and ethnic 
minorities are inconsistently available. 
I conducted a number of analyses in order to identify patterns of 
intolerance in the scale of questions.  First the scale of neighbors was analyzed 
using hierarchical cluster analyses with nearest neighbor estimators.  The result 
shown in figure 3.3 illustrates the approximate distances of covariation each item 
has for individual respondents.  
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Figure 3.3:  Cluster Analysis of Intolerance Indicators (WVS-EVS)
Intolerance toward neighbors who are immigrants or of a different race 
occur frequently in the same respondents.  The are only two steps between the 
two indicators this cluster.  Next, respondents appear to cluster AIDS sufferers 
and homosexuals together, then with the foreign worker/different race cluster at 
step twelve.  The indication from the cluster analysis is that intolerance toward 
foreign workers and toward homosexuals/AIDS sufferers is closely related.  Less 
tightly clustered are the two indicators of substance abuse behavior.  
Based on the results of the cluster analysis several estimates of intolerance 
were calculated.  One is an estimate of intolerance was calculated using factor 
analysis.   One variable derived from the factor analysis is used for analysis.  
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Details of the process to calculate Intolerance that is focused only on attributes are 
discussed in Appendix A    
  The identification of separate factors underlying intolerance in the European 
Union may have implications for policy as they can help policy-makers direct 
prescriptions at addressing the components of intolerance instead of the general 
concept of social intolerance.  Some groups, such as recent immigrants or 
religious people, might well group drug or alcohol addiction in with homosexuality 
as undesirable behaviors to be avoided in neighbors, while there are others who 
may be perfectly tolerant of sexual orientation, or even of alcoholics, while being 
strongly racist or anti-immigrant- supporters of Pim Fortuyn or Geert Wilders in the 
Netherlands would well fall into this group.
In order to develop a single easy to interpret scale of intolerance in Europe, 
that captures intolerance as a more general phenomenon and consistent with the 
European Union’s stated goals of social tolerance especially of race and lifestyle a 
simple summative index was created.
The 0-4 summative variable was created using the four questions that were 
most highly correlated in the polychoric correlations table and cluster analysis. For 
each neighbor from the list that was mentioned: “Immigrant”, “Different Race”, 
“AIDS”, “Homosexual”, a point was added to that individual’s score.  The 
frequency distribution of the resulting variable is shown below.  
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As shown by figure 3.4, the resulting scale has a single-tailed distribution 
with a slightly high skewness.  For the hierarchical regressions, the variable is 
transformed to further reduce skewness.  The distribution below is a gamma 
distribution, but although a gamma-link hierarchical general linear model may 
provide greater statistical power and better estimates, the mean (1.03) and 
median (1) are close enough in this distribution that the loss of power is made up 
for by the ease of interpretation.  
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Figure 3.4 :Summative Intolerance Scale Distribution (WVS-EVS 1990-2008)
The separation of general intolerance and a measure that emphasizes the 
attributive aspects of intolerance allows investigation of intolerance that is specific 
to particular sub-groups apart from persons who have generally intolerant 
personalities.  It may enable understanding of different kinds of intolerance that 
emerge at different economic or social development.
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3.5 Social Capital
Borrowing from analysis of social capital discussed in the literature review 
section about the concepts and measurement of social capital, a set of three 
social capital variables is crafted, composed of scales of variables linked to 
different dimensions of the concept; bridging social capital; containing metrics of 
generalized trust, friendships and memberships in organizations; bonding social  
capital is trust that is in-group focused, and not associated with active civic 
engagement or trust in government institutions.  Finally, the model will also include 
a measure of religiosity because religion and religious association are major civil 
society actors and have a strong tie to other forms of associational memberships 
and intolerance.
3.5.1. Bridging and Bonding Social Capital.
 The membership component of the bridging social capital is derived from 
a sum of membership questions available in the World Value sand European 
Values Survey.  The items for memberships included are church or religious 
organization, sports or recreation organization, arts, music or education 
organization, labour union, political party, environmental organization, professional 
organization, and charitable organization.  I created a summed scale of these 
items using the process described below.
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Unfortunately, the World Values Survey and European Values Survey use 
slightly different wording to ask respondents’ memberships and activity in various 
organizations.  As described in the literature review and introduction to this 
section, membership in organizations is thought to be a cornerstone of the 
conceptualization of social capital.  The different wording used in the two waves 
makes it impossible to simply use the responses from each of the surveys in direct 
comparisons between states and the different versions of the survey. 1  Appendix 
C contains details on recoding the surveys to amend the two versions and 
preserve the information contained in the surveys. I will review the relationships 
between the different aspects of social capital and the two different measures of 
associational activity.  
In order to check how the membership items relate to one another I tested 
them using both cluster analysis.  Examination of the dendrograms produced by 
hierarchical cluster analysis shows the different membership questions tending to 
cluster together except the variables for religious organization membership and 
union membership which lay outside the cluster of other organizations.  It is 
inaccurate to describe union membership as voluntary for many countries— if you 
are a worker in certain industries you are also a union member by law.  However, 
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1 A table with the different wordings is in appendix 2 
that very fact of obligatory membership, may also mean that unions can be 
generators of relationships that are not self-selected.
Further inquiry into the nature of the relationships between the membership 
indicators using exploratory factor analysis reveals that the business associations 
cut across various groups such as unions and religious organizations.  A 
subsequent factor analysis of memberships including items of abstract social 
trust, religion indicators, and the importance of family and friends showed no clear 
pattern other than that religious membership loads tightly on other religion 
indicators, and that the importance of family and friends measure slightly different 
constructs.  
3.5.2.  Combined Social Capital Factors
The memberships indicator was combined with three separate variables 
that measure trust in individuals and the importance of friends and family to 
establish factors for social capital.  The questions query respondents on the 
importance of family in their lives, the importance of friends in their lives, their state 
of happiness, and whether or not they think most people can be trusted.  The 
question on generalized trust, “Do you think most people try and take advantage 
of you, or that most people can be trusted” is a binary variable.  The importance of 
family and importance of friends is a four-point ranked ordinal question.  
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Table 3.1 presents the loadings of a factor analysis for four indicators of 
social capital that have been used in the literature and discussed in the preceding 
pages.  The table below reports the factor loadings (factor matrix), the unique 
loadings (pattern matrix), correlations, and coefficients of two factors identifying 
different aspects of social capital.The factor that emerged are labelled bridging 
and bonding capital.
Table 3.1:  Social Capital Loadings 
Factor Loadings Unique loadings Coefficients
Bridging Bonding Bridging Bonding Bridging Bonding
Most people can be trusted 0.467 -0.121 0.484 -0.05 0.396 0.010
Important in life: Friends 0.288 0.103 0.257 0.146 0.181 0.051
Importance of Family1 0.192 0.815 0 0.838 0.000 0.830
Memberships -0.407 0.056 -0.41 -0.005 -0.312 -0.007
Correlation 0.081 Variance explained 79%
1 Transformed using (ki^(1/ki)
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring of covariance matrix.  Promax rotation. a. 2 factors 
extracted. 16 iterations required.  Source: WORLD VALUES SURVEY 1981-2008 OFFICIAL 
AGGREGATE v.20090901, 2009. (2009).
The unique loadings indicate a definite pattern in the trust forms of social 
capital. They show that for many of the respondents their responses for Trust, the 
Importance of Friends, and Membership in Organizations, move together.  Other 
respondents are focused on the importance of their friends and families, but have 
unrelated movement in their responses to the trust variable and memberships.  
Figure 3.5 shows the value of these social capital factors across European 
countries over the available years of the study.  While the factor analysis identifies 
two related but distinct forms of social capital the variance explained is too low to 
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be used as latent variables in the analytical models.  I will use these factors to 
analyze the path of the relationship between relative political extraction, forms of 
social capital and intolerance.  The maps below show that the Northern European 
countries have high levels of both bridging and bonding capital, that is people can 
find friends and family important, while also having a generalized sense of trust 
and participate in groups.  The other countries exhibit a more zero-sum 
relationship between trust. memberships and the importance of family.  
Average Bridging Social Capital Average Bonding Social Capital
Less Bridging  More Bridging Less Bonding  More Bonding
Figure 3.5:  Social Capital Factor Maps (WVS-EVS)
The variance explained by the factors and the ability to quantify the different 
factors for a regression model using either OLS or ML estimators means that the 
full model can effectively include the factors for bridging and bonding social capital 
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to help distinguish between these forms of trust and a relationship with 
Intolerance.  
3.6 Trust In Institutions
In keeping with other analysis of social capital, a measure of trust in 
government using the scale of confidence variables included in both the World 
Values Survey and the European Values Survey.  There are four salient questions 
asked across all the waves and all the countries included in this analysis.  The 
questions seek the confidence level of respondents in a number of government 
institutions: the armed forces, police, parliament, and the civil service. 
While a summed scale would be the most direct way of measuring 
confidence in government, there is a complex relationship between the confidence 
in the armed forces and the other confidence variables.  It seems there are people 
with different kinds of confidence in government.  As discussed in the literature, 
some with confidence in government have confidence in authority structures, 
while others may have confidence based on performance or perceived 
effectiveness. 
Two confidence in government variables were extracted using Bartlett’s 
method which retains the correlations between factors, but also weights the 
unique variances of the different dimensions (DiStefano, Zhu and Diana 2009).  
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Details of the factor analysis are presented in Appendix C.  The separation of 
official trust into its component factors provides potentially useful insight into the 
qualitative element of confidence in government and reveal some drivers of 
intolerance among individuals who otherwise might score highly on elements of 
social capital.  Table 3.2 offers a comparison of different measures of official 
confidence correlated with the summed measure of intolerance.  
Table 3.2: Public Institutions Confidence Correlations
Civil Service/ 
Parliament 
Confidence 
Factor
Police/Armed 
Forces 
Confidence 
Factor
Summed 
Official 
Confidence
Intolerance 
Scale
Civil Service Parliament 
Confidence Factor 1
1 77713 77713 68115
Police and Armed Forces 
Confidence 2
.415** 1 77713 68115
Summed Official Confidence 4 .942** .654** 1 69427
Summed Intolerance Scale 3 .011** -.096** -0.003 1
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
1,2,4: Lower scores indicate “Great Confidence”, higher indicate “No Confidence”
4 Summed scores from Confidence in Police, Civil Service and Parliament.
3 Higher scores indicate increased intolerance of neighbors
N reported on off diagonal.
WORLD VALUES SURVEY 1981-2008 OFFICIAL AGGREGATE v.20090901, 2009. 
(2009).
As illustrated, the different dimensions of official confidence, although highly 
correlated, suppress the relationship between each other and intolerance.  This 
observation is consistent with the literature on authoritarian personality and 
intolerance discussed in the literature review.  The civil services confidence factor 
has a weak but direct relationship with intolerance indicating that confidence in the 
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non-authority structures is aligned with improved tolerance. The armed forces-
centered factor has a stronger and reversed correlation with intolerance than the 
civil services/ parliament factor.  This reversed relationship with intolerance exists 
despite the two factors being correlated with one another at a level of .69.  The 
official confidence measure that is simply the sum of the four confidence indicators 
shows a nearly completely suppressed relationship to intolerance.  The differences 
in slopes between the summed confidence scale and the each of the other 
confidence factors is significant at p<.05.  By separating the factors explanatory 
power and some understanding of the different forms of social capital and official 
trust and the relationship to intolerance.  
3.7 Religiosity
In order to include the unique effects that a social institution like religion 
might have on the personal attitudes of individuals, as well as their being 
embedded in community networks centered around the church, I include an 
indicator of religiosity. 
There are several variables that prompt responses about religion that span 
all waves and most countries in the World Values and European Values Surveys.  
Table 3.3 shows the mean scores for the range of religiosity questions asked most 
consistently across the waves. 
Table 3.3:  Descriptive Statistics for Religion Measures. 
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Standardized Variables
N Mean Std. Deviation Min Max
Important in life: Religion 1-4, 
1=Very, 4=Not at all.
74822 2.43 1.073 -1.33322 1.46383
Confidence: Churches(1-4; 
1=Great Deal, 4=None)
82621 2.43 0.982 -1.45612 1.59793
How often do you attend religious  
services (1-8; 1=more than 
weekly, 8=never)
84328 5.09 2.500 -1.63555 1.16454
How important is God in your life 
(1=Not at all, 9=extremely)
82851 6.04 3.307 -1.52458 1.19693
World Values Survey 1981-2008 Official Aggregate v.20090901, 2009. (2009).
 The most straightforward method of capturing a measure of religiosity is to 
simply standardize the variables and sum them into a scale of religiosity.  Detailed 
discussion of estimating religiosity is presented in Appendix D.  Analysis of 
religiosity questions indicated strong inter-item correlations that would likely form a 
reliable single scale.  The Cronbach’s alpha for a scale based on these four item 
is .86.  The resulting variable was adjusted to account for a multi-peaked 
distribution.  The final calculated scale for religiosity retains the high Chronbach’s 
alpha meaning that the information has been retained while reducing distortions 
caused by non-normality of the data.
 The literature has shown that there are several dimensions to religiosity.  I 
used factor analysis to test four indicators of religiosity to examine for multi-
dimensionality.  The analysis of the available measures indicates loading primarily 
on only one latent concept.  If more of the questions on religiosity were available 
through the different waves and across countries, a nuanced measure of religiosity 
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that parses out personal versus institutional religiosity might be possible.  
However, the eigenvalues for the potential factors indicate that only one factor 
accounts for a great deal of the variance in the latent factors, as reflected in the .
86 correlation between the two factors.  Only one religion variable is justifiable with 
the indicators at hand.  
Figure 3.12: Average Level of Religiosity by Country (WVS-EVS)
The level of religiosity reflected in this variable does appear to be in 
harmony with other research on religiosity in Europe.  The map below shows that 
religiosity is fairly low in Northern and Western Europe, while high in Ireland, 
Poland, and Turkey, with the other Roman Catholic States filling in the middle.
WORLD VALUES SURVEY 1981-2008 OFFICIAL AGGREGATE v.
20090901, 2009. Madrid, World Values Survey Association . 
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3.8 Minority Ethnic And Religious Group Status
I calculated the modal ethnic and religious affiliations of the country from 
the dataset.  For Northern European countries I only identify individuals outside the 
three main groups, non-affiliated, protestant and Roman Catholic, as minority 
respondents.  I also created a second identifier if the respondent is muslim.  
However, the infrequency of the religious identifiers make this variable difficult to 
use in the full multi-level analysis.  In single level analysis it provides an important 
control to explain why someone may be sympathetic towards minorities in 
defiance of expectations drawn from other characteristics.
3.9 Education
Education has been observed to correlate positively with tolerance in 
almost all studies.  However, variation can occur within national systems as the 
goals of education can be either instrumental-technical or include socialization 
curricula as well. The Educational Attainment variable in the World Values Survey 
provides a cross-nationally comparable scale of 1-9 levels of attainment starting at 
1= no formal education, to 9=completed education.  Forms of socialization in past 
education systems will likely have a persistent effect on older citizens, so individual 
educational attainment and national average educational attainment. Therefore, 
mean national educational attainment may also tested as a context variable.  The 
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education question asked on the different waves of the survey varied from the first 
wave of the European Values Survey to the rest of the waves of the survey.  In 
order to include the data for the countries that presented missing data in the years 
of the question change, I imputed the data using the waves for which data was 
presented using both questions.  There is more detail in Appendix F on missing 
data techniques that were used to preserve this data for the analysis.
3.10 Individual Political Position 
Political position on the right-left scale has been demonstrated to be 
strongly associated with intolerance; any model of intolerance attitudes must 
include some element of political self-identification.  The World Values, and 
European Values Surveys ask each respondent to place themselves on a 1-10 
scale of political alignment where 1= left wing and 10= right wing.  
3.11 Relative Political Extraction
As described in the literature review, relative political extraction helps to 
measure the penetration of the state into society at a certain level of development.  
I calculated RPE for the sample of European countries for the years covered by 
the relevant waves of the World Values Survey.  In keeping with the description of 
relative political extraction derived from the work led by Kugler and Arbetman, RPE 
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was calculated using the total tax revenue, minus tariffs, of each country to create 
a variable of expected versus actual tax receipts for each country over the period .
Arbetman and Kugler (1997) updated in Kugler and Tammen (2012) the 
measurement of government capacity describe a linear relationship between the 
indicators and the dependent variables in their regression equations to estimate 
the expected tax ratio and the expected ratio economically active population over 
population .  In developing equations to derive expected ratios for the smaller 
sample and range of years analyzed in this project there is improved fit with non-
linear relationships for important independent variables in the equations. Because 
the non-linear model deviates from the reference literature, and the model 
improvement is quite small (less than 2% of variance explained), retained the linear 
model. 
The calculation of RPE uses the level of development and a vector of 
sectoral composition variables to predict the tax effort of countries.  The model 
used for this analysis predicts .52% (R2) of variance in tax effort.   The residual 
unexplained variance is considered the Relative Political extraction.   Detailed 
explanation of the model, including the regression results are presented in 
Appendix E. 
The maps illustrate the relative political extraction of a range of the 
European countries over the period of this study.  As might be expected, Sweden 
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has the highest RPE overall and as one of the wealthiest countries, the highest 
level of absolute political capability.  The figure also illustrates how the measure of 
relative capacity varies over time as governments are able to extract resources 
from their societies, or choose not to. 2 Again the concept of RPE does not 
provide total available resources, but instead presents the tax effort in excess of 
that predicted for peer countries.  In figure 3.13 Bulgaria appears to have higher 
capacity than the Netherlands some years.  This indicates that Bulgaria’s tax 
revenues were unexpectedly high for its level of development not that it has more 
total resources compared to the Netherlands or the United Kingdom.
 
1988
-.26 .065
1998
-.045 .098
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2 Cyprus data after 2004 is S. Cyprus officially reported data combined with data reported by the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus weighted 70% and 30% respectively.  . 
2001
-.05 .072
2007
-.27 .115
Sources: Gross Domestic Product by sector from OECD members SourceOECD, non-
OECD members data from EUROSTAT tables using similar accounting methodology.  
Per Capita GDP from World Bank World Development Indicators database, using PPP at 
USD terms at year 2005 values.  Revenue data is from SourceOECD database for 
OECD members, others from EUROSTAT.  Oil production data is from the International 
Energy Agency, http://www.iea.org/stats/index.asp.  
Figure 3.13: Relative Political Extraction of Selected Countries 1988-2007
3.12 Moving Average of Participation of Right-wing Groups in Government.
This context variable is in recognition of the fact that an effective 
government is unlikely to effectively execute policy with which it either disagrees, 
or which does not rise to the ruling coalitions’ agendas.  In an effort to estimate 
the institutional intentions of governing parties, I use the political party placement 
data and cabinet composition data from the Comparative Political Data Set 
1960-2008, from the University of Bern (Armingeon, Engler, Potolidis, Gerber and 
Leimgruber 2010).  I compiled a 5-year moving average of the right-wing 
composition of government scores to serve as a proxy for government intent.  For 
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post-communist states I use a moving average of the post-transition years, until a 
five year history was achieved, then the 5-year moving average was used.  The 
Armingeon et al dataset did not include political party data for Turkey so values 
were calculated approximately comparable values for use in the analysis.3  
3.13  Ratio of Local to National Discretionary Spending
The models test the proximity of governance hypothesis that is implicit in 
Evans’ work about the interaction between the state and civil society (Evans 
1995).  The literature on social capital also seems to indicate that the closer to 
local civil society that government policy is executed, the more effective the policy, 
and more sustaining of social capital it is likely to be (Putnam, et al. 2003; 
Akkerman, et al. 2004b).  The data for budgetary allocation was collected from the 
OECD and Eurostat for non-OECD European states.  The allocation variable uses 
percentage of non-social insurance spending by local and regional governments 
divided by total spending minus social insurance.  For small countries with no sub-
regions, the figure was set to one.  Data for spending ratio in Turkey was acquired 
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3 Weighted government political placement values were calculated using a simplified version of 
Armingeon et al’s method of weighted cabinet participation.  For cases without a designation of 
right-left political values for political parties, each of the parties were coded based on 
supporters’ self-placement in the right-left spectrum on the 1990-2007 waves of the World 
Values Survey.  The leftmost values were subtracted from the of the major parties and divided 
by the range to gain a scale comparable to that used by Armingeon et al.  It is a Left=0, 
Right=100 scale.  As in Armingeon et al, the period of Prime Ministry was then weighted by time 
in office for each year.
from the EDDS database at the Central Bank of the Turkish Republic (TurkStat 
1990-2011; CBRT 2010).  
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS
4.1 Intolerance In Europe Over Time
Figure 4.1 below shows the mean scores for intolerance in the European 
countries being studied between the different waves of the World Values Survey.  
Because not all countries have participated in the surveys for each wave the data 
in the figures show a general comparison over time.  The data in the left frame is 
from wave 2, the earliest available, while the lower right frame is from the latest 
available data in 2008.  The figure 4.1 illustrates the intolerance scores for each of 
the country-waves for the European Union and accession states available through 
the surveys.  The table shows a general trend toward improved tolerance, 
especially the return to a normal level for France in 2008-2009 after the 2005 
wave reflected uncertainty due to nation-wide riots that had occurred weeks 
before the survey. However, the news is not all good, as a number of states, 
notably the Netherlands and the Czech Republic each had substantial increases in 
intolerance for the 2008-2009 wave of the European Values Survey over the levels 
reported in the prior wave of the World Values Survey.  A detailed table of 
intolerance by wave and year is reported in Appendix B. 
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Wave 2: 1989-1993
.46 2.4
Wave 4: 1999-2004
.18 2.4
Wave 5: 2005-2007
.12 2.3
Wave 6: 2008-2009
.16 2.7
Source: (World Values Survey 1981-2008 Official Aggregate V.
20090901, 2009 2009; EVS 2011)
Figure 4.1: Summed 4-Item Intolerance in Europe 1989-2009
The data reflect the observation that overall in Europe, and in all of Western 
Europe except France, there was improvement of social tolerance over the 15 
years covered by these surveys until the 2008-2009 wave.  The France anomaly is 
explained by the fact that data collection began 30 days after major race riots 
spread throughout the French suburbs.  The data from the 2008-2009 wave of 
the European Values Survey indicate that France has returned to levels lower than 
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before the riots. Some countries in Eastern Europe such as Hungary and Slovak 
Republic have made tremendous improvement in tolerance over the period, while 
other countries, such as Slovenia, Latvia and Turkey have notched increases in 
intolerance along with their Northern European neighbors the Netherlands and 
Sweden. 
4.2 Demographic Correlates Of Intolerance
 Chapter three provided an explanation of different measures of intolerance 
that will be used to gauge EU progress towards tolerance goals, and explore 
correlates of intolerance and that can provide insight to guide policy.  
Table 4.1: Correlates of Intolerance: Demographics, National Characteristics
Summed 4-item 
Intolerance scale
Behavior and race 
dimension
Religiosity (-1 Irreligious, 1 Religious) .178** -.026**
Bridging social capital (friends diffuse trust, 
memberships) -.216** -.014**
Self Position in Political Scale (1=Left, 9=Right) .113** -.016**
Gender (0=Female, 1=Male) -.028** -.037**
Age .108** -0.004
Educational Attainment -.190** -.049**
Scale of Incomes -.165** -.030**
Is respondent of a minority religion -.040** -.038**
Size of town -.119** -.050**
Country-Wave Level Correlations
GDP per Capita (2005 PPP USD) -0.77** 0.24*
Growth Rate of Migration -0.2** 0.29**
Relative Political Extraction -0.127** -0.303**
Right-wing Governments (lagged moving average) 0.383** -0.282**
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* p<.05, ** p<.01.  Country-Wave level correlations are correlations between aggregated 
intolerance levels and the country-level indicators.               
(World Values Survey 1981-2008 Official Aggregate V.20090901, 2009 2009)
Table 4.1 shows strong correlations in the expected directions between 
Intolerance and bridging social capital (-.216),  religiosity (.178) and educational 
attainment (-.19) on the individual level.  GDP (-.77), RPE (-.127), and Right-wing 
governments (.383) are all significant for the aggregated country-wave level data.  
The correlational relationship between RPE and intolerance is significant and in the 
hypothesized direction.  
For the dimensional factor of race versus behavior the connection with RPE 
is even stronger than with the combined scale for intolerance.  Correlation 
coefficients indicate that countries with higher RPE experience intolerance toward 
behavior more than racial attributes.  Those states with recent experience with in-
migration correlate with a significant uptick of intolerance against other races and 
foreign workers more than against drug users or alcoholics (.29). Keep in mind 
that in those states in-migration is correlated with decreased overall intolerance 
against immigrants or homosexuals (-.24).  Finally, there is a direct relationship 
between per capita GDP and intolerance focused on foreign workers or minority 
races (.24), indicating that the specific form of intolerance targeting only 
immigrants is specific to the wealthier states.  A sort of post-materialist 
intolerance.
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4.4 Examining the hypotheses
The series of hypotheses lead to the development of a path model that 
permits analysis of the relationship between relative political capacity and 
intolerance.  It is taken as an assumption that European Union member states are 
not totalitarian states and accede to the goal of social tolerance.  
The hypothesized mechanism is that relative political capacity will reduce 
intolerance through two primary paths. First, the presence and effectiveness of the 
state in society will foster the development of between-group focused bridging 
forms of social capital; second that there is a direct effect of relative political 
capacity in terms of the resources, both repressive and services that the state can 
deliver to individuals that reduce inter-group competition.  The main hypothesis are 
examined in this section using several techniques, including a path model of the 
proposed mechanisms and hierarchical models that examine the proposed 
relationships.  The path analysis is developed using ordinary least squares 
regression because it is robust to violations of normality in the dependent variable, 
but the nested nature of the data requires special techniques to address intraclass 
correlation4.  Then, because of the clustered nature of the societies surveyed, a 
series of hierarchical linear models are used to examine the full model with the 
express inclusion of group-level considerations.
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The several sub-hypothesis are also tested and several of the relationships 
between intolerance, social capital, governance, and state-level characteristics are 
explored.  
4.5 Path Model Examining Relationships Between RPE, Social Capital And 
Intolerance
The hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between the bridging 
forms of social capital and state capacity is tested with a single-level regression 
model controlling for other correlates of social capital.  In addition, if the notion of 
state capacity controlling the forms of social capital that will emerge is correct, 
RPE should be inversely related, or unrelated to bonding capital.  This test also 
provides the bridging social capital path to construct an overall path model using 
ordinary least squares regression to illustrate the relationships between relative 
political extraction, social capital and intolerance.
Modeling the path of relationships between RPE and the forms of social 
capital examines the mechanism proposed in hypothesis two; that stronger 
government capacity will constrain the formation of bonding social capital and 
foster bridging capacity. The regression of bridging social capital on relative 
political extraction, controlling for Education, Per Capita GDP and Religiosity, 
results in relationships that confirm the hypothesis.  Table 4.4 presents the mean 
standardized parameters and R-squared for the 5 imputed datasets.  
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Table 4.2:  Relative Political Extraction on Bridging Social Capital for Path Model
Model OLS RPE on Bridging Social Capital
β (t)
Intercept 0.21
Study (1=EVS,2=WVS) 0.11(.9)
Education 0.24* (6.8)
Religiosity .08* (2.9)
Is Minority Religion 
(0=majority, 1=Minority)
0.056 (1.65)
RPE 0.181* (4.8)
LN GDP per cap 0.375* (8.8)
R2, 0.178
N= 79735. Design Effect = 112.5, Adjusted N=708
Bridging Social Capital is on a scale of 1=intense<->-1= weak.
t-scores for group-level variables estimated using N for degrees of freedom at each 
level.
*significant at p<.05
Source: (World Values Survey 1981-2008 Official Aggregate V.20090901, 2009 2009; 
European Values Study 1981-2008, Longitudinal Data File 2011)
The table illustrates strong support for the hypothesis that there is a 
strengthening relationship between RPE and bridging social capital.  The 
standardized parameters show that for each standard deviation increase in RPE 
there is a .181 intensification of bridging social capital.  Education and per capita 
GDP also have strong associations with bridging social capital.  Religiosity, also 
has an intensifying effect on bridging capital.  This observation is likely because 
one of the components of the bridging capital factor is membership in a religious 
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organization and religious individuals are also engaged in other service oriented 
organizations as discussed in the literature review. 
 A second regression model, in table 4.8 below, to test the path between 
RPE and the bonding form of social capital does not confirm the expectation of 
hypothesis 2.3; the relationship between RPE and bonding capital is in the same 
direction as with bridging capital.  However, the relationship is very weak, .075 
standardized coefficient.  The model accounts for roughly 3% of the variance in 
bonding capital.  The bonding social capital model has a conditional intraclass 
correlation of only .04, indicating that it the characteristics of bonding social capital 
are driven by individual level characteristics that are not included in this path.  The 
item that correlates most with bonding capital is religiosity.  The relationship 
indicates that more religious people, other factors being equal, tend have a more 
in-group orientation.  It is also worthwhile to remember that although bonding and 
bridging capital are factors drawn from the same measured indicators, they are, 
largely independent of each other so there are states, like Sweden, that score 
intensely on both bridging and bonding capital.
The models that were tested in this section indicate that the expected 
relationship between bridging forms of social capital and RPE exists which 
indicates a confirmation of hypothesis 2.2.  The expected negative relationship 
between bonding, or inward focused forms of social capital, and relative political 
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extraction was not present however rejecting the relationship expected in 
hypothesis 2.3.  
In order to examine the direct effect of bridging social capital on intolerance 
the path analysis model is populated with other indicator variables.  This model 
also specifies the paths between Intolerance and bridging social capital and the 
relationships between and among RPE, GDP, education, political self-position plus 
the institutional trust and religiosity forms of social capital as well.
Path analysis requires that the entire web of effects be examined on order 
to identify the paths of relationships among the variables in the model.  To 
examine the path of bridging social capital in the single-level model it must be 
populated with all the relevant relationships, otherwise there may be unidentified 
suppression or moderation effects that will confound interpretation.  
 The table illustrates the first part of the path which passes through 
education and has a -.09 correlation with Intolerance in the final model.  The path 
model illustrates that only a very small part of the relationship between RPE and 
Intolerance stems from the relationship of RPE and GDP per capita through 
education. The path diagram shows the relationships as modeled by the path 
analysis, and manifest in the single-level regression model of the relationships 
between intolerance and the individual level variables, and the national-wave level 
variables of GDP and RPE.  
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Table 4.2: Intolerance Single-level Regression for the Path Analysis
Ordinary Least Squares Random Intercepts Regression
β (t) B (t)
Intercept -0.05 -0.07
Study (EVS,WVS) 0.004 (1.6) .086 (1.3)
Political Self-Placement 0.08 (3.1) .08 (19.6)
Age 0.063 (2.21) .0133 (27.8)
Religiosity .084 (2.9) .03 (9.8)
Educational Attainment -0.10 (-3.4) -.10 (-26.2)
Bridging Capital -.11 (-3.8) -.308 (-21.5)
Bonding Capital -0.012 (-.6) .005 (.5)
Ln (per Cap GDP) -0.315 (-2.8) -1.14 (-8)
RPE .006 (.07) .096 (.06)
R2 0.205
Dependent Variable= Intolerance summed with sqrt transformation. 
N= 79128, Design effect= 66, Adjusted N=1192, 
All Standardized Regression Coefficients 
*significant at p<.05.
Source: World Values Survey 1980-2005 combined dataset.  World Values Association.
The table provides the path model of the single-level OLS regression next 
to a random intercept hierarchical model.  The singe-level regression has an R-
squared of .20.  What both models provide is confirmation of that bridging social 
capital is associated with improved tolerance; the single-level regression with a 
single fixed intercept at the mean income and political capacity level, shows a -.11 
standardized correlation between bridging social capital and Intolerance, the 
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hierarchical linear model indicates that even if the intercept for the individual-level 
model is allowed to vary by country-year, the relationship holds.
Path model estimated using OLS regression for the total model (direct paths) and 
for the two indirect paths estimated.  
Source: World Values Survey 1980-2005 combined dataset.  World Values 
Association.
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Figure 4.2:  Path Analysis of RPE to Intolerance, Single-level Regression
4.5.1  Path model test of hypothesis 1: Political capacity will have a direct effect 
on intolerance.
Figure 4.2 illustrates that the direct path between relative political extraction 
and transformed intolerance in the model is a very weak and not significant .006.  
This is the opposite direction of the hypothesis and means the null hypothesis of 
no effect cannot be rejected by this model.  However, the discussion of the 
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relationship of RPE and intolerance illustrated by the path model, indicates that the 
effect of RPE on intolerance is mediated both through education and social 
capital.  As a note the random intercept multi-level models in section 4.6 also 
show a non-significant relationship of RPE and intolerance in the opposite of the 
hypothesized direction. 
4.5.2  Path model tests of hypotheses 2, 2.1, 2.2: Political capacity of the 
government will reduce intolerance through bridging social capital.
These hypotheses are confirmed in the path model.  The unexpected direct 
relationship of RPE and intolerance in the direct path is moderated by the indirect 
paths through educational attainment, bridging social capital, and GDP.  The path 
analysis in figure 4.2 illustrates the relationship of RPE to intolerance through 
bridging capital and education. 
Hypothesis 2.1, that bridging social capital (Trust-based) is associated with 
reduced Intolerance, is supported in the path model.  The path between bridging 
social capital and intolerance is statistically significant with a coefficient of -.11 (p<.
05).  Remember that the bridging social capital variable is constructed so that 
negative numbers indicate denser networks and greater social trust. The -.11 
correlation indicates that as individuals participate in fewer organizations and have 
less trust, they are more likely to exhibit intolerance.
Hypothesis 2.2, that increased government capacity will improve the level 
of bridging social capital, is also supported by the OLS regression used to 
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populate the path model.  The RPE to bridging social capital path, has a -.18 
correlation, consistent with the hypothesis.  The path between bridging social 
capital and the intolerance variable has a correlation of -.11.  Therefore, eighteen 
percent of the path that is between bridging social capital and the intolerance 
variable is a product of relative political extraction.  
Additionally, RPE is associated with ten percent of educational attainment 
scores, which have a .24 coefficient associated with bridging capital.  The product 
of the path, .10 by .24, is the .02 that is contributed indirectly to bridging capital 
by RPE through educational attainment. The net indirect contribution of RPE to 
Intolerance through bridging social capital is .02 plus .01 through education for a 
total indirect path of .03.  The relationship between Intolerance and RPE is still a 
very weak effect, requiring an examination using the more powerful tool of a multi-
level linear regression.  
4.5.2:  Path model test of hypothesis 2.3, Intense bonding social capital is 
associated with summed intolerance 
Hypothesis 2.3 is not supported by the results of the path model presented 
in table 4.1.  The standardized regression coefficient of -.012 is not close to 
significant.  Even the parallel random intercept multi-level model with improved 
sensitivity, presented alongside the OLS path model in table 4.1 does not support 
the hypothesis that bonding capital is directly related to intolerance.  Table 4.1 and 
the discussion of its results indicate that there was no significant relationship 
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between RPE and bonding forms of social capital.  This rejects the hypothesized 
mechanism of constrained bonding social capital.  Indeed, the maps of social 
capital in Europe (figure 3.9) show that some high bridging capital states like 
Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands, also have high levels of bonding social 
capital.
The path model is useful for illustrating the mechanisms of the relationship 
between government capacity and intolerance.  Relative political capacity is 
associated with improved educational results, and a strengthened relationship of 
GDP per capita and intolerance.  Without the path model, the simple correlation 
between RPE and intolerance would lead to a conclusion that increased capacity 
suppresses intolerance, however the mechanism is more complicated, and has 
implications for focusing limited public resources.
The OLS model does not permit varying intercepts and really dealing with 
the context-dependent nature of the surveys and the environment of the 
relationships between intolerance and its correlates requires the use of multi-level 
techniques which permit varying intercepts.
4.6: Testing Hypotheses With Multi-level Models.
The statistical power of multi-level models is determined by the number of 
groups, more than the number of individual cases (Hox 2002). The constraints 
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caused by the small number of group-level (country wave) indicators, the multi-
level model is limited in the number of country-level variables or cross-level 
interactions that can be tested in the multi-level model without losing power. 
Following the direction of a number of texts reviewed in the literature discussion, 
the focus will be on the interaction of social capital and relative political extraction 
with few context-level variables such as RPE and GDP per cap in each analysis.
The subsequent models examine the role of RPE and bridging social 
capital in multi-level models that include the contextual effects of GDP/Capita and 
RPE, as well as the cross-level interaction of RPE and bridging capital.  The 
interaction term allows the slope of bridging capital to vary by country.  The 
observation of the single model, that the impact of RPE on bridging social capital, 
and on Intolerance is affected by the right-left nature of the government, indicates 
that the slope of social capital varies by country-wave.  
Several models are presented in the table in Appendix J that lead to the 
specification of the model in table 4.3. The first is the null model containing 
random intercepts to provide a baseline for comparison and derivation of the 
psuedo-R2.  
The relationships of interest for this study are the relationships of 
intolerance, RPE and bridging social capital with each other and interacted on 
intolerance.  The model below allows the inspection of the relationships of the 
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country-level variables on the individual-level intercepts, and the relationship 
between bridging social capital and RPE as nested in the context of each country 
in each wave of the survey.  In multi-level regression models the observations of 
the single-level models carry forward to the multi-level model in the slopes of the 
individual-level and group level variables.  The fixed effect coefficients of the 
group-level variables act on the intercept for individual’s regression equations.  
4.6.1: Analysis
 The results of the hierarchical model for the 1986-2007 data looks similar 
to the final OLS regression for the path model. The relationships of education, as 
well as political self-assignment, age, income and gender all retain significant 
individual-level slopes with intolerance in the expected direction.  
The addition of GDP per capita reduces the between country error term 
(random intercept) by more than half, and doubling the explained variance 
between the null model from the appendix and populated model below. While 
none of the other context variables had statistically significant fixed effects.   
The unstandardized slope of bridging social capital on intolerance is 
between -.28 to -.33 in all the models and still significant at the .00. This result 
provides consistent support to hypothesis 2.1, that intensified bridging social 
capital is associated with lower intolerance.  
Table 4.3:  Hierarchical Model 1986-2007 Data
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Fixed Effects Coefficients
Intercept γ00 -0.21
Religiosity (centered) .04**
Gender (male) .27**
Education (centered) -.09**
Right-Left Political (centered) .08**
Income (centered) -.017**
Bridging Social Capital (centered) -.33**
Age (centered) .013**
Town Size -.04**
Relative Political Extraction 1.90
ln GDP/Capita (centered) -1.03**
Migration. rate -2.24
Soc. Security Spending/GDP -2.9
Local expenditure /total expenditure -0.036
RPE x Bridging Capital -1.39*
Ln GDP x Bridging -.15**
Local Exp x Bridging 0.12
Random Effects
Residual 3.13
Random Intercept .22*
Random Slope Bridging .025**
Slopes by Intercepts Bridging 0.006
Model Fit (smaller is better)
AIC 226570.00
BIC 226606.00
Pseudo R2 0.19
Individual N= 77,015, Group-level N = 72 . Mixed Regression, Unstructured Random 
Effects (variance components). Right-wing parties in percentage of total cabinet posts, 
weighted by days. Source: own calculations for Turkey based on Schmidt and Beyer 
(1992); 1991 onwards: Political Data Yearbook(s), EJPR. 
Source: World Values Survey 1980-2005 combined dataset.  World Values Association.
 While the direct path between RPE and intolerance does not have a 
Noordijk Bridging Intolerance 127
statistically significant coefficient, it is positive which is the opposite direction 
proposed for hypothesis one (1.9).  However, the cross-level interaction term RPE 
x bridging also highlights the relationship between RPE and bridging social capital 
in the model. The coefficient of the cross-level interaction term is -1.39 and is 
significant even though the coefficient for RPE alone is not.  The -1.39 coefficient 
of the interaction term indicates that at higher levels of RPE, the relationship 
between bridging social capital and intolerance is slightly, but significantly 
intensified.  Review of the hierarchical models in Appendix J provide more support 
for the idea that some change in RPE accounts for an element of the random 
slope of bridging social capital.This is because there a reduction of the random 
slope for the bridging social capital (from .04 to .03), meaning that some of the 
random variation in slope for bridging social capital, is accounted for by RPE. 
The error term for the random slope of bridging social capital (.025) 
indicates that there is slight, but statistically significant variation in the slope 
between intolerance and bridging social capital at the country-wave level.  The 
slope by intercept error term of ,006 for bridging social capital means that the 
variation in slopes is not a product of the intolerance. 
 The variation is accounted for without further explaining the model fit, 
which still has a psuedo-r-squared of .18 to .19 for both models. The existence of 
an inconsistent relationship in the interaction effect explains why there is no 
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increase in the slope of bridging capital for an increase in relative political 
extraction.  
This observation is also confirmed by the relative lack of slope variance for 
bridging social capital.  If the slope of bridging capital on Intolerance is almost 
always the same, the slope of the interaction of RPE and bridging social capital 
cannot have a consistent effect on Intolerance because RPE changes from group 
to group.  While the  slope RPE x bridging capital is significant, indicating that the 
variance of slope from context to context accounts for a non-trivial amount of the 
error in the model, however there is a large standard error of the estimate and 
small degrees of freedom ( 31) means the relationship has little power.  
The hierarchical model also includes the interaction of country-wave level 
per capita GDP with bridging social capital. The coefficient of -.15 is significant.  
For higher levels of GDP the slope of the relationship between bridging capital and 
intolerance will also change slightly.  Illustrating that the relationship between per 
capita GDP and intolerance is also partially mediated by bridging social capital.  
First the level of recent influx of immigrants has a reversed relationship with 
intolerance, that is intolerance is inversely related with the immigration rate.  
Second, the level of unemployment in the country has a significant relationship 
with intolerance but the weak relationship indicated is the reverse of common 
assumptions (model 3 in Appendix J).  This is in contrast with results of some 
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other studies, however other authors have observed that unemployment at the 
individual level does have a direct relationship with intolerance (Coenders and 
Scheepers 2003).  Possible explanations might be that migrants seek strong 
economies and countries with capable governments as destination countries.  
Contact theories of intolerance also are supported by the strong reversed 
relationship of town size and intolerance as most migrants and their heirs settle in 
urban settings. 
Finally, a separate term for social security spending over GDP is included to 
explore the idea that a strong social safety net reduces the dependence on tightly 
bonded organizations for social welfare support and reduces the costs of 
defections by potential partners in organizations or enterprises that lie on the edge 
of an individual’s network of social controls. Social security spending is not 
significant in the fully specified model in table 4.3.  
The model rejects a direct effect of RPE on social intolerance.  Hypothesis 
one is rejected.  However, hypothesis two; that RPE will foster bridging social 
capital is supported.  As is hypothesis 2.1, the expectation that intensified bridging 
social capital is associated with lower intolerance.
4.6.2: Testing the relationships of relative political extraction, local expenditure 
and bridging social capital
Hypothesis three postulates that, a smaller locus of public spending control 
will contribute to greater social capital and reduced intolerance, controlling for 
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other factors.  This is following arguments in the literature that local organizations 
will be engaged if they have input into spending decisions, and that local civil-
society groups will be supported local expenditures.  In these results, the locus of 
expenditure has no significant direct relationship with intolerance (-.04), nor one 
that is mediated through bridging social capital illustrated by the interaction term 
between bridging social capital and ratio of local control (.12).  Hypothesis three 
cannot be sustained based on these results.  The policy or environmental 
conditions for tolerance and policy decisions on how to address issues of 
intolerance are not linked simply to local expenditure.  How the resources are used 
appears to matter more than what level of government reports spending.  
Hypothesis four is tested in the model where neither local expenditure, or 
the interaction of local expenditure with social capital are significant in the setting 
of the 72 country-years included in the sample.   
4.6.3: Multi-level models With 2008 and 2009 cases testing interaction with 
right-wing government and the EU effect
Table 4.4 presents several models (seven through ten) largely testing the 
same issues discussed above but with additional country-year cases drawn from 
the 2008-2009 wave of the World Values and European Values Surveys.  The 
most important additions to the models are the interaction of right-wing 
government participation and the inclusion of Time EU; a measure of years the 
country has been in the EU since the SIngle European Act of 1986.  The models 
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also differ from prior models because all variables have been grand-mean 
centered and standardized on their standard deviation.  Because the data from 
the new wave of the surveys has only recently been released and is not entirely 
recoded to match the prior waves, the models below omit a number of the 
interesting variables covered in the previous sections such as individual income 
and town size.  However, the overall outcome of the new models is that the 
relationships evident between intolerance, bridging social capital and relative 
political extraction persist even with a larger range of countries and cases.  
4.6.4: Testing hypothesis four; Right-wing participation in government will 
mediate the relationship between political extraction and Intolerance.
Model A, in table 4.4, includes both an independent variable of the trailing 
moving average for right-wing party participation in government and an interaction 
effect with relative political extraction.  This model includes these variable to test 
the hypothesized relationship between right-wing governments and political 
extraction.  Hypothesis four from the introduction postulated that right-wing 
governments will be less likely than other governments to use political capacity in 
an effort to directly constrain intolerance.  The expectation is that there would be a 
direct relationship between right-wing government participation and intolerance.  
The model also tests for the interaction between RPE and right-wing participation 
in government to examine mediation effect.  The fixed effect coefficient for right-
wing government is .04 with a t-value of 1.74, below the significance threshold of 
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1.96.  The interaction effect in model A fails to reject the null hypothesis that right-
wing participation in governments has no effect on the relationship between 
relative political capacity and intolerance.  The coefficient of the interaction term is 
-.02 with a t-value of .97. 
The coefficient for the direct relationship between intolerance and right-
wing party composition of government in the models with the newer cases 
confirms the result of the multi-level models with the smaller dataset.  There is a 
weak relationship between right-wing government participation and intolerance (.
04 in models A and B, and even weaker .03 in model C) indicating that as 
governments have greater participation of right-wing parties, the reported 
intolerance level increases slightly.  This is in addition to the relationship of 
individuals’ right-left political disposition and intolerance (.05 and p <.01).  The 
interaction term for right-wing party participation in governments with RPE is also 
below significance, with a t-score of -.72 the interaction effect does not approach 
significance at p.05.  The coefficient is -.02 indicating that as RPE increases the 
marginal effect of right-wing participation declines.
Hypothesis four asserts that the participation of right-wing parties in the 
Parliament will effect how political capacity is applied by governments.  The weak 
relationship indicated by the coefficient for the interaction term does not support 
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the hypothesis.  There appears to be a direct effect, but it is only very weakly 
related to RPE.
Table 4.4: Models with 2008-2009 Cases Added, Models A through C 
Fixed Effects of Standardized Mod
el A
t Model 
B
t Model 
C
t
Intercept 0.61 26.47 0.61 26.55 0.68 31.31
Male 0.08 20.15 0.08 20.16 0.08 20.17
Bridging Social Capital -0.07 -11.85 -0.07 -11.52 -0.07 -12.45
Religiosity 0.03 15.31 0.03 15.30 0.03 15.44
Political Self-Placement 0.05 26.89 0.05 26.90 0.05 26.86
Age 0.07 35.48 0.07 35.48 0.07 35.50
Education -0.08 -38.24 -0.08 -38.23 -0.08 -38.17
Ln GDP/cap -0.23 -10.22 -0.24 -10.38 -0.09 -2.96
RPE -0.01 -0.57 -0.02 -0.81 -0.06 -2.97
Bridging * GDP -0.01 -2.36 -0.01 -2.52 -0.01 -2.24
Gov-right  5 year MA 0.04 1.74 0.04 1.86 0.03 1.50
Bridging * RPE -0.01 -0.97
RPE by Gov right -0.02 -0.72
Bridging Group 0.04 1.14
Bridging Group * Bridging Ind. -0.01 -1.57
Time EU -0.22 -6.51
Random Effects Est. Wald ZEst. Wald Z Est. Wald Z
Residual 0.376 231.4280.376 231.428 0.376 231.400
Random Intercept 0.042 6.198 0.042 6.237 0.028 6.157
Bridging by Intercept 0.001 0.944 0.002 1.241 0.001 1.358
Bridging Random Slope 0.002 4.518 0.002 4.517 0.002 4.570
Model Fit
Psuedo R2 0.19 0.19 0.20
AIC Fit 200286 200293 200251
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Dependent variable= Transformed and centered intolerance
Individual N=98279, Group-level N = 85.
 Mixed Regression, unstructured random effects. 
Right-wing parties in percentage of total cabinet posts, weighted by days. 
Source: own calculations for Turkey based on Schmidt and Beyer (1992); 1991 
onwards: Political Data Yearbook(s), EJPR. 
(World Values Survey 1981-2008 Official Aggregate V.20090901, 2009 2009; 
European Values Study 1981-2008, Longitudinal Data File 2011)
4.6.5: Effect of the duration of European Union membership on intolerance and 
RPE
Model C includes a new term in the independent variables, duration of 
membership in the European Union since 1986.  This variable is calculated simply 
by subtracting the year of survey from the year the country joined the European 
Union, or since the ratification of the Single European Act in 1986.  
With the term for duration in the European Union included, several shifts of 
values in the model are revealed.  The coefficient of the direct effect on intolerance 
is substantial and significant -.22 (p<.01), indicating that longer term membership 
is associated with improved social tolerance.  Additionally, duration in the EU has 
suppression effect on GDP/capita, accounting for more than half the relationship 
between national wealth and intolerance.  The direct term for RPE shifts from the 
very weak positive relationship in models one through five, to a significant and 
negative relationship in model ten.  The coefficient -.06 is significant at p<.01. 
Although still not a strong effect compared to bridging social capital or education.  
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It is significant and in the direction expected in hypothesis one.  In the presence of 
whatever factors are captured in the indicator Time EU, RPE behaves as expected 
in the hypotheses from chapter one.  The more recent accession and candidate 
countries have much higher intolerance levels than the older EU members.
4.6.8 Effect of group-level bridging social capital on individual bridging social 
capital and intolerance.
Model B, illustrated in table 4.4, indicates that the group-level reservoir of 
social capital does not have as strong a relationship with intolerance as does an 
individual’s level of social capital.  This result was indicated by other models that 
illustrated relative indifference in the slope of bridging social capital to the levels of 
intolerance, however, model B specifically tests for this relationship.  A group-level 
variable was created by taking the country-wave average social capital for each 
country in the sample.  The variable was centered on the grand mean and 
standardized.  The direct effect of the group-level variable for bridging social 
capital indicates that the .04 shift in the intercept of intolerance is the opposite of 
the direct effect.  That is, the greater the average intensity of bridging social 
capital, the intercept of intolerance for that country-wave actually increases, 
although the relationship is weak and not significant as an indicator in a random 
sample of countries. However, the interaction term does indicate that with higher 
levels of social capital the impact of an individual’s level of bridging social capital is 
slightly intensified-- again, the relationship is weak, and not significant.  The 
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random slope for bridging social capital in model nine is also unaffected by the 
inclusion of the group-level and interaction terms, indicating that there are other 
sources for the slight differences in slope of bridging social capital from country-
wave to country-wave.
4.7:  Multi-level Examination Of Bridging Social Capital
The path model in section 4.5 presented a ordinary least squares model 
that investigated the causal paths between GDP, political extraction, education 
and social capital on intolerance. As bridging social capital is a lynchpin of the link 
between of political extraction and intolerance, it warrants more investigation.  
Also, table 4.4 from the path model to bridging social capital indicate that while 
religiosity is associated with increased intolerance, it is also associated with more 
intense bridging social capital.  This section uses hierarchical techniques to revisit 
the relationship of bridging social capital the other independent variables.  All the 
variables are standardized by the standard deviation and centered on the grand 
means.
 The use of a single-level regression model to measure the paths of 
relationships between the hypothesized variables allows for an understanding of 
effects in the aggregate, but is not as sensitive to changes of group-level variables. 
Comparing the multi-level model below to the path regression on bridging social 
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capital and new model allows for including the impact of group-level variables on 
the individual-level intercepts and inspection of the relationship between religiosity 
and bridging social capital.  The model below differs from the single-level 
regression above in two important ways.  First, the intercepts are allowed to vary 
by country-year, secondly it includes indicators for how the group-level variables 
effect the intercepts in each country.  That means that relationships observed 
moving in one direction in the aggregated ordinary least squares regression may 
flip for the individual level as the impact of different intercepts and the changes on 
intercepts caused by context variables is accounted inside the model.
Table 4.5: Hierarchical Random-Intercept Regression on Bridging Social Capital
Model Bridging 1,2 Random Intercept Random Slope Religiosity
Fixed Effects- Standardized Z-scores Coefficients Sig. Coefficients Sig.
Intercept 0.02 0.72 0.02 0.70
Study (WVS=1,EVS=0) 0.00 -0.03 -0.004 0.890
Gender (1=Female, 0=Male) 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00
Religiosity 0.11 0.00 0.114 0.000
Minority (0=minority, 1=majority) 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.00
Education 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.00
Income 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00
Political Self-position 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00
Age 0.010 0.04 0.010 0.04
GDP per Cap 0.30 0.00 0.31 0.00
Relative Political Extraction 0.18 0.00 0.21 0.00
Government Right Participation 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.38
Local expenditure ratio 0.21 0.00 0.15 0.00
Random Eﬀects Residual 
Variance
Sig. Residual 
Variance
Sig.
Residual (within group variance) 0.74 0.00 0.74 0.00
Random Intercept (variance between 
groups)
0.08 0.00 0.08 0.00
Religiosity Random Slope 0.002 0.001
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Religiosity Slope by Intercept 0.007 0.002
Model Fit AIC 166865 AIC 166839
Dependent is grand mean-centered bridging social capital. Source: World Values Survey 
1980-2010 combined dataset.  World Values Association.  Mixed model using variance 
components structured random effects and random coefficients models.
Even with the improved sensitivity and possibility that relationships will shift 
with the introduction of the random or group-level intercepts, the results are 
consistent with the path model.  Table 4.5 illustrates that the relationships noted in 
the single-level path model still hold even with the reduced degrees of freedom 
while random slopes by context are allowed. 
4.7.1. Revisiting hypothesis 3; Local expenditure ratio and bridging social 
capital.
There are several results of interest in these models.  One is that an 
increased ratio of local expenditure will improve bridging social capital is borne out 
in this model, that is in conflict with the result of the interaction term of bridging 
social capital and local expenditure from the hierarchical model. The result 
supports the mechanism of improved tolerance proposed in hypothesis three.  A 
standard deviation increase in the local expenditure ratio is associated with a .21 
intensification of bridging social capital (the scale of bridging social capital is 
reversed).  This effect can be compared to the other effects in the model as they 
are all standardized.  The .21 coefficient reduces to a .15 effect when a random 
error for religiosity is included, indicating some interaction effect between personal 
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religiosity and local expenditure.  Both the .21 and .15 coefficients are among the 
strongest correlates of bridging social capital in the model. 
4.7.2  Religiosity and bridging social capital: a closer look.
Religiosity and bridging social capital are investigated in the hierarchical 
regression that includes random slopes and intercepts for religiosity, shown in 
table 4.5.  The results indicate that religiosity intensifies memberships and social 
trust-- bridging social capital.  The coefficient is -.11 (p<.01), indicating that it is 
one of the more powerfully correlated independent variables included in the model 
(remember these are standardized coefficients).  The effect of religiosity on 
bridging social capital weakens only slightly at higher levels of social capital with a 
random coefficient for slopes by intercepts of .007.  There is some statistically 
significant variability in the slope of religiosity on the formation of bridging social 
capital as indicated by the .002 (p<.01) coefficient for random slopes.  
The model indicates that while the effect of religiosity on bridging social 
capital is strong and increased religiosity intensifies the stock of an individual’s 
social capital, the relationship is variable and weakens at higher levels of social 
capital.
4.7.3 Minority status and bridging social capital
According to the models in figure 4.5, minority religion status is associated 
with a .07 standard deviation decline in the intensity of their bridging social capital 
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reserves.  This is a clear indication that social capital efforts should target minority 
communities, of course for social capital to be bridging it must bridge outside 
identity communities meaning spreading to majority communities as well.  Until the 
last ten years, little of the policy effort in the Netherlands case studies included the 
majority population, these results seem to indicate that is not a rational policy 
choice.  There has been a recent shift in the past several years among some 
Dutch cities with a neighborhood focus that includes majority participation.  As the 
majority population is also more likely to express intolerance, efforts to address 
intolerance should be focused on majority population as well as increasing 
minority social capital.
4.8 Summary and Conclusion of Analysis
The path model and hierarchical models were used to test the 
hypothesized relationships between and among social intolerance, relative political 
extraction and social capital.   
Hypothesis 1: Increased relative political capacity will be associated with 
lower levels of Intolerance in the European Union and accession states.  The 
hypothesized direct path between relative political extraction and intolerance was 
not supported in any of the models, save model ten.  In fact, in most of the 
models, including the OLS path model the direct relationship between RPE and 
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intolerance was not significant and was positively correlated with intolerance.  In 
model ten, the independent variable for time in the European Union was added as 
a measure of government intent.  When that variable was included in the model, 
the suppression effect on RPE potentially caused by per capita GDP was reduced 
and the direct path was both statistically significant and negative.
Hypothesis 2: Relative political capacity will reduce intolerance by 
encouraging bridging forms of social capital.   Relative political capacity will reduce 
intolerance by constraining bonding forms of social capital. The path model, the 
several multi-level hierarchical models and especially the final hierarchical model in 
table 4.5, which analyzed the contributing factors to bridging social capital, all 
support the thesis that relative political capacity fosters the formation of bridging 
social capital.  However, the second part of this hypothesis, that relative political 
capacity will constrain the emergence of bonding capital is not supported in the 
path model.  
Hypothesis 2.1: Bridging social capital (Trust-based) is associated with 
reduced intolerance.  This hypothesis is supported in every investigation.  All the 
models show a very strong relationship between bridging social capital and 
intolerance, often, with education, the independent variable with the highest 
correlation with improved tolerance.  
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Hypothesis 3: Local allocation of state resources will foster stronger 
bridging social capital.  The models provided slightly contradictory outcomes.  In 
the hierarchical model testing effects on intolerance, the  interaction term between 
bridging social capital and local ratio of spending was not statistically significant.  
The lack of significance for the interaction indicates that the relationship between 
bridging social capital and intolerance did not differ with levels of local spending.  
However, further inspection of the relationship with a model regressed on bridging 
capital in section 4.7 indicates support for the hypothesis with a strongly 
significant (p<.05) standardized coefficient of .21.  The direct analysis of the 
relationship is a better gauge of the relationship than the interaction effect, so the 
hypothesis should be accepted.
Hypothesis 4: Government intention (measured by right-wing participation) 
interacted with relative political capacity should have a stronger effect on 
intolerance than relative political capacity measured alone.  This hypothesis was 
directly tested in the hierarchical models.  The results showed a very weak and not 
significant relationship for the direct effect of right-wing participation in 
government.  
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CHAPTER 5: TWO DUTCH CASES.  
Investigating the efforts of public officials to tackle the challenges of 
intolerance in a single national context.  The examples illustrate that the tasks of 
integrating different cultural groups falls largely to local governments, and that 
those governments use their resources to actively promote programs to foster 
bridging social capital, both for the community and individuals.  Furthermore, the 
case of these cities in the Netherlands shows the usefulness of policy diffusion 
through public administration networks.  The local implementation of policy and 
the use of networks echoes both the subsidiarity structure of the European Union 
and the open method of coordination for non-coercive pursuit of policy goals that 
remain under the national-level competency.
Governance of integration and immigrant policy in the European Union falls 
under national competency since the Maastricht Treaty.  This means that there is 
no “European” policy on integration of minorities into society.  The policy 
environment is one of parallel governance in which treaty goals have been 
articulated, but policy is established and implemented in a manner idiosyncratic to 
national political conditions (Zielonka 2007).  Under the principle of subsidiarity, the 
national governments retain control of policy implementation.  In the case of the 
Netherlands, policy implementation is further devolved to municipal authorites, 
who are connected to each other through policy networks, and to other European 
cities through the Committee of the Regions. 
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The international treaty obligations of the Netherlands have informed the 
development of policy among technocrats since the first major review in 1979, the 
international obligations are mentioned in at least three major reports over the 
years (Pennix 1979; WRR 1990; WRR 2001a).  However, while policy in the 
Netherlands has been informed by international obligations, the national and local 
context of policy and implementation is paramount.  Also, the Netherlands has 
rarely been in danger of violating the vague strictures of EU and Council of Europe 
treaties covering intolerance and migration.  
As one of the major migration destination countries and founding European 
Union members, the Netherlands has led the way in developing immigration and 
integration policy for ethnic minorities (Borket, Bosswick, Heckmann and Lüken-
Klaßen 2007, 10-22; Scholten and Timmermans 2010,  532-535).  The 
Netherlands has had some form of articulated minorities policy since the late 
1970s after a national report noted the need to formally accept the permanence of 
immigrant groups (Pennix 1979; WRR 1990).  In addition to the Minorities Policy, 
the Dutch legal environment has enfranchised minorities by extending the right to 
vote in local elections in 1988; Dutch officials engaged with consultative bodies 
composed of local minority leaders; and the Netherlands emphasized protection 
against discrimination as embodied in the 1994 Equal Treatment Act which 
intensified tracking of discrimination by governments and employers (Borket, et al. 
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2007, 21-22).  However, despite not ever articulating policies that extended 
political franchise to immigrants as “multiculturalism,” the majority Dutch culture 
hosted a political backlash against accommodation in the new millennium.  
  The policy structure of the Netherlands is similar to that of the European 
Union in the larger context.  Local governments in cities and towns have chief 
administrative responsibility for managing policy set at the national level for 
achieving integration and combatting intolerance (WRR 1990, 86-88).  However, 
that administrative responsibility is directed by national-level policy directions and 
framed in the policy conversations of the day.  Local administrators rely on national 
directives, funding and data collection to manage their efforts.  However, they also 
participate in policy networks that are at least partly supported by the central 
government.  The local administrators access national research and data 
networks managed by the central government, as well as policy networks 
composed of other Dutch city administrators, non-governmental organizations 
and academics (Entzinger 2006, 127).
The national policy conversation throughout the 1970s to the assimilationist 
trend of the 2000s has been focused primarily on the responsibility of ethnic 
minorities to engage in broader society, with much less conversation about ethnic 
Dutch society engaging with and incorporating minorities into social activities.  
Interestingly, apart from a few programs promoting intercultural, and 
Noordijk Bridging Intolerance 146
intergenerational dialogue, the emphasis in the Netherlands, including Utrecht and 
Rotterdam has largely been focused on the participation of minority and immigrant 
residents in organizations outside of the home with recognition of majority 
responsibility for inclusion mentioned but not emphasized.
Integration policy was given added impetus by a 1979 analysis of the 
situation of ethnic minorities and existing policy conducted by the Netherlands 
government’s research institute, the WRR.  The 1979 analysis examined the 
situation of several minority groups then extant in the Netherlands including 
Moluccan, Surinamese, Caribbean, and Mediterranean immigrants.  The report 
found that there was little coherence in Dutch nationality policy because, prior to 
the 1970s, the government policy behaved as though immigrants were transitory 
(Pennix 1979, 160).  This conclusion was surprising because in 1973 half a million 
immigrants were former colonial subjects; they were officially citizens but still 
treated as temporary communities. The other major community of immigrants was 
the Mediterranean labor recruitment group composed largely of Greek, Spanish, 
and Turkish labor migrants.  More recently, a combination of economic and 
political refugees from Arab states and Africa have also settled in the Netherlands 
(WRR 2001a, 46).  
Highlighting the immediacy of acknowledging a multi-ethnic society, 
Amsterdam has a population of immigrants and non-ethnic Dutch exceeding fifty 
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percent, while Rotterdam and some mid-sized cities like Utrecht have non-ethnic 
Dutch (allochtonen) populations exceeding twenty percent (Entzinger 2006, 123; 
Scholten and Holzhacker 2009, 81-82).  Even more starkly, the youth populations 
of ethnic minorities currently exceeds the ethnic Dutch (autochtonen) youth 
population in Utrecht (Manders 2011).  Dutch policy on immigration and 
integration since 1979 has been marked by comparatively intensive research and 
evaluation, but shifts in methodology, political environment, and unit of 
implementation have caused apparent shifts of focus in policy but not necessarily 
changes in implementation at the street-level (Entzinger 2000; Scholten and 
Holzhacker 2009).
Scholten (2008) writes that the local implementation of integration policy 
continues to reflect the community identity models of multiculturalism and 
integration of the 1980s and 1990s.  However, in my conversations with 
bureaucrats in both Utrecht and Rotterdam (two major allochtonen population 
centers), they stressed the focus on people as individuals and not as part of 
communities.  The newer term for policy directed at integration or assimilation is 
the struggle against social exclusion (Manders 2011; Jagmohansingh 2012).
5.1 Three periods of Dutch policy related to social capital and multicultural 
society: the national context.
Most of the period of integration policy since the 1970s, when social capital 
is mentioned at all, it is almost exclusively focused on the importance of 
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immigrants being engaged in economic activity and organizations.  It is not until 
more recently that greater emphasis has been put on community cohesion and 
bridging capital activities of the majority community.  Programs like “Welcome to 
Rotterdam”, neighborhood interventions in Rotterdam and Amsterdam and 
community projects in Utrecht, have an intentional element of drawing ethnic 
Dutch into shared activities  (WRR 2001b; Engbersen, Snel and Weltfvede 2005; 
Lub 2005, 32-35; Scholten 2009).  
The first of these periods of Dutch policies (1979-1990) emphasized 
pillarization and bonding within groups connection to officials through formal 
public consultation organizations.  The initial national policy report in 1979 
contained several policy recommendations, foremost among them were 
coordinating national efforts at meeting the basic needs of immigrants and 
fostering their participation in society.  Activity was focused within pillars of 
organizations and outreach.  The effect of policies meant to assist minority 
communities to manage their own affairs was bonding minorities to one another 
and then linking them municipal governments.  However, this policy experienced 
difficulty because the representation organizations occasionally did not reflect the 
community they were assigned to represent, for example having Sunni (Grey 
Wolves) immigrants on a board to organize a Turkish immigrant population 
consisting of Alevi Kurds and ethnic Turks (WRR 1990, 89) (Entzinger 2006, 
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125-126).  In the first period of policy local officials allowed for some public 
instruction in the language of their home country and extended the electoral 
franchise for local elections.  
During the second period of minorities policy (1991-2001) there was more 
of a focus on integration; with a shift towards the engagement of individuals in 
formal labor and an increased focus on social participation especially in the labor 
force (Scholten and Holzhacker 2009).  There was a strong emphasis directed at 
improved education and language skills as the gateway to accessing employment 
and social integration.  The focus of policy was also less “group” based and more 
focused on improving individual human capital, although social capital in the form 
of participation by groups and in organizations within the communities was still 
referenced in the reports structuring this period of national policy (WRR 1990, 
50-52).  Improved Dutch language and culture skills were emphasized in this 
period and were considered the responsibility of the state. 
The inburgering (citizen creation) process established as national policy in 
this period focused on mandatory Dutch language classes (free at the time) with 
600 hours of language lessons and training for participation in the labor markets 
as a means of empowering individuals to access labor and social networks 
outside the home.  The 1989-90 report on integration policy that provided this 
policy outline also reflected that there was fairly little public instruction happening 
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in the native tongue of immigrants, despite the public outcry against this “policy” 
that emerged at the end of the decade (WRR 1990, 77-83).  Indeed, the report 
noted that the lack of education and discrimination by natives were equally causes 
of the high unemployment and social isolation experienced by ethnic minorities.  
Nonetheless, national policy direction was shifted away from addressing 
integration through communal identity group memberships and addressing issues 
through community-based multicultural organizations or consultation committees.  
Despite the shift in focus from identity community-based participation, there was 
an increasingly strong focus on developing human and social capital for 
individuals, including participation in ethnic group-based organizations but also in 
participation in the broader economic society (WRR 2001b, 50-52).        
The third period in Dutch integration policy, beginning roughly with the rise 
of Pim Fortuyn’s Liveable Rotterdam party and his subsequent murder in 2002,  
has been described as “the assimilationist turn,” reflecting the political backlash 
against what had been described as the multiculturalist model pushed by scholars 
and the major political parties in the Netherlands (Scholten 2009; Scholten 2011a, 
189).  According to Scholten, the assimilationist backlash already had roots in the 
publications of the Social Cultural Research office, and political movements that 
redefined tolerance as limited to tolerating only those who shared majority cultural 
practices.  Ironically, among the complaints of Fortuyn’s supporters was that 
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immigrants and asylum seekers did not share the Dutch value of social tolerance 
of different lifestyles (Scholten 2011b, 197).  As a note, the 2008 World Values 
Survey wave from the Netherlands shows that the few respondents with a parent 
born abroad (n=133) have significantly lower intolerance rates towards 
homosexuals or different race neighbors than the native population (p<.05, p<.05) 
(World Values Survey 1981-2008 Official Aggregate V.20090901, 2009 2009). The 
data also show intolerance rates for ”Homosexual“ or “Different Race” neighbors 
among immigrants that are much lower than in presumptive home countries such 
as Turkey (.04 in the Netherlands vs .9 in Turkey and .045 vs .43).  
The assumption of the politicians pushing back against the multiculturalist 
policies of the prior two periods was that the immigrants were not adopting Dutch 
values and that the policies were abject failures.  This assumption persisted even 
against the conclusions of a special parliamentary report that was commissioned 
by the anti-immigrant Socialist Party in 2004 (Scholten 2011b, 192-194).  The 
Temporary Committee on Integration (TCOI) found that many of the measures of 
policy had been more successful than expected, particularly in the areas of 
educational attainment and housing, while goals of employment and social 
participation were still below targets  (Blok 2004, 534, 540-541).  Furthermore, the 
report noted that allochtonen success was greater where there were consistent 
programs that targeted populations for language training, work programs, and 
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education.  The results of the report were challenged by the anti-immigrant 
parliamentarians who had commissioned the report, and the political coalitions of 
the new millennium pushed assimilation as the policy goal while pushing the 
burden of assimilation onto immigrants and asylum seekers.  
A series of assimilationist laws were promoted by the new minister of 
Immigration and Integration, Rita Verdonk (Scholten 2011b, 188).  Further 
examples of the new laws included the two Wet Inburgering laws in 2005 and 
2006.  The 2005 laws, “Wet inburgering in het buitenland” (the Integration Abroad 
Act), requires that individuals seeking immigration to the Netherlands, including for 
family reunification, must pass a language and citizenship test administered in their 
home country before they can apply from immigration (The Netherlands: 
Discrimination in the Name of Integration Migrants’ Rights under the Integration 
Abroad Act 2008).  The exams and language training are at the expense of 
individuals.  The 2006 law applies similar requirements on individuals already in the 
Netherlands who seek to remain in the country or to gain naturalization.  In 
addition, the laws passed in this period tightened restrictions on dual citizenship 
(van Oers, de Hart and Groenendijk 2010, 19-23).  
The language of assimilation and individual-level focus was echoed in 
several of the conversations with local level bureaucrats and researchers from 
Rotterdam and Utrecht (Brouwer 2011; Manders 2011; Jagmohansingh 2012).  
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This echoes the observation of researchers, that direction of the national turn in 
integration and immigration policy turned away from multicultural integration and 
towards individualistic assimilation. However, in practice the local level policy has 
pursued pragmatic efforts at improving civic capacity through building social 
capital and utilizing a number of public, business and civil society partners, 
including groups organized by ethnic identity (Poppelaars 2007, 250-251; 
Jagmohansingh 2012). 
5.2 Social Capital and Civic Capacity Efforts at the Local Level
The analysis of the dataset in the analysis section demonstrates that the 
level of revenues directed locally had a significant effect on the development of 
both bridging social capital and reducing intolerance.  The conversation in the 
introduction of the Dutch case may give an indicator of both why the level of 
allocation may matter and why the national level right-left political orientation may 
matter less than other factors in success with social tolerance goals.  When 
comparing the Netherlands ratio of local expenditure to some of its European 
peers the Netherlands is in the middle of the pack.  However, the political structure 
dictates that most of the efforts at integration and social cohesion are devolved to 
the local level.  
Below, examples from two Dutch cities are included to examine how they 
targeted social capital issues as a mechanism for achieving greater social 
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tolerance.  These cities are part of both Dutch policy networks and increasingly 
linked to Europe-wide policy networks and epistemic communities.
5.2.1 The Participatie-Ladder: monitoring success in developing social capital of 
individuals at risk of social exclusion.
One recommendation consistent across the government research institute 
reports through all three periods of policy, as well as the Parliamentary 
Commission on Integration in 2004, was the need for better measurement of 
program effectiveness (Pennix 1979; WRR 1990; WRR 2001a).  Local versions of 
the inburgering process and efforts at combatting social exclusion that include 
emphasis on bridging social capital required a means of evaluating the base rate 
of participation in order to gauge the success of efforts.  One instrument gaining 
widespread usage in the Netherlands is the Participatie Ladder.  The Participatie 
Ladder is a program that embodies a number of the different conceptual strands 
discussed in this section.  One, it is a tracking tool for cities to asses their efforts 
at improving individuals’ social and human capital.  Two, it was developed with the 
think tank RegioPlan, a consortium of twelve Dutch municipalities, and The 
Association of Netherlands Cities (Verenigde Nederlandse Gemeente) that work 
together to share the costs of developing new social science tools and reinforcing 
an existing policy network (Participatie Ladder 2012).  Finally, it is an example of 
public policy network coordination that could easily extend beyond national 
borders.
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The Participatie Ladder is essentially a panel survey instrument that 
provides an indicator of individual social participation. Although the tool could 
provide a baseline for the general population’s social engagement, it was 
developed primarily to asses the resources of unemployed individuals. Participants 
(recipients of state assistance, regardless of ethnicity) are assessed for their 
position on the “Participatie Ladder” that includes the frequency of contacts 
outside their families.  Part of the program then makes assistance contingent on 
engaging in language courses (if required) before assigning placement in either 
paid or voluntary employment to increase the recipient’s social network and skill 
set (Rezai and Barendrecht 2010, 34-35; Jagmohansingh 2012).  Rotterdam and 
Utrecht have used the Participatie Ladder instrument since 2008 (Participatie 
Ladder 2012). 
The Participatie Ladder is currently used to track the social capital reserves 
of social assistance recipients by 100 of the 430 Dutch cities.  The ladder is a 
survey that evaluates respondents on six levels of social participation.   The levels 
of participation rank from social isolation at one, to paid employment at six.  The 
emphasis is on paid work, so it is not a perfect measure of social capital, however 
levels two through five emphasize the importance of engaging friends, joining 
organizations, and performing voluntary work respectively (Participatieladderhelpt 
Gemeenten Bij Het Maken Van De Juiste Keuzen 2011).  The survey instrument 
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contains 21 questions about the participant’s social activities such as shopping or 
volunteering outside the home.  The tool is meant to be used as a panel survey 
interviewing the same participants over time to track the effectiveness of policy 
efforts.  Unfortunately the survey has not been conducted among the general 
population of any Dutch cities, so no base rate has been properly established 
against which at risk populations could be compared (Brouwer 2011).  The closest 
similar metrics may be unemployment rates and rates of volunteerism found in 
surveys by the Dutch Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek or the European Values 
Surveys.  The absence of a base case also highlights the emphasis of social 
capital development efforts and integration policy in general on minority 
populations, with less concern for employers.  The City of Utrecht was a pilot 
member of the intercity consortium in the Participatie Ladder’s development and 
has used the tool to assess the success of individuals and programmatic efforts to 
decrease social exclusion and improve social capital (Brouwer 2011). 
Both Utrecht and Rotterdam use the Participatie Ladder as a tool for 
encouraging or requiring participation in activities outside the home.  In 
Rotterdam, receipt of social assistance, is contingent on performing twenty hours 
of volunteer or paid work as a way of ensuring that individuals are learning new 
skills and creating a network that can lead to employment in some cases.   
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5.3 Rotterdam: Mensen Maken de Stad
Rotterdam is an immigration city.  According to recent data held by the city 
there is a majority allochtonen population among minors, like Utrecht.  Rotterdam 
itself has only a 57 percent native Dutch population, a number that includes 
second and third generation ethnic minorities (Rotterdam Facts and Figures 2009, 
12).  In keeping with recent political changes in the Netherlands, where 
multiculturalism has been described as the cause of, not the solution to 
intolerance, Rotterdam has shifted its official policy focus away from identity-
group-based efforts and towards addressing individuals’ needs (Jagmohansingh 
2012).  However, in practice, the policies remain engaged in reaching out to 
minorities, building social capital in mixed ethnicity communities and even 
subsidizing art and sports programs for poor and minority youth (Deelgemeente 
Begroting 2012 Charlois 2012; Jagmohansingh 2012). 
The policy effort in Rotterdam and Utrecht is to incorporate citizens, non-
profit organizations and local employers in co-production of policies to improve 
both the human and social capital of individuals on social assistance (Engbersen, 
et al. 2005).  In Rotterdam, conversations with social policy makers indicated that 
there remains a focus on social tolerance, with developing social capital seen as 
instrumental to achieving tolerance in a very diverse setting.  The policy experience 
of Rotterdam also reflects the different phases of national policy, with the present 
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political-policy environment emphasizing the experiences and needs of individuals 
over group identity (Scholten and Poppelaars 2008; Jagmohansingh 2012).  
However, in practice, civil society groups that are connected to different ethnic 
communities remain important partners. (Bijlage 2.: Stand Van Zaken Mensen 
Maken De Stad 2007 2012; Jagmohansingh 2012).
Rotterdam has an ongoing initiative to improve social cohesion and reduce 
intolerance between migrant and minority communities and older ethnic dutch 
residents of Rotterdam’s neighborhoods.  The Mensen Maken de Stad (MMS), or 
People Make the City, is an initiative to increase active citizenship and social 
capital and foster a co-production model of public policy with roots extending 
back to a citizen-led efforts at connecting new and old Rotterdammers in a city 
that has experienced very high in-migration over the past 30 years.  The MMS is a 
merger of two different programs a civil society initiative called Opzoomeren and 
an official pilot program called StadsEtiquette.  The two programs each work to 
foster bridging social capital by coordinating local efforts and intensive support 
from public sector, civil society and business actors at the neighborhood scale. 
The civil society effort was led by organizations in several Rotterdam 
neighborhoods in the early 1990s and called Opzoomeren after the first street that 
enacted the effort (Lub 2005, 13-14).  The Opzoomeren initiative was an effort to 
increase interactions among neighbors, engage community members in local 
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leadership, and reduce mistrust and intolerance in a street by street, 
neighborhood-by-neighborhood model.  The initiative was triggered deterioration 
of conditions in Rotterdam’s neighborhoods, where residents did not feel safe on 
the streets and the physical character of the neighborhoods were substantially 
deteriorated.  The Opzoomeren project worked by activating neighbors into 
participating an open discussion about the conditions of the neighborhood, and 
inviting participation in planning activities in response.  Official help for the first 
initiatives came in the form of small grants for resources such as brooms, cleaning 
supplies, and occasionally funds for youth activities like sports leagues (Lub 2005, 
13; Bijlage 2.: Stand Van Zaken Mensen Maken De Stad 2007 2012, 3).  The 
Opzoomeren project grew to cover many streets and refined its methodology in 
the decade between the initial efforts and institutionalization as Mensen Maken de 
Stad in 2004.  The methodology includes training for volunteers in identifying 
neighborhood leaders, assessing needs, and attaining the early participation of 
business and government stakeholders in the process of changing quality of life in 
the neighborhood (Lub 2005; Hengeveld and Janssens 2010).  The program is 
supported financially and administratively by the city, with social services, police 
and even city maintenance workers coordinating their efforts in each focus 
neighborhood (Hengeveld and Janssens 2010).  The program expressly supports 
the establishment of bridging social capital through place-focused efforts to get 
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neighbors to work together solving problems, and view one another as part of a 
single community (Mensen Maken De Stad: 'Het Vervolg' 2006, 5). In addition to 
local financial support, programs are funded with pass-through money from the 
national government and grants to non-profit sector partners (Deelgemeente 
Begroting 2012 Charlois 2012, 123)
The Mensen Maken de Stad effort as supported by the City of Rotterdam 
also contains elements of a separate effort meant to train new residents in Dutch 
urban etiquette in response to rising public perception of a safety threat caused by 
immigrants (Lub 2005).  The pilot effort of the Urban Etiquette program launched 
in Rotterdam from 2000 to 2001 was a city-directed effort to bring residents of 
some neighborhoods together to assess the problems in their neighborhood, and 
to teach, especially to the young, the expectations of public behavior in Dutch 
society.  In addition to teaching behavior, the StadsEtiquette program helped 
neighbors conduct an assessment of problems including the capabilities and level 
of engagement of the community members.  Like the Opzoomeren project, the 
StadsEtiquette program was focused on creating social capital, but with a 
somewhat tighter focus on livability issues and resolving conflict with immigrants 
(Rotterdam 2002, 13-16).  
The StadsEtiquette project was successfully piloted in 2001-2002  just 
before the election of the Livable Rotterdam coalition led by the anti-immigrant 
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politician Pim Fortuyn in 2002 (Hengeveld and Janssens 2010, 10-11).  In spite of 
the fall of the Labor Party in Rotterdam and the election of an expressly anti-
multicuturalism, anti-muslim coalition to city government, Mensen Maken de Stad 
was launched as the StadsEtiquette program was combined with the successful 
civic capacity and tolerance model developed by Opzoomeren in the prior 
decade. The policy emphasis of the new coalition was less focused on the 
expansion of inter-communal trust, than cultural assimilation by immigrants to a 
notional standard of “Dutch” behavior, but the Mensen Maken de Stad program 
initiated in 2002 is precisely focused on social capital and increasing tolerance and 
trust in the community (Mensen Maken De Stad: 'Het Vervolg' 2006, 7-8).  The 
emergence of a distinctly social capital centered, social tolerance model with 
support of public resources, indicates that street-level bureaucrats and active 
members of the public already understand the importance and effectiveness of 
social capital as a means to achieving improved tolerance and understanding.  
This experience underscores the observation of Scholten and Poppelaars on the 
divergence between national-level and local politicians and practical application of 
knowledge by bureaucrats and the civil society actors (Scholten and Poppelaars 
2008).
Rotterdam funds sports and arts activities for that are organized different 
ethnic identifying civil society groups.   In the new political climate, the model of 
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pillarization by ethnic groups is rejected and replaced with a formal focus on 
individuals, the reality is that civil society organizations often emerge along ethnic 
or cultural lines. It is the role of the state to manage linking those organizations 
and using the existing groups to promote broader networks among their 
members.  As has been illustrated in the case of Rotterdam’s implementation of 
the Mensen Maken de Stad program, despite having a city council actively hostile 
to the idea of multiculturalism and integration, if not immigrants outright, the City 
of Rotterdam’s professional staff implemented programs expressly meant to 
nurture bridging social capital with the intent of improving civic capacity and 
reducing intolerance.  Also significant in this effort is the importance of public 
financial and professional support to grow this effort to over 2000 neighborhood 
streets.  Only the government has the resources to coordinate and support these 
efforts, and the example of Mensen Maken de Stad and other social capital 
support programs provides a concrete illustration of how government resource 
can actively enhance tolerance through supporting the development of bridging 
social capital and improved civic capacity.
5.4 Utrecht: Enhancing Social Capital Through Interventions, and Fostering 
National and European Policy Networks to Apply Research
As mentioned before, the City of Utrecht is a multicultural city.  It is a 
research and transportation hub with several universities, major think-tanks and 
government research institutes in the community.  Some thirty percent of its 
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population is non-white Dutch and there is a majority ethnic minority population 
among the young generation (Manders 2011).  Like Rotterdam, Utrecht has 
focused efforts on supporting local organizations that work on improving social 
capital and intergroup understanding.  The city provides funding for sports groups, 
arts, groups and cultural events in public spaces.  Additionally, the city 
government has also faced the challenges of improving and replacing the housing 
stock with a target of reducing neighborhood homogeneity, and it has used the 
need for redevelopment as an opportunity to create civic capacity in order to 
improve participation in the process of redevelopment.  Finally, the City of Utrecht, 
is a member of DIVOSA (the association of municipal managers, a public policy 
incubator) and pilot case for developing the ParticipatieLadder with other 
members of the  association of Dutch municipalities (Verenigede Nederalandse 
Gemeenten).  Utrecht is also a pioneering member of the European Union 
Fundamental Rights Agency and the Committee of the Region’s efforts to 
establish a network of best practices in the Joined-up Governance project to 
disseminate best practices across the European Union (Sakkers 2012).
Examples of continued efforts to enhance public engagement and 
coproduction of policy in Utrecht can be found in the reports of activities from 
Overvecht, an area of the city that has been a focus for lower-income in-migration 
and perceived social cohesion problems for the city (Doe Mee in Overvecht:  
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Wijkactieprogramma 2012-2013 2012) (van Kempen 2008).  The reports show a 
continued focus on programs such as “street coaches” who work with social 
workers to direct at-risk youth to community programs and volunteer activities.  
The Overvecht neighborhood is also interesting because the Utrecht government 
has focused on redevelopment to change the housing mix to decrease rental unit 
concentration and avoid ethnic homogeneity (van Kempen 2008).  Part of the 
effort of relocating and restructuring the neighborhood has been to incorporate 
minority voices in planning the neighborhood, an effort made difficult by the 
absence of civic participation among minority population in the district (Koster 
2012).   In response to the need to invest in the community and increase 
participation so community voices could be heard, as well as to increase civic 
capacity, the Doe Mee in Overvecht (Do It Together in Overvecht) initiative was 
created in 2008 (Doe Mee Overvecht). The initiative contains many programs 
directed at increasing social capital and civic capacity in this changing and 
challenged community.  Including street mentors, a participation guideline on the 
website, and directions for coordinating efforts between city planners, city 
maintenance, social workers, and citizens. It is similar in many ways to the efforts 
of Mensen Maken de Stad.
Despite the national imperative to attack intolerance with identity-free 
policies, park activities and programs and promoted by the City of Utrecht do 
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precisely focus on minority youth with sports, arts, and education programs 
(Peters 2011).  The programs that target particular areas or needs such as 
education for Roma girls, or parenting coaches for Moroccan-Dutch parents 
(Manders 2011; Doe Mee in Overvecht:  Wijkactieprogramma 2012-2013 2012).
A recent analysis by Karin Peters (2012), of the role public parks play in 
promoting integration and inter-ethnic understanding found that two different 
types of parks in Utrecht contributed differently to the experiences that ethnic 
Dutch and ethnic minority families had vis-a-vis one another.  The researcher 
found that while individuals from different groups rarely interacted directly, in 
general, sharing the same public space reduced threat perception of “Others.”  
She also reviewed city grant-funded cultural activities at the a community center 
and found that the efforts to directly produce conversations between groups were 
effective in reducing potential conflict.  Interestingly, her qualitative research 
revealed a fairly stark divided between active younger people, and older ethnic 
dutch residents with the older residents (generally) harboring greater suspicions of 
immigrants and ethnic minorities because of social isolation (Peters 2012).  She 
also finds that local level interactions of individuals influences social cohesion and 
forms of social capital (trust, organization participation) in contrast to a national 
political narrative that highlights differences and the imperative of assimilation 
placed on immigrants.
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Finally, the Utrecht case is important as an illustration of how a medium 
sized municipality can leverage its resources through the sharing of its experiences 
in fostering social capital and confronting intolerance within a policy network. 
5.5 Bridging Capital for Cities: National and European Policy Networks to 
Increase Municipal Civic Capacity
 The Dutch cities studied are part of several interacting networks to share 
policy, research and expectations.  The networks are both nested in the national 
context and the European contexts.  Participation of the cities with the European 
UNion Agency for Fundamental Rights and the Committee of the Regions also 
indicates that the municipal managers are also aware of European Union 
objectives.  
Utrecht was a founding member of the consortium (DIVOSA) that 
developed the ParticipatieLadder measurement tool.  They continue to share best 
practices in how to apply that tool to improve individuals’ levels of social and 
human capital as part of DIVOSA. Utrecht is an active part of the Verenigde 
Gemeenter der Nederlanden, the network of associated Dutch cities.  That 
association pools resources to exchange information and research policy issues 
that are common challenges facing Dutch cities.  The city government also works 
with the Central Statistics Agency to collect data for monitoring and evaluation of 
public policy.  
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The city of Utrecht is also one of several pilot cities working with the 
Fundamental Rights Agency and the Committee of the Regions in the European 
Union to develop tools that share best-practices in combatting social intolerance 
and fostering inclusion (Joined-up Governance: Connecting Fundamental Rights 
2012). The Joined-Up Governance efforts seeks to amplify the diffusion of best 
practices element of the Open Method of Coordination, in lieu of relying on the 
naming and shaming function of the monitoring performance and publishing 
results.  Leveraging their own human rights experiences with those of other cities 
facing similar challenges is a major goal of Utrecht’s efforts to be considered a 
“human rights” city (Sakkers 2012).  In addition to being a pilot member of the 
FRA’s network, Utrecht is active with other policy networks, such as, the Eurocities 
initiative, a partnership of 140 major European cities founded by in 1986 by six 
major cities; Barcelona, Birmingham, Frankfurt, Lyon, Milan and Rotterdam .
The active policy networks both within the Netherlands and in the wider 
European area have been developed precisely to enhance epistemic communities 
of policy makers and diffuse policy innovation.  In the absence of the European 
Union shifting social tolerance policy into the Union’s area of competence or joint 
competence where there could be some element of coercion to laggards, the best 
that can be hoped for under the Open Method of Coordination is that bureaucrats 
are able to share best practices.  Institutionalizing expectations and practices is 
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precisely what the Dutch cities have done domestically and are extending to the 
European Union-wide networks of regional and local administrators.  The effective 
practice of promoting social tolerance through increasing bridging social capital 
can be disseminated and practiced by regional and municipal leaders, even in the 
face of political opposition at the national level in their countries.  
5.6 Conclusion of Netherlands Policy Cases
The investigation of policy practice in the two Dutch cities illustrate several 
of the mechanisms behind relationships that emerged from the path and 
hierarchical linear models.  Education and social capital were primary drivers of 
successful efforts to reduce intolerance.  The role of political capacity as an 
indicator of improved social capital is illustrated by the resources Dutch cities 
poured specifically into improving bridging forms of social capital.  Finally the 
Dutch cases illustrated that Dutch municipal policy-makers are aware of, and 
participate in, European Union institutions that pursue European Union policy 
objectives.
The apparent success of policy networks and shared resources for in the 
Dutch cities has strong implications for the potential of Europe-wide or even 
transcontinental policy networks.  Also, at least one mystery from the models, the 
irrelevance of right-wing participation in government, was explained by the fairly 
consistent practices of street-level bureaucrats faced with pragmatic choices 
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about how to address social policy issues in the face of shifting national-level 
politics.
Noordijk Bridging Intolerance 170
CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
By analyzing the interaction of government capacity and the emergence of 
intensified bridging forms of social capital, this study contributes to our 
understanding of the mechanisms by which bridging social capital emerges.  
Combining techniques of comparative political economy and public administration 
to investigate the relationships and mechanisms of government capacity helps 
explain why and when government presence improves bridging social capital.  It 
also helps fill the gap in knowledge left by Putnam’s (2007) more recent 
observation that diversity undermines social capital.  This study offers an important 
improvement by incorporating the role of existing government capacity in 
facilitating the rise of bridging forms of social capital, even in diverse settings.
Over the past three years the European Union has been rocked by the 
global financial crisis.  The challenge of combatting intolerance has gotten even 
more daunting in the face of continued economic and politically motivated 
migration and persistent high unemployment in European Union states.  
Additionally, under the leadership of Germany and the United Kingdom, austerity 
has been the prescription for all ails.  The policy environment facing public 
administrators is one of increased stressors on the public and a more competition 
for policy resources on the government side.  Assessments of effectiveness are 
even more critical for policy now than the period for which the bulk of the data for 
this project was collected.
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The tests in the analysis show a consistent relationship between relative 
political extraction and bridging forms of social capital.  The direct relationship 
between relative extraction and intolerance was much weaker and inconsistent.  
More intense bridging social capital is associated with reduced intolerance, relative 
political extraction is associated with improved bridging social capital, and the 
multi-level test of the interaction between bridging social capital and relative 
political extraction confirmed that the relationship of political capacity with 
Intolerance is mediated by its relationship to bridging social capital and education.  
The relationship confirms the main hypothesis offered that relative political capacity 
shapes the forms of social capital emerging in societies and that the rise of 
bridging social capital will be associated with improved social tolerance.
Although a direct relationship was proposed for relative political capacity on 
intolerance by constraining the impact of bonding forms of social capital, the data  
indicate that the role of the bonding form of social capital, as measured in this 
model, has little relationship with intolerance once other variables are included in 
the model.  The fact that the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway among others, 
had more intense social capital, both bridging and bonding, than most other 
countries presents some clues as to why the relationship is not clear across all 
countries.  The important observation is not that relative political extraction 
constrains the nasty effects of bonding social capital; it is that bridging social 
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capital is the more important of the two for addressing social intolerance.  The 
country-level maps of social capital in figure 3.9 show that individuals can 
simultaneously have elements of bonding capital like strong family ties and have 
active links to broader relationships.  Those people strong in both are not 
dependent on their in-group identity for their support networks and not as subject 
to social control.  Bridging capital appears to be key as it is associated with more 
diversity of contacts.
Two other powerful drivers of intolerance in these models were educational 
attainment and age.  There is an interaction and context effect present in these 
items, as older cohorts are often not as well educated as younger individuals who 
are in a cohort that is more educated.  As important as educational attainment is, 
the younger cohorts of the new accession states have also experienced some 
recent qualitative changes in the type of education. While the education systems 
of the EU 15 have long included some normative content promoting social 
tolerance and inclusion, this is a relatively recent phenomenon for many of the new 
EU member states and Turkey (Coenders and Scheepers 2003).  A policy 
implication is that an emphasis needs to be made on school curriculum and 
outreach to maximize the qualitative impact of education especially for states at 
lower levels of economic development.     
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The exploration of the Dutch case studies provided insight into the reality of 
the interaction between government resources, social capital and tolerance policy 
at the level of implementation in the European Union context of subsidiarity.  The 
cases showed the emphasis of local policy implementors had on supporting 
bridging social capital and several policies meant to foster social capital resources 
in minority communities.  The cases contributed insight explaining why the 
national right-left political context may not have mattered in the determining policy 
effectiveness as local leaders pursued pragmatic policies, that were coordinated 
between cities and with E.U. institutional actors.  
National government policy documents emphasized the importance of 
social capital for immigrant integration in economic and civic life.  The policy 
documents of the 1980s and 1990s encouraged the creation of better metrics for 
social capital and minority integration.  The national and municipal contexts even 
called for the enhancement of minority civic capacity, both as groups and 
individuals.  The national documents also acknowledged the European policy 
imperative for protecting human rights, including non-discrimination, although 
European Union pressure was never central to the policies proposed. By the 
2000s the national policy context had shifted towards more focus on assimilation 
for minorities and less on integration with differences tolerated.
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The investigation of the municipal level activities was also quite instructive. 
Both to illustrate the types of policies that might be used to enhance government 
capacity (policy networks) and in the kinds of policies created to enhance personal 
and community social capital stocks. Some of the unexpected results from the 
quantitative analyses were also addressed.  One phenomenon was the 
insensitivity of intolerance  to changes in right-left distribution of government 
power at the national level.  This was because the hard work of social tolerance 
programs is executed at the street-level, and municipal bureaucrats and social 
workers are more pragmatic than ideological.  Also, the cases illustrated that local 
government focus is on improving bridging forms of social capital, and may also 
render bonding capital less necessary but did not actively suppress the 
persistence of identity-based trust networks.
Also, in the municipal cases reviewed, local governments worked together 
to develop methods to asses either personal social capital stocks (Participation 
Ladder) or community-wide bridging social capital (Mensen maken de Stad).  Both 
projects have the intention of reducing social intolerance and social isolation as 
stated goals, and in the case of the Participation Ladder, as the phenomenon it is 
meant to measure.
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6.1: Implications of Results for Policy
The results of the analysis in this document also support the emphasis on 
the role of bridging social capital in improving governance.  The obverse is more 
directly supported in this analysis however, as governance seems to be linked to 
more intense bridging forms of social capital.  If bridging social capital leads to 
better governance, and relative political extraction is associated with improved 
bridging social capital, the expectation should be that there is a feedback process 
between governance and civil society that improves civic capacity.  An improved 
ability to identify and find effective remedies to community is not surprising.  
Associated with the ability to identify and address problems is the locus of policy 
creation and implementation.  The analysis and cases indicate support for the 
hypothesis that more local control of expenditures results in greater bridging social 
capital.  Local groups and actors may find their activities more relevant if they 
expect to be able to participate in the creation and execution of policy.
The relationship between bridging social capital and intolerance is fairly 
insensitive to changes in per capita GDP, meaning that the policies directly 
focused on fostering social capital are relevant to all European Union member 
states, not simply the rich ones.
There are two broader implications for policy in the EU at large.  The 
current focus of the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) in enhancing cooperation 
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and networks in civil society seems to be an effective strategy for improving both 
oversight and social capital.  The European Union is already expending effort 
focused on fostering networks between non-governmental organizations and 
officials between countries to exchange best practices and experiences.  In many 
of the European Union member countries, the efforts at facilitating integration and 
managing multiculturalism falls to local officials.  Facilitating the spread of best 
practices should fall heavily to the supporting network of relevant urban officials.  
However, the effort should also be directed at linking individuals and organizations 
within each of the member states and encouraging national governments to put 
resources into community organizations that are focused on tasks or activities as 
opposed to identity.  It appears that general efforts focused on improving 
memberships in social, business, sport, or activism can have positive effects on 
achieving social tolerance goals in conjunction with other efforts.
The second element is related to harnessing the effects of political capacity 
more directly.  The current arrangement for improving social tolerance in the 
European Union is modeled on the Open Method of Coordination. However, the 
FRA does not have the means to compel reporting that Eurostat and other 
agencies have to harmonize measurement.  The EU also needs stronger “naming 
and shaming” procedures to stimulate efforts in dawdling countries or other 
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means of putting social tolerance on the agenda of states with indifferent 
governments.  
Additionally, the efforts at improving social tolerance in new accession 
states should certainly involve facilitated policy-diffusion by sharing best practices 
among functional agencies of street-level bureaucrats like social workers and law 
enforcement.  This is an argument for supporting efforts like the “Joined-up” 
governance network created by the Committee of the Regions and the 
Fundamental Rights Agency of the European Union (Joined-up Governance: 
Connecting Fundamental Rights 2012).   Finally, encouraging links between well 
established civil society organizations may help bridge the gap to older Europeans 
who are outside the education system but still connected to labor or social 
groups.
6.2: Next Steps for Research and Practice
Further avenues for research and model improvement, fall into four groups; 
Measurement improvement, model specification, improved estimation of policy 
effectiveness to help target resources effectively, extension of the model beyond 
Europe.
First, improving the measure of intolerance could certainly help track 
progress and policy effectiveness.  As noted in the literature review, intolerance is 
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difficult to accurately measure.  It would be fruitful if more comprehensive 
questions for assessing intolerant attitudes were included in social surveys.  
Questions that are structured on a Likert scale would improve analysis and permit 
for more accurate modeling of effects.  
Secondly, relative political capacity, as it is conceptualized in this paper 
includes taxes paid to social insurance in the comparisons between societies 
because of the poor fit in calculating relative political extraction with a term for 
social insurance omitted.  Even in Europe there is non-uniformity in what services 
are paid for by other taxes, taxes at different levels of government or through 
regulatory requirements that do not show up on the government balance sheet.  If 
this model were extended beyond the European Union setting to countries with 
even wider divergence in whether revenue was paying for social insurance or other 
expenses.  The model should adopt a more complete conception of government 
performance.
Improved estimates of treatment effectiveness to establish a sort of cost-
benefit model for social capital improving policies like those explored in the next 
section.  There has been yet another wave of data collected for the years 
2010-2011, this new data will permit the use of a growth model.  Growth models 
add some complexity, but better control for within country variations.  With 
improved model fit from better specification and a growth curve model, it might be 
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possible to locate inflection points in the relationship between social capital and 
intolerance to determine countries or municipalities that might gain the most from 
dedicated social capital programs.
Finally, although the European Union has a very specific policy goal in 
reducing intolerance, it is certainly not unique in recognizing intolerance as a public 
bad.  The models can be extended beyond Europe.  As can the recommendations 
for policy.  For example, in the process of researching this project it became 
apparent that there is no reason that the networks of public agencies and the 
promulgation of best practices in the Open Method of Coordination in tackling 
intolerance need stop at the borders of Europe. 
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APPENDIX A: CALCULATING INTOLERANCE MEASURES
In order to more clearly identify  is Inspecting the polychoric correlations of 
the responses to the questions can identify the relationships between each of the 
above elements of the “neighbors” scale5.  The table below shows the polychoric 
correlations between the different questions, with the standard error shown in the 
diagonal.  The creation of a polychoric correlations table allows for the factor 
analysis of relationships between the binary variables by generating an estimate of 
correlations from presumed scalar variables.  Using a polychoric correlations 
matrix allows the use of factor analysis in order to identify underlying latent 
variables that can contribute to a better understanding of the phenomenon being 
measured. 
Table A.1: Intolerance Component Correlations
Different 
Race
Heavy 
Drinker
Immigrant AIDS Drug 
Addict
Homosexual
Dif. Race 1 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Heavy Drink 0.27 1 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.0
Immigrant 0.77 0.31 1 0.00 0.01 0.0
AIDS 0.57 0.46 0.55 1 0.00 0.00
Drug Addict 0.23 0.63 0.28 0.62 1 0.00
Homosexual 0.51 0.5 0.49 0.79 0.64 1
N= 96520. Random subsample drawn to meet memory constraints of software. 
Bold numbers show correlations, normal font above diagonal provides significance level. 
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5 Polychoric correlation is a maximum-likelihood estimator of the correlations between ordinal or binary 
observed variables developed on the assumption that those variables represent a normally distributed 
latent scalar concept.  
The polychoric correlations illustrate the connections between two 
apparent groupings of the variables, one concentrated on the race or immigrant 
status of an individual, another on Homosexuality and AIDS status, and to a lesser 
extent on drug addiction.  Analysis of the correlation table using the factor analysis 
function in SPSS provides an estimate of how the different elements of this scale 
relate to one another.
Because of its robustness in dealing with minor violations of bivariate 
normality, Principal Component Analysis was chosen to analyze the correlations 
matrix and extract two components of intolerance found in the “neighbors” scale 
(Kline 2005; Garson 2010).  The promax rotation allows for the correlation of 
extracted factors—  in keeping with a conception of intolerance that incorporates 
racial and status components.  Table A.2, shows the variance loadings of the 
different variables on two components of the intolerance scale.  
The matrix of pattern loadings is of particular interest as it is the unique 
variance contributed to the factors by each of the observed variables.  The 
structure and pattern matrices are very close to one another for these two factors 
because they have a small correlation and the contributions to variance shown in 
the structure matrix are largely unique to each of the two factors.  
Table A.2: Intolerance Loadings Matrices
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Structure Matrix Pattern Matrix (unique 
variance)
Component Score
Behavior to 
Race
General Behavior to 
Race 
Dimension
General Behavior to 
Race 
Dimension
General
Different 
Race
0.97 -0.10 0.97 0.00 0.28 -0.00
Immigrant 0.96 -0.18 0.95 -0.09 0.27 -0.04
Homosexuals -0.22 0.92 -0.13 0.91 -0.04 0.47
AIDS Sufferer 0.02 0.94 0.11 0.95 -0.03 0.49
Heavy 
Drinker
-0.87 -0.27 -0.90 -0.35 -0.26 -0.19
Drug Addicts -0.90 0.36 -0.88 0.27 -0.25 0.14
Correlation between factors= -.098
Promax rotation with Kaiser Normalization using Principal Component Analysis
Data: World Values Survey Combined Dataset. 2009.
I have named the two factors identified by the different loadings that 
contribute variance to the two factors “Behavior<>Race” and “General”.  As can 
be seen from the pattern matrix, the loadings for the “Behavior<>Race” factor 
load very strongly and positively with respondents who claimed an objection to 
neighbors of either a different race or immigrant status.  The sexual orientation or 
AIDS status of individuals only contributes slightly or negatively to the factor.  On 
the other hand, undesirable behaviors of drinking or drug addiction are inversely 
loaded on this factor.  The combination of negative loadings on undesirable 
behavior with positive loadings for race and immigrants highlights one of the 
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strengths of using factor analysis to understand the relationships in the data.  This 
identifies a unique axis of intolerance for people who have specific objections to 
potential neighbors by race or immigrant status.
Those intolerant of behaviors like drug abuse or to a lesser extent 
homosexuality are on the left (negative) end of the axis, those who are intolerant of 
everyone, or no one, fall in the middle, and those with a special intolerance 
centered on race or immigrant status fall on the right.  The loadings indicate the 
presence of respondents who, instead of having a generalized intolerance for all 
potential ‘undesirables’ have a special dislike for different races and immigrants 
versus the behaviors of people.  Imagine how the loadings would work for a 
particular individual who mentions a problem with both a racial minority and an 
immigrant but not that of an addict or a heavy drinker; that person would score a 
maximum score on the Behavior<>Race factor, more than an individual who had 
expressed uniform intolerance towards everyone.  
In order to capture the different components of intolerance in a way that 
can be used in the models, the Bartlett-regression extraction method available in 
SPSS.  That method turns the pattern matrix into regression coefficients (pattern 
matrix scores are standardized variance scores) for each factor.  It is a less 
efficient way of conserving information than a structural equation model, but 
structural equation models are beyond the scope of this project and the loss of 
Noordijk Appendix A 196
some explanatory power is compensated by the utility of identifying the underlying 
factors.
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APPENDIX B:  MEMBERSHIP QUESTIONS AND RECODING
Examples of Diﬀerent Wording for Memberships Questions between EVS and WVS.
Country Year Survey Question Question Translated
United Kingdom 2006 
WVS
Now I am going to read oﬀ a list of voluntary 
organizations. For each one, could you tell 
me whether you are an active member, an 
inactive member or not a member of that 
type of organization?
United Kingdom 2000 
EVS 
Please look carefully at the following list of 
voluntary organizations and say...
a) to which if any you belong?
b) which, if any, you are currently doing 
voluntary work for?
Netherlands 2006 WVS Nu lees ik een lijst voor van organisaties/
verenigingen. Kunt u voor elke organisatie 
aangeven of u een actief lid bent, een 
inactief lid of geen lid van dat type 
organisatie?
Now I am reading a list of 
organizations/associations. 
For each one, could you tell 
me whether you are an 
active member, an inactive 
member or not a member of 
that type of organization?
Netherlands 1999 EVS Op KAART 5 staat een lijst met organisaties 
en activitien. 
a) Wilt u voor elk daarvan aangeven of u er 
lid bent of er aan mee doet?
b) Doet u voor een van deze organisaties of 
activiteiten onbetaald vrijwilligerswerk?  
Voor welke?
On card 5 there is a list of 
organizations and activities.
a) For each, will you 
indicate whether you are 
a member or engage in 
the activity?
b) Do you do unpaid 
voluntary work for any of 
these organizations or 
activities?  For which?
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Examples of Diﬀerent Wording for Memberships Questions between EVS and WVS.
Country Year Survey Question Question Translated
Turkey 2001 EVS Siz dernek, vakıf, sendika  siyasi parti veya 
bunun gibi herhangi bir gönülü kuruluşa üye 
misiniz?
İf yes then...
Şimdi size çeşitli alanlarda bazı gönüllü 
kuruluşlar sayacağım.
a.  Bu alanlarda çalışan bir kuruluşlar, 
derneğe vakfa vs. üye olup olmadığınızı
b. Eğer üye iseniz bu kuruluş için para 
almadan, gönüllü olarak bazı faaliyetler, 
çalışmalar yapıp yapmadığınızı söyleyinizi
Are you a member of a club, 
faith-based charity, labor 
union, political party, or any 
similar voluntary 
organization?
Now I will say my list of 
some voluntary 
organizations of various 
kinds to you.
a.  For each of the various 
activities, organizations 
and foundations working 
in this field of activities, 
are you a member or not? 
b. If a member, could you 
say whether or not you 
worked in this 
organization without 
receiving pay or did some 
volunteer activities?
Turkey 2000 WVS Şimdi size çeşitli gönüllü kuruluşlardan 
oluşan bir liste okuyacağım.  Bu listede 
değişik türde gönüllü kuruluşlar (örneğin 
dernek, vakıf ve benzeri) var. Okuduğum her 
gönüllü kuruluş için, üye olup olmadığınızı 
belirtiniz.  Eğer bu tür bir gönüllü kuruluşa 
üye iseniz, aktif yani faal bir üye misiniz, 
yoksa pasif yani faaliyetlere pek katılmayan 
bir üye mi? 
 
 
 
 
Now I am going to read a list 
of a variety of voluntary 
organizations to you. There 
are a variety of diﬀerent 
organizations on the list 
(groups like, associations, 
foundations, religious 
organizations for example). 
For each voluntary 
organization I read, tell me if 
you are a member or not.  If 
you are a member of such 
an organization, whether you 
are an active member, or a 
passive member who does 
not participate in many 
activities?
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APPENDIX C: SOCIAL CAPITAL
Memberships Responses Compared.
The World Values Surveys and European Values Studies use slightly 
different wording in the questions used to explore participation in social 
organizations.  This section explains how both studies were rectified to include 
data from all available countries and years.
A look at the dendrograms in figures 3.6 and 3.7 below, show the similarity 
of relationships between the groups for both survey instruments, with both 
reflecting the same clusters of organizations appearing among respondents.  The 
political party memberships, environmental group membership, professional 
organization and human right organization memberships cluster together within 
five steps while the education and arts connect at 11 steps. The dendrograms 
indicate that membership in voluntary organizations tend cluster together, except 
for union membership and religious organization membership.  The graph for 
waves using the EVS wording is first, and WVS wording is below it.  
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WORLD VALUES SURVEY 1981-2008 OFFICIAL AGGREGATE v.20090901, 2009. 
(2009).
Figure C.1 :Cluster Diagram for Membership Question from European Values Survey: 
Waves 2 and 4
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WORLD VALUES SURVEY 1981-2008 OFFICIAL AGGREGATE v.20090901, 2009. (2009).
Figure C.2: Cluster Diagram for Membership Question from World Values Survey: 
Waves 1,3 and 5
In order to make the responses from the different survey instruments 
available ın the EVS and WVS comparable, the membership variables for the WVS 
were recoded to reflect the binary coding of the EVS questionnaires.  The wording 
of the WVS instruments offers the respondents the choice of claiming “active” or 
“inactive” membership versus simply being asked to self-identify as a member, or 
not, is the EVS questionnaire.  Given the choice of being an inactive member, the 
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WVS instruments consistently return a much higher level of membership than the 
EVS, even in the few cases where a clear trend is visible in the EVS surveys.  In 
order to bring the scales to a similar range and level, if a respondent was coded 
as an active or inactive member, the answer was recoded to member.  This is 
closer to the wording of the questions about membership in the EVS survey 
instruments and it also creates a binary variable, instead of the 0-2 three point 
scale in the WVS questionnaires.  With the two variables adjusted to the same 
scale and similar wording it is possible to compare the relationships between 
membership types and other elements of social capital within countries for 
individuals.  as well as other parts of the proposed model for individuals within 
countries, and between countries for the two different waves, but not between 
countries for all the waves.  Each analysis of the models includes a dummy for the 
wave of the survey instrument, the multi-level models returned non-significant 
effects of instrument 
Testing the External Validity of Membership Questions
Because of the challenges associated with the slightly different wording of 
the two questionnaires used in the surveys, I tested both the external validity of 
the self-reporting membership variables, and compared the effects of the two 
different survey instruments.  To do this, I ran a regression of the self-reporting of 
labor union membership contained in the WVS/EVS instruments against union 
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membership data for seventeen European countries as reported in a 2006 
Monthly Labor Review article (Visser 2006).  Visser describes union density as the 
number of union members divided by all wage and salary earners collected from 
government administrative data or labor surveys (2006, 40-41).  
Table B.1 : Analyzing Effect of Changes in Wording for Union Membership Questions
Model B Std. Error β Sig.
1
Adj. R2 =.65
(Constant) 0.179 0.035 0
Combined WVS and 
EVS Reported
1.246 0.14 0.812 0
2
Adj. R2 =.73
(Constant) 0.2 0.032 0
Combined WVS and 
EVS Reported
1.39 0.129 0.906 0
Survey dummy WVS = 1 -0.166 0.046 -0.304 0.001
a. Dependent Variable:Reported Union Density
N=42, Source:  WORLD VALUES SURVEY 1981-2008 OFFICIAL AGGREGATE v.20090901, 2009. 
(2009).. Visser, J. (2006). Union Membership Statistics in 24 Countries. Monthly Labor 
Review, 38-49.
Table B.1 above contains the results of the analysis.  The results illustrate 
how well each of the survey instruments match up to labor union statistics 
produced by European governments.  The model adjusted R2 of .73 indicates that 
even for the low number of cases, the variation in combined WVS and EVS 
questions predicts seventy-three percent of the variance in recorded union density 
for each country each year that both data sets were available.  The intercept of .
197 illustrates that the EVS data appears to slightly overestimate the union 
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membership rates.  The slope for the combined questionnaire is greater than one, 
indicating that the combined variable tends to overestimate membership.  
Figure C.1: Survey Measure of Union Membership Compared to Union Reported 
Membership
Figure C.1 contains the mean union membership reported for each country 
year sorted by survey instrument and charted against the union density for each 
country, each year, reported in Visser (2006).  The top solid line is the mean slope 
for the European Values Survey questionnaire and the dotted line is the slope for 
the World Values Survey questions.  Both are parallel to the unit relationship line, 
but at different levels. The WVS questions (including both active inactive member 
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options) is closer to the recorded union membership density.  Figure C.2 illustrates 
the unstandardized predictors from the model with unified membership coding 
and the inclusion of the dummy term for the survey instrument.  The second 
model shifts the slope very close to a unit relationship. As illustrated, when 
adjusted for the survey type and the predicted slope line is almost exactly overlain 
on the unit relationship predictor line for union membership (unit slope).  
FIgure C.2: Fit Line of Union Membership Reported in WVS Survey
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Importance Of Family And Friends  
The importance of family and friends questions, plus the generalized trust 
question comprise the indicators for forms of social participation and trust-- 
elements of social capital.   All the indicators in table C.2, except the importance 
of family variable, exhibited normal distributions.  The importance of family variable 
had heavy kurtosis (kurtosis score of 10).  Eighty-five percent of respondents 
reported family as being very important, with another ten percent responding that 
family is somewhat important.  An inverse power transformation using (ki^(1/ki), 
reduced the reported kurtosis to less than 3 (2.10), while preserving the 
distribution and standard error.
Table C.2: Importance of Family and Friends, and Trust
Important in 
life: Friends 
Most People 
can be trusted
Important in life: 
Family (transformed)
Important in life: Friends 
(1=Very,4=Not at All)
1 .121** .146**
Most People can be trusted 
(1=Yes, 2=No)
.119** 1 -.012**
Important in life: Family 
(transformed)
.146** -.010** 1
** . Correlation is significant at p < .01.
Pearson correlation except Most People Can be Trusted (Spearman for non-
parametric correlation.)
N=71170 < > 83212
WORLD VALUES SURVEY 1981-2008 OFFICIAL AGGREGATE v.20090901, 2009. (2009).
 The table reports the correlations of each indicator with one another and   
The correlations between the variables are fairly low and attempts to identify 
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factors showed no clear pattern, indicating that each variable is measuring a 
unique phenomenon or that they are interacting in a way that prohibits easy 
interpretation.  The slight and negative correlation between the Trust question and 
the Importance of Family variable is noteworthy as it illustrates the conceptual 
difference between within group trust and more diffuse forms of trust.  The diffuse 
forms of trust are those more generally associated with benevolent forms of social 
capital. 
Confidence in Government 
The cluster analysis results are illustrated by the dendrogram below (figure 
C.4).  The dendrogram reinforces the patterns evident in the correlations table.  
Confidence in parliament and confidence in the civil services clustered together 
immediately.  The police and armed forces clusters were merged much later.  
Figure C.4: Official Confidence Clusters
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Factor analysis following up on the initial reviews of the data revealed 
groupings of the variables similar to that of the cluster analysis.  The table below 
provides the factor loadings in the structure matrix, unique variance accounted for 
by each of the factors is displayed by the pattern matrix, and finally the factor 
coefficients used to derive the two factor variables are in the last columns. For 
principal axis factoring using an oblique rotation (allowing correlation between 
factors), the pattern matrix provides the best information for identifying the 
underlaying latent structure.  In the pattern matrix for the official trust scale of 
questions two clear patterns emerge.  The first confidence factor explains much of 
the unique variance for confidence in the parliament and the civil service, with a 
slight reverse relationship with confidence in the armed forces.  The second factor 
is slightly less well defined but still distinct.  The loadings in the pattern matrix 
center on the confidence in the armed forces and confidence in the police and 
almost no cross-loading on the other two indicators.  Correlation between the two 
factors is .69, which indicates that respondents with confidence in government 
institutions generally extend that confidence to the different branches. The table 
below contains the Pearson correlations between the different questions.
Table C.3: Public Institutions Confidence Correlations
Armed Forces The Police Parliament  Civil Services
 Armed Forces 1 n=81311 79767 79251
The Police .383** 1 80950 80381
Parliament .260** .430** 1 79622
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Civil Services .274** .414** .551** 1
Pearson Correlation.
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Number of cases in the off diagonal (weighted).  
WORLD VALUES SURVEY 1981-2008 OFFICIAL AGGREGATE v.20090901, 2009. (2009).
In order to tease out the different types of relationships among the 
confidence indicators I conducted two analyses; first, a hierarchical cluster 
analysis followed by factor analysis to further understand the relationships 
between the variables and derive factors that capture the different dimensions of 
confidence in government.  The coefficients derived and used to calculate the two 
factors are provided in the table.  They show that the first factor weights 
confidence in the parliament the most (.78) , and gives lesser but positive weight 
to confidence in the civil service responses (.5) and the police respectively (.11).  
However, individuals’ responses to confidence in the armed forces are reverse 
weighted and weak (-.08).  This means that people with low confidence in 
parliament and the civil service but higher confidence in the armed forces will 
score higher in this factor than someone with equally low regard for all branches.  
Conversely, the second factor weights heavily on both the armed forces and 
police confidence variables, and reverse weights parliament confidence and all but 
ignores the civil service responses.  The first factor is more of a general confidence 
factor, while the second highlights confidence in authority institutions than 
governance institutions.
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Table C.4: Official Confidence Factor Dimensions
Structure Matrix 
(loadings)
Pattern Matrix 
(unique variance)
Factor Coefficients
Civil Parl Police 
Army
Civil Parl Police 
Army
Civil Parl Police 
Army
Confidence: Armed Forces 0.353 0.572 -0.074 0.623 -0.070 0.815
Confidence: The Police 0.562 0.672 0.190 0.542 0.109 0.885
Confidence: Parliament 0.776 0.503 0.812 -0.054 0.796 -0.179
Confidence: The Civil 
Services
0.698 0.508 0.660 0.055 0.496 0.057
Factor Correlation 0.415
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.  Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization. 
Factor Scores Method: Bartlett. 
Questions are coded: 1=Great Deal of Confidence ,4=None
Source: WORLD VALUES SURVEY 1981-2008 OFFICIAL AGGREGATE v.20090901, 2009. (2009).
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APPENDIX D: ESTIMATING RELIGIOSITY
Because the literature indicates that there are at least two dimensions of 
religiosity that may have bearing on intolerance, factor analysis was conducted to 
extract them. Those two dimensions, a personal religiosity and institutional-
doctrinal dimension did not emerge from the data as explaining a great deal of 
independent variation. 
Table D.1: Unique Loadings for Factor Analysis of Religion Variables
Pattern Matrixa Personal Religiosity Institutional Religiosity
How often do you attend religious 
services?
0.219 0.548
 Important in life: Religion 0.703 0.167
Confidence: Churches 0.222 0.544
 How important is God in your life 
(reversed and rescaled.)
0.696 0.178
Eigenvalues 2.9 0.45
Responses coded with lower values indicating more intense religiosity. 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring; Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization; 
Rotation converged in 3 iterations.  World Values Survey 1981-2008 Official Aggregate v.20090901, 
2009. (2009).
A scale of the religiosity items was created using the four religiosity 
indicators and reversing them.  Unfortunately, a straightforward sum of the 
religiosity variables is problematic as the “Importance of God” measure has a 
multi-peaked distribution at the ends and in the middle that makes it somewhat 
platykurtotic (-1.32). Those extreme values carried over into the summed scale 
and flattened the distribution.  To calculate the measure of religiosity I created an 
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additive scale using standardized indicators of top three items in table 3.13 above. 
Then I multiplied the three item scale by the absolute value of the standardized 
“Importance of God in your life” indicator, effectively using the “Importance of God” 
measure to weight the intensity and reverse the scale of the other indicators.  The 
resulting distribution is illustrated in figure D.1 below.  It still retains some of the 
peakedness of the summed scale, but has a much more normal distribution with a 
skewness of -.33, and kurtosis -.23, well within the normal range for social 
science statistics.
Unreligious
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Figure D.1:  Frequency Distribution of Religiosity Indicator
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APPENDIX E: CALCULATING RPE
The table below illustrates the results of the regression equations described 
in the literature review above for relative political extraction.  The table shows the 
unstandardized coefficients for component of relative political extraction.  
Table E.1: Regression Model of Relative Political Extraction 
RPE 1986-2008 RPE-soc security
Standardized β Standardized β
Intercept 0.378
Mining/GDP 0.03 -0.237
Export/GDP -0.046 0.210
Oil Prod. 1000 bbl/d -0.180 0.211
Agriculture/GDP -0.574 -0.366
GDP/Capita 0.220 -0.12
N=470 Adjusted R2=.515 Adjusted R2=.232
Dependent Variable is Total Revenues - Tariffs. Total revenues-soc sec - tariffs.
Sources: Gross Domestic Product by sector from OECD members SourceOECD, non-OECD members 
data from EUROSTAT tables using similar accounting methodology.  Per Capita GDP from World 
Bank World Development Indicators database, using PPP at USD terms at year 2005 values.  Revenue 
data is from SourceOECD database for OECD members, others from EUROSTAT.  Oil production 
data is from the International Energy Agency, http://www.iea.org/stats/index.asp.  
In table E.2 below the mean political extraction for each of the countries 
over the available years of the studies is reported.  Again the values are derived 
controlling for level of economic development, so the RPE of .026 for Romania 
does not mean that Romania has the same political capacity as Finland’s .029 in 
absolute terms.  Rather it means that for its level of development, Romania has a 
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higher than average political capacity, but not nearly the resources for policy that 
are available to the Dutch.
Table E.2: Mean Relative Political Extraction, By Country.
RPE Total Tax Revenue Minus Tariffs
Country Mean N Country Mean N
Austria 0.029 22 Italy 0.015 22
Belgium 0.059 22 Latvia -0.043 13
Bulgaria 0.044 13 Lithuania -0.040 11
Cyprus -0.055 13 Netherlands 0.029 22
Czech 
Republic 0.008 12 Poland -0.003 17
Denmark 0.085 22 Portugal -0.057 22
Estonia -0.027 10 Romania 0.026 13
Finland 0.052 22 Slovenia 0.035 15
France 0.036 22 Spain -0.045 22
Germany -0.035 22 Sweden 0.092 22
Greece -0.031 22 Turkey -0.038 22
Hungary 0.057 17
United 
Kingdom -0.013 22
Ireland -0.036 22
Sources: Gross Domestic Product by sector from OECD members SourceOECD, non-OECD 
members data from EUROSTAT tables using similar accounting methodology.  Per Capita 
GDP from World Bank World Development Indicators database, using PPP at USD terms at 
year 2005 values.  Revenue data is from SourceOECD database for OECD members, others 
from EUROSTAT.  Oil production data is from the International Energy Agency, http://
www.iea.org/stats/index.asp.  
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APPENDIX F:  MISSING DATA IN THE MODEL
The data were examined for missing values on the concept of intolerance 
and the components of social capital.  Dummy variables of the each of the 
relevant indicators were created with the value of 0 indicating a valid response, 
and 1 indicating a missing response.  The missing values dummy variable for the 
intolerance scale were then correlated with demographic variables and other 
indicators to identify significant deviations from a random distribution of missing 
values (McKnight, McKnight, Sidani and Figueredo 2007).  The dataset was 
divided by each country and each wave of the survey in order to control for data 
missing from entire sub-samples, that would then manifest as a significant 
relationship between demographics and intolerance despite not being present in 
the model.  
The results of the first test for influence of missing data on the intolerance 
scale are included in table F.1.  The table reveals that the relationship between 
missing variables and Intolerance does show some associations, that is, the value 
of Intolerance is not associated with missing values at random.  
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Table F.1: Test for Completely at Random Distribution Missing Data
Intolerance Bridging 
Trust
Confidence in 
Civil 
Government
Overall proportion 
missing
Gender missing 0.00 -.009** 0.00 0.00
Age missing 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
Income missing -.053** .010** -.012** 0.18
Self-identified political 
position
.064** .132** .068** 0.20
Religiosity missing -.008* .023** .023** 0.06
Bridge trust missing -.011** 0.07
Confidence in Civ. Gov. 
(Missing)
0.00 .065** 0.06
Kendall’s tau-b for non-parametric correlations. The row variables in the left column are all dummy 
coded 1= missing, 0= recorded.
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
a. Listwise N = 74230
In order to ensure that the relationships noted above are not simply artifacts of the 
data, the tau-b correlations were examined by country-year as well.  While some 
of the correlations between missing data and the dependent variables, are 
artifacts of complete waves of missing data for a few countries, the two variables 
with the strongest relationship, are not. The relationships indicate that some steps 
to rectify the potential, albeit minor, distortion of parameters caused by missing 
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data.  As a further tests of missingness on components of social capital are also 
included as columns in the table.  Finally the rate of missing data is included in the 
final column, illustrating the general very low rate of missing data.  The one area 
with a high level of missing data was educational attainment.
Missing Education
For the 1989-1991 wave, a number of the European Values Survey 
countries only collected education data in terms of the age of completion of 
education instead of highest level of education achieved.  The table below 
indicates the distribution of the missing variable by country and wave.  Also in the 
table is the r-square of a regression equation that estimates the “highest level of 
education achieved” for years that the variables overlap in each country.  The 
regression equation uses age, income level, gender, age of completion of 
education and intolerance as independent variables for the regression equation.
I used the application Amelia II (King, Honaker, Joseph and Scheve 2001), 
to estimate the missing educational attainment variables both  within years for 
which the data was collected, and the waves and countries listed below in the 
years where the data on attainment were missing.  Amelia II works by estimating a 
matrix for each of the variables, then once convergence has been achieved 
repeats this process with 5 times working each time with a data set created by 
random draws (with replacement) from the returned data.  The program creates 5 
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data sets with imputed responses in place of missing data (King et al 2001, ).  This 
method reduces the missing information that would be worsened by listwise 
deletion, while preserving non-biased estimators for the model.
Table F.2:  Imputed values for Educational Attainment
Country - wave Educational Level 
Attained, Mean 
Imputed
St. Dev 
Educational 
Attainment
Reported Age 
Education 
Completed
R-Square 
OLS 
Predictor
Austria (2) 4.03 1.97 16.84 0.628
Belgium (2) 4.39 1.95 16.59
Bulgaria (2) 4.54 2 19.21 0.692
Czech Republic (2) 3.9 1.94 16.46 0.465
Finland (2) 5.7 1.91 21.78 0.323
France (2) 4.32 2.1 17.62 0.698
Germany (2) 4 2.23 16.84 0.525
Hungary (2) 3.86 2.08 16.29
Ireland (2) 4.16 1.99 16.53 0.706
Italy (2) 4.07 1.8 16.53 0.629
Malta (2) 3.85 1.94 15.81 0.58
Netherlands (2) 4.67 1.89 18.9 0.421
Poland (2) 4.14 1.99 17.47 0.426
Portugal (2) 3.5 2.38 15.2
Slovakia (2) 3.9 2.21 16.31 0.635
Slovenia (2) 4.57 2.31 19.39 0.559
Spain (2) 3.78 2.38 14.23 0.488
Sweden (2) 5.28 2.49 21.62 0.413
Great Britain (2) 4.05 2.4 16.47 0.352
Source:  World Values Survey 1981-2008 Waves Official Combined ...
Using:  Amelia  II: A Program for Missing Data. (Honaker, King and Blackwell 2009)
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Overall, with the exception of item “educational attainment”, the dataset 
has a very low rate of missing data.  The missingness rate is low even for 
composite, or factor variables containing several component indicators.  Despite 
the low rates of missing data for the data set, several significant relationships 
existed between the Intolerance measure and missing data in several of the 
demographic and theoretically important parts of the model.  Because of this 
minor problem with data not missing completely at random, the Amelia II missing 
data Monte Carlo bootstrapping program was used to multiply impute the missing 
items.  
Noordijk Appendix F 221
APPENDIX G: DATA ASSUMPTIONS AND MODEL CONCERNS FOR MULTI-LEVEL 
MODELS
The distributional and structural assumptions multi-level models reflect 
assumptions of other classes of multiple regression and maximum-likelihood 
models with a few unique caveats.
Data used in hierarchical linear models is expected to be normally 
distributed variables the same as for other OLS or maximum-likelihood estimators. 
Detection of violations of normal distributions will be necessary prior to estimating 
models. Variables that are found to not have a normal distribution will either be 
transformed to correct the violations or dropped from the model if there is no way 
to retain the information without compromising the analysis.  Additionally, the 
transformed summed intolerance variable is closer to a gamma distribution, so 
transformation of the variable using Box-Cox estimators was required. 
Effective sample size is also a concern when conducting a multi-level 
analysis.  The level of intraclass correlation conditions the effective sample size of 
a multi-level model generally reducing the sample to something substantially lower 
than the raw N (Snijders and Bosker 1999).  However, each participant in the 
World Values Survey has a national sample of at least 950 respondents providing 
some margin for inclusion of level 1 dependent variables.  As of October 2011, 
there was only data for individuals nested in 25 European Union member and 
accession countries over several waves, meaning that the limit on available 
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degrees of freedom for a group-level variables is a very tight 62 country-waves 
with 72 waves available for a more limited model.  This small number of country-
wave cases permits inclusion of only the few most salient group-level random 
effects variables for this analysis.
As this model will likely suffer from under-identification dealing with 
problems associated with missing data is critical.  Missing data is examined to 
determine whether it is missing completely at random, or missing at random or 
missing not at random.  Data missing completely at random has no detectable 
relationship with any other available data.  Data missing at random has no 
detectable relationship with the value of the data itself but is related to other values 
in the dataset.  Missing not at random is self-explanatory (McKnight, et al. 2007).  
Depending on the volume of missing data and the pattern of missingness, the 
decision to delete listwise or take advantage of a multiple imputation estimator to 
fill-in missing data and maintain the ever important sample-size.
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APPENDIX H: TABLE OF INTOLERANCE
Table H.1: Intolerance by Country and Wave 1989-2008
Intolerance by summed race, immigrant status, AIDs and orientation
1989-1993 1994-1999 1999-2004 2005-2007 2008
Austria 1.04 0.62 0.90
Belgium 0.85 0.65 0.24
Bulgaria 2.03 1.59 1.38 1.34
Cyprus 1.27 1.15
Czech Republic 1.46 0.86 0.70 1.13
Denmark 0.32 0.20
Estonia 1.34 1.24 1.46
Finland 0.79 0.79 0.68 0.53
France 0.61 0.45 1.20 0.16
Germany 0.89 0.26 0.37 0.51 0.51
Great Britain 0.75 0.48 0.40
Greece 0.82 0.88
Hungary 1.86 1.36 0.85
Ireland 0.79 0.75 0.65
Italy 1.11 0.92 0.83 0.84
Latvia 1.31 0.89 1.10
Lithuania 1.86 1.56 1.70
Luxembourg 0.46 0.59
Malta 1.12 1.09
Netherlands 0.47 0.24 0.31 0.46
Northern Cyprus 1.68
Poland 1.55 1.40 1.15 1.34
Portugal 1.19 0.62 0.56
Romania 1.61 1.58 1.35 1.37
Slovak Republic 1.72 1.22 1.29 0.96
Slovenia 1.64 1.46 1.06 0.98 1.19
Spain 0.84 0.59 0.57 0.37 0.26
Sweden 0.51 0.27 0.18 0.12 0.27
Turkey 2.43 2.46 2.27 2.68
World Values and European Values Surveys, 1981-2007 Combined Waves Dataset, 
and the 2008-2009 European Values Survey.
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APPENDIX I: INTRACLASS CORRELATION
Intraclass correlation and effective sample size for the summed intolerance 
dependent variable and the bridging social capital(diffuse trust and memberships)
Calculating the unconditional intraclass correlation is an important measure 
of the stratification structure of your data has an impact on the model.  An 
unconditional intraclass coefficient for Intolerance as nested in country-wave 
groups is .133 indicating that 13% of variance in the intercept only model is 
accounted for by the respondents being nested in country-waves, this is 
effectively an ANOVA using country-wave as the classification variable. 13% is 
sufficiently high to warrant a multilevel analysis. 
The .133 intraclass correlation also provides a first look at the design 
impact of the World Values Surveys sample as stratified by country and nested in 
waves.  Calculating the design effect with the unconditional intraclass correlation is 
accomplished by simply finding its product with the group sample size (Hox ).  
With this dataset weighted to 1000 cases per country per wave and 60 country-
waves there is an unadjusted sample of just under 60,000.  The design effect with 
the unconditional intraclass correlation coefficient of .133 in this case by the 1000 
per group is 133.  The effective sample size of an OLS model without group-level 
explanatory variables is around 60000/133 = 451.  
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The unconditional intraclass correlation coefficient for the bridging form of 
social capital is a very high .25.  Rendering a design effect of 250, and an effective 
sample of 240 for OLS models without group level explanatory variables.  
Including the indicators of education, RPE and per cap GDP into the full path 
model results in a conditional intraclass correlation of .14, meaning that some of 
the intraclass variance is accounted for and that the effective sample size for the 
model used in the path analysis is over  7000.
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APPENDIX J:  NOTES AND FIGURES FROM ANALYSIS
Religiosity by Country and Correlation With Intolerance 
The correlation of religiosity to the summed measure of intolerance is .172 
(p<.05).  Indicating that across countries and waves higher levels of religiosity are 
correlated with intolerance.  The correlation also breaks down along the 
dimensions of intolerance that were reported in the intolerance section, with a 
higher correlation between religiosity and intolerance for the dimensions that 
specifically capture disapproval of social behavior while there is still substantial 
correlation between the types of intolerance themselves.  In effect, religious people 
are only slightly more likely than their peers to report intolerance towards racial or 
immigration minorities, but far more likely to report intolerance of homosexuals or 
AIDS sufferers than their fellows.  
Table J.1:  Correlations of Religiosity and Selected Intolerance Indicators.
Religiosity Neighbors: People of a 
Different Race.
Neighbors: 
Homosexuals
Religiosity 1 .084** 205**
Intolerance Scale .172** .567** .81**.
Neighbors: People of a 
different race
.084** 1 .275**
Neighbors: 
Homosexuals
.205** .275** 1
Behavior vs. race 
Intolerance
-0.036 .51** -.24**
 Spearman's rho non-parametric correlations.  Pearson’s correlation for scaler variables.
 **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Analysis in the regression indicates that the correlations between religiosity 
and the different forms of intolerance is largely an artifact of the grouping of 
Noordijk Appendix J   227
intolerant and religious individuals within the same societies and the covariance 
between religiosity and other indicators such as age in societies with weaker 
distinctions between intolerance toward lifestyle versus racism and homophobia.  
The hierarchical analysis of bridging social capital indicates that religiosity is 
positively correlated with bridging social capital, but that indirect path is more than 
suppressed by the reverse correlation in the indirect path.
Table J.2: Education Path by RPE with GDP Per Capita 
OLS β
Intercept 2.76
RPE 0.102 (1.2)
Ln GDP/cap 0.018 (.86)
R2 0.01
Dependent Variable= Educational Attainment
N= 82839, Deff= 85, Adjusted N=974 for Educational attainment.
All Standardized Regression Coefficients, t-scores from group level.
*significant at p<.05
Source: World Values Survey 1980-2005 combined dataset.  World Values Association.
Table 4.4 presents the coefficients of the GDP per capita and relative
Table J.3: Regression Test of RPE and Bonding Capital
β
Intercept 0.121
Study -0.046 (-1.9)
Education -0.025 (-1.14)
RPE -0.075 (-.37)
GDP per cap -0.087 (-.55)
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Religiosity -0.156 (-6.8)
Is Minority 0.026 (1.2)
R2 0.029
N= 79983, Deff= 40, Adjusted N=1999
t-scores for group-level variables estimated using N for degrees of freedom at each level.
Bonding Social Capital is on a scale of -1=intense<->1= weak.
Source: World Values Survey 1980-2005 combined dataset.  World Values Association.
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Table J.4: Multi-level regression results
Model Random 
Intercept
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Fixed Effects
Intercept γ00 -0.20 -0.17 10.80 11.40 11.90
Gender (0=female, 1=male) .27** .28** .28** .28**
Minority Religion (0=min,1=maj) 0.01
Religiosity .039** .038** .038** .037**
Education -.088** -089** -089** -087**
Right-Left Political .05** .078** .078** .08**
Income -.018** -.018** -.017** -.017**
Bridging Social Capital -.31** -.31** -.29** -.29**
Official Trust .018**
Age (uncentered) 0.01** .013** 0.13** 0.13**
Town Size (uncentered) -.035** -.034** -.035** -.035**
Unem (uncentered) -2.7** -2.8**
Relative Political Extraction 1.20 1.14 1.50
ln GDP/Capita -1.1** -1.09 -1.13**
Soc Security Spending/GDP -3.9* -3.87 -4**
In-Migration Rate -2.6*
Right-Wing Gov (5-year MA) 0.00
RPE x Bridging Capital -1.3*
Random Effects
Residual 3.4 3.14 3.14 3.13 3.13
Random Intercept .7** .54** .19** .20** .20**
Random Slope Bridging .04** .03**
Model Fit (smaller is better)
AIC 227193.00 222738.00 222684.00 222574.00 222605.00
BIC 227210.00 222756.00 222702.00 222600.00 222632.00
R2 estimated 0.10 0.19 0.18 0.18
Model Chi-square Difference 0.00 0.00 0.00 Worse fit
Individual N= 77,015, Group-level N = 72 . Mixed Regression, unstructured Random Effects 
(variance components). Right-wing parties in percentage of total cabinet posts, weighted by days. 
Source: own calculations for Turkey based on Schmidt and Beyer (1992); 1991 onwards: Political 
Data Yearbook(s), EJPR. 
Source: World Values Survey 1980-2005 combined dataset.  World Values Association.
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Fixed Effects Model 5 Model 6
Intercept γ00 -0.04 -0.21
Religiosity (centered) 0.03** .04**
Gender (male) .27**
Education (centered) -0.087** -.09**
Right-Left Political (centered) 0.082** .08**
Income (centered) -0.01** -.017**
Bridging Social Capital (centered) -0.28** -.33**
Age (centered) 0.013** .013**
Town Size -0.037** -.04**
Relative Political Extraction 1.87 1.90
ln GDP/Capita (centered) -1.22** -1.03**
Mig. rate -2.24
Soc. Security Spending/GDP -2.09 -2.9
Local expenditure /total expenditure -0.036
RPE x Bridging Capital -1.03* -1.39*
Ln GDP x Bridging -.15** -.15**
Local Exp x Bridging 0.12
Random Effects
Residual 3.18 3.13
Random Intercept .23** .22*
Random Slope Bridging -.025** -.025**
Slopes by Intercepts Bridging -0.005 -0.006
Model Fit (smaller is better)
AIC 269040.00 226570.00
BIC 269077.00 226606.00
Pseudo R2 0.18 0.19
Individual N= 77,015, Group-level N = 72 . Mixed Regression, Unstructured Random 
Effects (variance components). Right-wing parties in percentage of total cabinet posts, 
weighted by days. Source: own calculations for Turkey based on Schmidt and Beyer 
(1992); 1991 onwards: Political Data Yearbook(s), EJPR. 
Source: World Values Survey 1980-2005 combined dataset.  World Values Association.
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Fixed Effects of 
Standardized 
Model 7 t Model 8 t Model 9 t
Intercept 0.61 26.64 0.61 26.47 0.61 26.55
Male 0.08 20.15 0.08 20.15 0.08 20.16
Bridging Social 
Capital
-0.07 -12.33 -0.07 -11.85 -0.07 -11.52
Religiosity 0.03 15.31 0.03 15.31 0.03 15.30
Political Self-
Placement
0.05 26.90 0.05 26.89 0.05 26.90
Age 0.07 35.48 0.07 35.48 0.07 35.48
Education -0.08 -38.24 -0.08 -38.24 -0.08 -38.23
Ln GDP/cap -0.24 -10.35 -0.23 -10.22 -0.24 -10.38
RPE -0.02 -0.71 -0.01 -0.57 -0.02 -0.81
Bridging * GDP -0.01 2.21 -0.01 2.36 -0.01 2.52
Gov-right  5 
year MA
0.04 1.85 0.04 1.74 0.04 1.86
Bridging * RPE -0.01 -0.97
RPE by Gov 
right
-0.02 -0.72
Bridging Group 0.04 1.14
Bridging Group 
* Bridging Ind.
-0.01 -1.57
Time EU
Random 
Effects
Est. Wald Z Est. Wald Z Est. Wald Z
Residual 0.376 231.428 0.376 231.428 0.376 231.428
Random 
Intercept
0.042 6.238 0.042 6.198 0.042 6.237
Bridging by 
Intercept
0.001 1.046 0.001 0.944 0.002 1.241
Bridging 
Random Slope
0.002 4.556 0.002 4.518 0.002 4.517
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APPENDIX K:  GROUP-LEVEL SCATTERPLOT OF INTOLERANCE BY GDP/CAP
Figure K.1: Ln of per capita GDP by group mean Summed Intolerance, uncentered.
0
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2
2
3
6.500 7.625 8.750 9.875 11.000
y = -0.4423x + 5.0526
R² = 0.607
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APPENDIX L: PARTICIPATIE LADDER LEVELS
Dutch English
Niveau 1: Geïsoleerd 
• Heeft niet of nauwelijks contact met anderen dan 
huisgenoten EN 
• de contacten buiten de huisgenoten beperken 
zich tot functionele contacten (winkelpersoneel, 
hulpverleners, buschauffeurs etc.) 
Voorbeelden niveau 1: 
- Nauwelijks contacten buiten de deur 
- Mantelzorg voor huisgenoten 
- Alleen actieve contacten via internet/email 
- Dakloos zonder contacten met niet-daklozen, 
behalve hulpverleners 
Level 1: Isolated
• Has little or no contact with people other than 
household members AND
• contacts outside the household limited to 
functional contacts (Shop assistants, social 
workers, bus drivers, etc.)
Level 1 Examples:
- Hardly any contacts outside the home
- Care for family members
- Only active contacts via internet / email
- Homeless; no contacts with non-homeless,
except emergency
Niveau 2: Sociale contacten buiten de deur 
• Heeft minimaal één keer per week fysiek contact 
met mensen die geen huisgenoten zijn EN 
• die contacten vinden niet plaats in  
georganiseerd verband EN 
• voert geen taken uit met verantwoordelijkheden 
naar anderen  (d.w.z. het is geen werk) EN 
• die contacten beperken zich niet alleen tot 
functioneel contact met winkelpersoneel, 
hulpverleners et cetera 
 
Voorbeelden niveau 2: 
- Mensen ontmoeten zoals buren, buurtbewoners 
en ouders van vriendjes van kinderen 
- Regelmatig activiteiten buiten de deur 
ondernemen, zoals bezoek van vrienden, 
bioscoopbezoek, museumbezoek etc. 
- Regelmatige mantelzorg voor niet-huisgenoten 
(die niet via een organisatie is georganiseerd) 
- Individuele sporten zoals sportschool 
- Neemt deel aan activiteiten in georganiseerd 
verband maar minder dan 1 x per week 
- Regelmatig kerk/moskeebezoek (minimaal 1x 
per week) 
Level 2: Social contacts outside the 
Household
• Has physical contact with people who are not 
household members at least once a week 
AND
• these contacts do not occur in an organized 
context AND
• does not perform tasks with responsibilities to 
others (I.e., it is not work) AND
• these contacts are not restricted to contact with 
store clerks, workers etc.
 
Level 2 Examples:
- Meeting people like neighbors, neighbors
parents and friends of children
- Regular activities, including visits from friends, 
cinema, museum visits, etc.
- Regular care for non-household members (Not 
organized by an organization)
- Individual sports such as gym or fitness
- Participates in organized activities but less than 
1 x per week
- Regular church / mosque attendance (at least 
1x per week)
Noordijk Appendix L 234
Dutch English
Niveau 3: Deelname georganiseerde 
activiteiten 
• Neemt deel aan activiteiten in 
georganiseerd verband zoals verenigingen of 
opleidingen EN 
• voert geen taken uit met verantwoordelijkheden 
naar anderen (d.w.z. het is geen werk) EN 
• neemt minimaal eens per week deel aan die 
activiteit waarbij hij/zij in fysiek contact komt met 
anderen 
Voorbeelden niveau 3: 
- Volgen van een
inburgeringsaanbod, 
educatieaanbod of re-integratie-instrument zonder 
werkcomponent 
- Volgen van andere cursussen of opleidingen 
zonder werkcomponent 
- Lidmaatschap vereniging (regelmatig een 
activiteit volgen waarbij je in contact komt met 
andere mensen) 
- Regelmatige sport beoefenen in georganiseerd 
verband 
- Vrijwilligerswerk (minder dan 1x per week 
contact) 
 
Level 3: Participation in organized activities
• Participates in organized activities such as 
associations or training AND
• does not perform tasks with responsibilities to 
others (I.e., it is not work) AND
• take part in that activity in which he / she is in 
physical contact come with others at least once a 
week.
Level 3 Examples:
- Tracking a range of integration, offer education 
or rehabilitation tool without Work Component
- Tracking other courses or training
unemployed component
- Association Membership (regular activity
follow where you come into contact with other
people)
- Regular organized sport in link
- Volunteering (less than 1x per week contact)
 
Niveau 4: Onbetaald werk 
• Doet onbetaald werk; dat wil zeggen: 
• heeft geen arbeidscontract EN 
• voert taken uit en heeft daarbij 
verantwoordelijkheden naar anderen EN 
• heeft minimaal eens per week fysiek contact met 
anderen bij het uitvoeren van het onbetaalde 
werk.Voorbeelden niveau 4: 
- Werken met behoud van uitkering (Work First, 
participatiebanen e.d.) 
- Duale inburgeringstrajecten met een 
werkcomponent 
- Re-integratie-instrument met werkcomponent 
- Stages 
Level 4: Unpaid Work
• Doing unpaid work, ie:
• has no employment contract, 
AND
• performs tasks and thereby responsibilities to 
others AND
• has at least once a week physical contact with 
others when performing unpaid work.
 
Examples of level 4:
- Working with conservation benefits (Work First,
participation jobs e.d.)
- Dual integration programs with a Work 
Component
- Re-integration tool with work component
- Internships
- Volunteer work (at least 1 x per week contact)
- Bol-training (training course with occasional
internship)
- GIT-projects (Integrated Pathways - vocational 
training projects where a with training is combined 
with learning the Dutch language)
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Dutch English
Niveau 5: Betaald werk met ondersteuning 
• Heeft een arbeidscontract met een 
werkgever of is zzp’er en ontvangt daarbij 
ondersteuning, dat wil zeggen: 
• maakt gebruik van gemeentelijke 
participatie-instrumenten OF 
• ontvangt een aanvullende uitkering OF 
• werkt in WSW-verband (intern, 
gedetacheerd of begeleid werken) OF 
• volgt een reguliere opleiding met 
arbeidscomponent, onder het niveau van de 
startkwalificatie. 
Voorbeelden niveau 5: 
- WSW (intern/gedetacheerd/begeleid werken) 
- Werk (parttime) met aanvullende uitkering van 
gemeente of UWV 
- Werkt met loonkostensubsidie 
- Werk waarbij uitkering wordt verloond (o.a. 
bepaalde vormen van Work First) 
- Werk met apart ingekochte instrument nazorg 
waarbij sprake is van echte ondersteuning 
- Werk met externe begeleiding/jobcoach 
- Werk en volgt daarnaast een inburgeringsaanbod 
Level 5: Paid work supports
• Has a contract with a employer or SOHO and 
will then issue support, ie:
• uses municipal participation instruments OR
• receive an additional allowance OR
• work in connection WSW (internal, seconded or 
supported employment) OR
• follows a regular training labor component, 
below the level of the basic qualification.
 
Level 5 Examples:
- WSW (internal / seconded / supported 
employment)
- Work (part time) with additional payment of
municipality or the UWV
- Works with wage
- Work with distribution is verloond (inter alia
certain types of Work First)
- Work with separately purchased tool aftercare
involving real support
- Work with external assistance / job coach
- Work and follows also an integration range
- Work and follows also an educational offer
- Bbl training (four days working in a teaching 
facility and training days)
- Working with allowance and without 
supplementary benefit
Niveau 6: Betaald werk 
• Heeft een arbeidscontract met een 
werkgever of is zzp’er EN 
• ontvangt geen aanvullende uitkering van 
gemeente of andere uitkeringsinstantie 
EN 
• wordt niet door anderen dan 
leidinggevende of collega’s begeleid bij het 
uitvoeren van het werk EN 
• maakt geen gebruik van WSW of 
gemeentelijke participatie-instrumenten. 
Voorbeelden niveau 6: 
- Baan met arbeidscontract 
- Baan met arbeidscontract en pro forma nazorg1 
- Zzp’ers 
- Ondernemers 
 
 
Level 6: Paid work
• Has a contract with a
employer or SOHO and
• does not receive additional payment of
municipality or other benefits agency AND
• will not be other than
supervisor or colleagues assisted in
perform the work and
• does not use or WSW
municipal participation instruments.
 
Examples of Level 6:
- Course of employment
- Course of employment and pro forma nazorg1
- Self-employed
- Entrepreneurs
 
Noordijk Appendix L 236
